

## **Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition**

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
**Department of Humanities and Social Science  
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay**

**Lecture No. # 29**

**Phenomenal Consciousness-11**

In the last class, I have explained about phenomenal consciousness, qualia and quining qualia. And now, the important points; I will be explaining again in this lecture because the qualia is one of the important aspect of philosophy of mind and without proper explanation on qualia, it is very difficult to explain what is consciousness, and how conscious experience is explainable in terms of qualia. What you experience are realized in our brain, and then the qualities of experience will be neurological qualities. There is a debate about whether such quality is really in air, in object or whether they are simply subjective effects in the mind of the observer.


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According to the reductionists, qualia can be explained in terms of the neurophysiological events in the brain and its interactions with the environment.


For epiphenomenalism, qualia are causally dependent or 'supervenient' on the brain events, but cannot be directly identified with such events.

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According to the reductionists, qualia can be explained in terms of the neuro-physiological events in the brain and its interactions with the environment. For epiphenomenalism, qualia are causally dependent or 'supervenient' on the brain events, but cannot be directly identified with such events.

An epiphenomenalist account of mind is that mental states have no causal powers of their own, and that they are causally derived from the brain processes; however, for non reductionists, qualia have physical causes, but are real none the less because for dualism, if we see, qualia are independent of physics and autonomous in existence. The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experiences involve non physical properties.

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


It will depend on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being may yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have experiences of that being. Its basic underlying assumption is that, there is some knowledge about experience that can be acquired only by undergoing the relevant experience oneself.

For example, someone has knowledge about what is the character of phenomenal red color. Only by having a red color experience, he or she will get that kind of red color experience. Physical knowledge is not sufficient to know on the experience of the red color.


But according to Dennett, if you see, Dennett is one of the reductionist, and he has been arguing that we can **quain** qualia. Qualia can be quained on physical object and it can be explainable in teams of scientific way. And for him, there are no such things as qualia or the qualitative subjective experiences. He does not accept the reality of the qualia because he believes that qualia is the private experience of how things look like, and there is nothing in the mind which can be correspond to these qualities; a features of the mental states.

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Dennett writes that qualia are an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. And look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you- the particular, personal and subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale. These various properties of conscious experience are prime example of qualia.


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For him, qualia are supposed to be properties of a subject's mental states that are by definition ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehensible in consciousness, but such properties have absolutely no use in our understanding of consciousness. They are as good as non existence.

As he puts it that, I do not deny the reality of conscious experiences because conscious experiences has some properties, and these consciousness have properties in virtue of which those tests have the experimental content, and that qualias are supposed to be a special properties. But each claim was that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the way as qualia have been supposed to be special.

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
The qualitative experience, according to Dennett is that are the functional state of the brain. These are not different from what happens in the brain when the brain is stimulating by the external environment. Thus Dennett concludes that qualia do not exist.

Dennett; third person perspective relates qualia with the neuro physiological function of the brain; to say that our subjective experience of color ,beauty, etcetera embody, qualia is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. The brain states explains what sensation when we have first person experiences; whether qualia are private sense experiences can be publically lost by attaching a perfect neuro-scientific machine into human head.

In addition, that will certainly provide the causal explanation of the visual experiences which are called qualia. Thus this function is an approach of... Dennett proves that qualia are non-existent. It is because the mechanism is sufficient to explain how qualitative experiences occur according to inverted qualia. If qualia are defined broadly, as the properties characterizing what it is like to have conscious experiences, then their existence have to be denied.


Qualitative experiences are only the first person conscious experiences or the subjective attitude of experiencing things. Therefore, qualia belong to the first person point of view and the first person's ontology.

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
Here, according to professor Pradhan, he point out the mental life of man cannot be fully represented in mechanistic systems and that there are subjective mental states which need a first-person perspective for their proper understanding. Therefore, it is very difficult to explain qualia in the mechanistic way.

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
Now, we have to see the inverted qualia and other issues that are related to inverted qualia.

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
According to this, qualia; our conscious mental states have distinctive qualitative features. For example, a man has a visual experience of red color which differs qualitatively from the kind of experience he has when he looks at a green thing. Here, his experience of red and green things involves defined color qualia, but let us invert his color experience. Now he sees something different from what he used to see earlier.

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According to the inverted spectrum or inverted qualia argument, if our functional organizations were realized in a different physical substrate, a system may still have experience, but it would have a different kind of experience. A person, who sees something as red today, may see yellow tomorrow. Here the thing remains constant, but his color experience can vary from red to yellow.

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




In this case, the person's color experience is inverted in the experience that he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. He only describes his previous experience of red as that of yellow now. We cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the case of oneself and of others. A person's color experience can vary from seeing red to green. His experience is inverted in the sense that he sees something different from what he had seen earlier.


Qualia inversions would not possible if the conscious states would have been functionally state of the brain.

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In the case of consciousness, qualia inversion is possible because qualia are the properties of the mental states which cannot be ascribed to the physical and machine states. The machine functionalist's view about consciousness is that it must be rejected because conscious states are not physically states and because conscious states have qualia.

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


According to **Penagan**, inverted qualia are a problem primarily because they are **leased** to the unacceptable but the very possibility of inverted qualia challenges computational functionalism because the computational states cannot have any qualia.

For example, two people with red-green inversion have different inner lives. Such persons may be input-output equivalent, but they are not mentally equivalent. It is because, even if the two systems are mechanically equivalent, they do not have the same mental properties. Thus inverted qualia are an epistemic problem, even if they are not metaphysically problematic.

According to functionalists, state of a mind is functional states. There can be complete explanation of qualia without any reference to consciousness or conscious thought experiences.

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Functionalism is able to explain the qualia in terms of functional states of the brain, but not the inner or qualitative nature of our mental states. The problem for functionalism is that even if my spectrum is inverted related with yours, we remain functionally isomorphic with each other. My visual sensation is functionally identical with your visual sensation.

Therefore, they are the same type of states and it does not make sense to suppose that my sensation is really a sensation of green. If it meets the functional condition for being a sensation-of-red, then by definition, it is a sensation-of-red. According to functionalism, a spectrum inversion of the object described is ruled out by definition.

According to Shoemaker, in the case of inverted spectrum, there should be a systematic difference between the character of someone's color experience at the certain time and the character that same person's color experiences at another time.

Here, there is distinction between intra-subjective and inter-subjective. In both the case, qualia inversions are possible. For Shoemaker, the qualitative similarity and differences is well defined only for the intra-subjective case. It is considerable that two people have similar functional visual systems, but only the things that look red to one person, look green to the others.


If this spectrum inversion; the way things look is possible, but that cannot be given a functional descriptions. The way things look to a person is an aspect of that person's mental life. That cannot be **explicated** in purely functional terms.

If somebody finds yellow things more similar to orange things and lesser similar to blue things, other person finds just the opposite. For Shoemaker, in this intra-subjective inversion case, the color quality spaces of the two people should have the same structure that requires the same conditions. They make the same subjective of relative color similarity about the same visual objects; however, if one claims to have undergone spectrum inversions, then it is different to know about the change in his color experiences and his memory of how things apparent to him in the past.

Therefore, there is no answer to the questions how it intra-subjective inversions possible. We cannot comprehend the inverted experience of others. According to Shoemaker, the possibility of a spectrum inversions leads to skepticism about our ability to acquire knowledge, about the qualitative character of experiences of other person.

He writes that the behavioral evidence that establishes intentional similarities and differences between experiences of different person is not by itself sufficient to establish qualitative similarities and difference between such experiences.


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In the inverted spectrum case, we have two persons whose experiences are functionally and intentionally same, but qualitatively inverted. There are two kinds of content of experiences; one is intentional or representational content and the other is qualitative or sensational content. If my spectrum is inverted with respect to John's, then in the qualitative sense, red things look the same to me as green looks to John.


According to Ned block, if an inverted spectrum is possible, then experimental contents that can be expressed in public language. For example, looking red are not qualitative contents, but rather intentional contents. For Ned block, the intentional content of experience is functional. An experience has the intentional content of looking red if it functions in the right way; if it is caused by red things in right circumstances and used in thought about red things and actions with respect to red things rightly.

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
The functionalist argue that interpersonal case of interpersonal spectrum inversion, it is most implausible to suppose that the subjects concerned would really be functionally equivalent in respect of their color experiences. That means, there are causal relations between our color experiences and our emotional responses. There is no reason to think that the different physiological realizations of the experiences of red things involve any experiential differences.

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For example, the mental state like the experience of red has alternative physiological realization, and this is held to be just a case of alternative realizations of the very same experiences. Thus, if qualia inversion is possible, functionalism is false.

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Therefore, Ned block discusses a case of two persons whose experiences are qualitatively the same, but intentionally and functionally inverted in his inverted earth case. Inverted earth is just like earth, except that the colors around us change.

When one uses inverted spectrum spectacles, appearances changes, grass becomes red, sky becomes yellow and etcetera.


In addition, on this inverted earth, the color vocabulary is also inverted. They call their yellow sky blue; they are bright red grass green and so forth. Suppose mad scientist make John unconscious, inserted color inverting lenses in his eyes changes his body pigment to show that it will look normal to him upon awaking, and then move him to inverted earth. When he wakes on inverted earth, he notices no differences. Again Ned block says that what it is like for you to interact with the world and with other people does not change at all.

So, one has to see the things which are different from each other, but in the case of color experience or inverted color experience, if you see, either at those color experiences are kind of functional and intentional inversions together with the same qualitative contents and the converse of the inverted spectrum cases. This is enough to **refute** the functionally theory of a qualitative content and at the same time, to establish intentional and qualitative distinction.

According Ned block, our new linguistic and physical environment will eventually produce changes in the intentional content of our mental states. In time, our blue experience will be about yellow things, our red experiences will be about green things and so on. Just like the other inhabitation of the inverted earth.

According to Block's view, we will be intentionally and functionally inverted with respect to our former self, but our qualia will remain in inverted. Inverted hours also change representationalism; the view that qualia are just representational or intentional properties. On that view, blue experiences are equated with perceptual state that represented the blue things.

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


What David Chalmers; he argues that the absent-qualia hypothesis challenges not only functionalism, but also versions of physicalism. Just as a qualia-free functional duplicate of a conscious human being seems possible, a qualia-free physical duplicate seems possible.

Such creatures are known as phenomenal zombies. We cannot see any conscious experience in such a system. In this case, a zombie may have mind just like us, beliefs, desires, even pains functionally equivalent to us, but it would never enjoy mental states with qualitative character. Here the qualia are absent and there is a zombie externally identical to us, but lacking an inner life.



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Chalmers discusses that fading qualia as a positive argument against the possibility of absent qualia. A thought experiment is involved with the replacement of part of a brain by silicon chips. Here a system isomorphic; that is robot is a functionally same with a conscious system like a man with lacks consciousness experiences entirely and is made on silicon chips instead of neurons. Every neuron in the system has been replaced by chip and there are no biochemical mechanisms playing an essential role.


The system robot is processing the same inputs and behavior like human begins by hypnotizes. This is experiencing nothing at all. According to Chalmers, that fading qualia are logically possible because there is no contradiction in the distinction of system that is so wrong about its experiences. but logically possibility and naturally possibility are different things.

Chalmers dancing qualia is also on argument against the possibility of inverted qualia. In this case, the structural features of these system experiences are preserved throughout. There can be two functional isomeric systems in the same functional state, but having different experiences. This thought argument takes a silicon circuit and install it in a human beings head as a backup circuit. After the install, the switch can operate directly between the neural and silicon circuits. When often flipping the switch, the neural circuits become irrelevant and silicon circuits takes over.

Suppose somebody is having a red experience and his or her silicon isomer is having a blue experiences, when we flip the switch, that time his or her experiences was red. After the switch, he or she has a blue experiences. Chalmers describe the situation as what will happen then is that my experiences will change before my eyes, where I was once experience is red, now I will experience blue. All of a sudden, I will have a blue experience of the apple on my desk. We can even imagine keeping the switch back and forth a number of times so that the red and blue experiences dance before my eyes.


According to Chalmers, qualia are dependent not just on functional organization, but on a implementation details. It may well be that our qualia are in fact, dancing before our eyes all the times. Therefore, in dancing qualia, a functional isomorphic silicon system may experience blue where human beings experience red.

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Chalmers argues that though it is logically possible to have dancing qualia and fading qualia, it is not practically possible to have them. It follows that we have good reason to believe that the principle of organizational invariance is true, and that functional organization fully determines conscious experience.

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Functionalists and physicalists sometimes respond by challenging the coherence of the absent qualia hypothesis. For example, Shoemaker argues that a true functional duplicate of a conscious human must have introspective beliefs about its own sensory states, which in his view enters that some of its states have qualia. Another reply is to concede that the absent qualia hypothesis is coherent, but deny that it undermines functionalism or physicalism.

Here we can discuss **scrip** case view on necessity, according to whom water is H<sub>2</sub>O is metaphysically necessary truth which is found even if the laws of nature are different, yet the we know that the truth is only **a (( ))** . Conceptual reflection alone cannot reveal the meta physical impossibility of water existing without H<sub>2</sub>O. Likewise, the argument shows that conceptual reflection alone cannot reveal further absent qualia cases are physically possible.


This arguments depends on clear got distinction between the ordinary concept of water which is given by its superficial features and water itself; the essence of which consist in it molecular structure we have some subjective character of experience or raw feelings which involves something increasing; not reducible to behavior. For example, the red things which look red and our feelings of red are the way the red things appears to us. These appearances are the phenomenal properties of the things. These are also in our

subjective consciousness and as such, they make our color experiences. The phenomenal properties of color red are given only in the subjective consciousness.

The raw feelings are inducing in a certain sense in which the character of an individual's raw feeling is logical independent of its relation to external things. Raw feelings is in our in a special way. In the other words, raw feelings are subjectivity. These are involved in all verities of sensation and conscious perceptual experience, dreaming, after imagining, etcetera.

The frames of qualia argue that there are qualitative feature of consciousness that are inter subjective understandings; the conscious states which constitutes our mind have some features like being experienced. These types of aspect of our consciousness cannot be studied by the brain sciences. This subjective aspect can be studied only by the phenomenology of the psychological states which is known as the qualitative features of consciousness.


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The first-person point of view only takes the mental states as belonging to a person from his or her subjective point of view. The raw feelings of our consciousness are ontologically real, because they are the ultimate qualitative objects which make up the phenomenal mind.

The qualia constitute the essence of consciousness and are intrinsic to the conscious subjects. Functionalism fails to explain our color experience. In case of spectral inversions, there is no difference in functional terms between my color experiences and that of others. In the aspect of color experience, we are functionally equivalent. Thus it means that my color experience and other experience would exhibit exactly the same pattern of causal relation to environmental states and the other mental states are behavioral. After all, they would have exact with the same causal role; however, our color experiences have the most striking feature of qualitative characters.


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Lastly, we cannot doubt the fact that other human beings can see colors differently. Even in our own case, we may see colors differently in different situations. Therefore, both the intra-subjective and inter-subjective quale inversions are possible, and we can always imagine what could account to our present color experience in different situations. This inversion is possible because we have all the relevant conceptual resources to think of the inverted qualia.

A theory of subjective consciousness gains its motivation from that need to explain the heterogeneous qualitative character of our mental life. Thus our knowledge or awareness of our qualia could not constitute by any of the physical processes occurring in us. The similar processes would occur in beings that are physical just like us, yet completely lack consciousness.

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


Now, we have to see quinning qualia. Can qualia quinned on the physical object? As we know that qualia are the increasing quality of the conscious experiences, for example, the experience of tasting a sweet is very different from that of watching movie because both of these have a different qualitative character of experience. This shows that there are different qualitative features of conscious experience. That is why; we cannot derive the pleasure of eating sweets by watching movies and vice versa.

As **salmers** writes that mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in the mental states. To put it in another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feeling; that is, an associated quality of experience. These qualitative fields are also known as phenomenal qualities or qualia for short.


But functionalist like Dennett have argued for eliminating qualia from the discourse of mind. The basic reason for them is that mind is a machine; it cannot entertain the so called qualitative subjective experience called qualia.

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
According to Dennett, qualia are supposed to be properties of subjects that are ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly or indirectly appraisable in consciousness.

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Qualia are ineffable because one cannot say exactly what way one is currently seeing, tasting, smelling and so forth. Why qualia are ineffable is that they are intrinsic properties, which seems to imply inter alia that they are somehow atomic and unanalogable. Since they are simply, there is nothing to get hold of when trying to describe such property.

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
Since qualia are ineffable and intrinsic, qualia are private because all interpersonal comparisons of these of appearing are systematically impossible.

Lastly, since they are properties of experiences, qualia are directly accessible to the consciousness because qualia are properties of one's experiences with which one is immediately apprehensible in consciousness.

Thus qualia constitute the phenomenal structure of the mind in that they enrich our understanding of the mind, and also provide clues to the ontology of the mental... For the mental, ultimately is as distinguished from the physical is to be known from what the qualia reveals about mind. Therefore, the qualia play a very important role in the understanding of mind.



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
The important question is here is that is Dennett right in calling qualia the private and in ineffable experiences of queer a sort? Obviously, not.

As Pradhan argued that the notion of privacy as we know from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the qualia in the sense that the qualia are intersubjectively intelligible and that they are available for inter-personal communications. The qualia of color experience are such that any two persons belonging to the same linguistic community can easily communicate their color experience and can understand each other well. This shows that the qualia, in spite of being subjective, are not private at all. As to their affability or otherwise, it goes without saying that they are expressible in an interpersonal language; that is, the reason why they are accessible to all speakers if they are suitably placed.

Thus Dennett's men argument that the qualia are in accessible to all except to this object of the qualia does not hold a good because if you see Dennetts argument that qualia are atomistic and non relation, **i is equally** with further is in that the subjective experience need not be atomistic at all because they can be taken as constituting this stating of consciousness in that they constitute a single unbroken series of conscious experiences. In this sense, the qualia are holistic rather than atomistic. The fact of the matter is that the qualia never exist is isolation, and they are always in constellations. For example, the

color experience of a red rose is not only that of the color red is that of color red, but also of the rose plant of certain shape and size.

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
Here the two experiences do not stand apart, but constitute one whole. But Dennett is skeptical about reality of the qualia because he believes qualia to be the private experiences and there is nothing in the mind that can correspond to these qualitative features of the mental states. According to him, the qualitative features are the appearances of the brain states which in reality, are the functional state of the brain.

Dennett argues against qualia because for him, the brain functions as machines. The brain performs multiple functions; that is, to say that all varieties of thought or all mental activities are accomplished in the brain by parallel multi track processes of interpretations and elaboration of sensed inputs. That is why; this model of mind is called the multiple draft model which I have already explained.

In Dennett's language, according to the multiple draft model, all varieties of perceptions, indeed all varieties of thought or mental activities are accomplished in the brain by parallel multi track processes of interpretations and elaboration of sensor inputs. The nature of the mind under this model is (( )) in the cognitive processes which the mind undertakes.

For Dennett, the mind turns out to be a computing machine programmed to scope with the cognitive representations of the world. For machine functionalist liking the structure of the mind is the structure of the machine representations. Therefore, in this respect, there is no place for the subjective qualia among the mechanical state of the mind.

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Now, the question is that, can the qualia be made a part of the third-person perspective? Dennett's reductionist program is fully committed to the reducibility of the qualia to brain-state. However, this can be opposed on the ground that the qualia are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the brain because the brain is a physical system though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is not reducible to the brain in the sense that brain itself belongs to the subject. Our conscious mental states have different conscious experiences.

For example, a man can see something as red today, but tomorrow he may see the same as green; that is, the thing remaining the same, a man's color experience can vary from seeing red to seeing green. In this case, the person's color experience under goes an inversion in the sense that he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. Here, that man is not only identifying the same object rather they systematically goes on describe his previous experience of red as that of green now. Therefore, we cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the case of oneself and of others.


The qualia inversion does not entail the physicalistic and the machine functionalist notion of consciousness because qualia inversion would not be possible if the conscious state would have been functional state of the brain. The qualia inversion cannot be ascribed to the physical and the machine states. Therefore, the functionalist according to consciousness must be rejected on the ground that consciousness or conscious states are not physical states because conscious states have qualia.

As I have mentioned earlier, there is a first person in dimension of the conscious states; in that only from the first person point of view. Point of view can be understood the conscious states. The first person point of view is such that it takes the mental state as belonging to a person from his or her subjective point of view.

In this connection, we can mention Searle's view that the first person perspective provides an ontological state to the subjective mental state. John Searle says that ontological objectivity is not an essential that essential trait of science. If science is of suppose to give an account of how the world works and if subjective state of conscious are part of the world, then we should sit and epistemically or object account of an ontological subjective reality. The reality of the subjective states of consciousness, but Searle does argue here is that we can have an epistemological objective science of domain that is ontological subjectivity.

Therefore mental subjects are subjecting at in the epistemological science of being non-exclusively by the subject, but in the ontological sense that they are essential, revealed only to the subject.

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Functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because functional organism is not simply a matter of sensory inputs, transition from one state to another, and motor outputs. Semantic externalism refers to the content of our words and thoughts which is partly determined by our relation with things in environment.

A robot which has a program encoded into its system does not have any relation to the external environment. What now mean is letter writing as rejected the computational view of mind on the ground that the literal Turing machine like the robot would not give representations of the psychology of the human being and animals.

For him, functionalism is wrong in holding the thesis that propositional attitude is just like computational state of the brain. For example, to believe that there is a cat on mat is not the same thing as that there is one physical state or a computational state believing that there is a cat on the mat. Then the question is whether these semantic and the propositional attitudes properties and relations are reducible to physical computational properties and relations. This is impressive because the propositional attitudes refer to the intentional state that is, to say that it is a refer to various state of facing the world.

For example, if I say that John will go to New Delhi from Hyderabad, this statement refers to many attitudes, and it cannot be realized computationally. Thus according to Patnam, the functionalist is wrong in saying that semantic or propositional attitudes predicates are semantically reducible to computational properties. There is no reason


why the study on human cognition requires that we try to reduce cognition either to computation or to brain processes.

We may while succeeded to discovery theoretically models of the brain which (( )) increase our understanding of how the brain works, but if we will reduce the human mind into brain, it is no way help us in understanding the mind .therefore, functionalism fails to account for the real nature of the mental study because of its unsuccessful attempts to reduce mental state to the machine state.

It fails as a theory of mind because of its **reductions dogma**, and it makes mind meanings less in the universe. It also fails to explain how consciousness is possible. Therefore, the mechanistic theory of mind does not have any positive or possible answer to the question how qualia are necessary feature of consciousness.

There are mechanistic model of mind like artificial intelligence that offers large functionality view of mind fails to explain how consciousness is possible. We conclude that in this lectures, mechanistic explanation of qualia is not sufficient in explaining the consciousness. These theses follow from the conviction that we cannot convince of consciousness unless we view it as having raw feelings.

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Therefore, there are two aspects thesis this thesis; Epistemological and the Metaphysical. Epistemological; the subject of consciousness intimately knows the raw feelings.

Metaphysically speaking; however, the raw feelings are real in the sense that they are part of the furniture of the mental world. Therefore, it is very difficult to explain qualia in the mechanistic way. Therefore, qualia are conscious experiences.

Thank you.