

## **Indian Philosophy**

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**Module No. # 05**

**Lecture No. # 16**

### **The Nyaya Philosophy**


Welcome viewers. Today we will be discussing in continuation to the last class. Last class, we have concluded by saying that, that how Naiyayikas treats knowledge under the epistemological purview. Now, this class, we will be discussing that, how Naiyayikas considers the knowledge under the metaphysical perspectives. We will be discussing Naiyayikas' view and after that, we will be saying that, knowledge are of which types and when you say that, the types of knowledge, what we mean, it **what** is the representative cognition; what is representative cognition; what is valid cognition what is invalid cognition. So, all these things, today we will be discussing.

Again, I am saying, just to remind you further what we have discussed in the last class in a one line. That last class we said that, according to Naiyayikas, knowledge stands out in relation to some object; if you say that knowledge, it means that, your knowledge relates to some of the objects in the empirical world; therefore, Naiyayikas are a realist. Now, in the metaphysical perspective, the question asked that, whether knowledge is a relation or not; whether knowledge is an substance or not; whether knowledge is an attribute or not; whether knowledge is a mode or an activity. So, all this questions attempted by Naiyayikas, and one after another, they have given the explanation that, whether knowledge can be a mode or activity; whether knowledge can be a relation or not; whether knowledge can be a substance or an attribute.

The first they said that, knowledge is an activity because it is activity of mind. If mind is not alert, if you are not in a conscious stage, whatever you cognize, you cannot cognize the object properly; you cannot even cognize the object with all its features. Therefore, knowledge is an activity; it is a mental activity, because it is a mind which takes the

responsible for cognizing the object as it is and also, later, recapitulate the object if it is encountered, in that kind of object in future. Therefore, it is a mental activity when you cognize an object.

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**Metaphysical Perspective**

- ❖ Is it a mode or an activity?
- ❖ Is it a relation?
- ❖ Is knowledge a substance or an attribute?

**ACTIVITY**

- ❖ Knowledge must be a kind of activity- mental activity
- ❖ Knowledge is not a reflection of objects of the mind which receives them passively like a mirror or reflector.
- ❖ It is a process in which the mind actively reaches out to objects and illuminates them.




Therefore, they said that, it is a mental activity. Further, they said that, when you say that mental activity, knowledge cannot be attained by just having the passive mind; what they mean is that, knowledge is not a reflection of objects, of the mind which receives them passively, like a mirror or reflector. It is saying that, if you say that knowledge is a mental activity, then, mind should be active; mind should be alert; mind should be conscious. It is not the case that, mind will be like a mirror and once the mind have a contact with the object and the mind can able to cognize that object. It is not so. Like in a mirror, if you stand in front of a mirror, your face can be immediately reflected. Therefore, they are saying that, do not consider mind as a mirror; that means, whenever there is an object presented before the mind, mind will cognize that object. Therefore, they submit that, mind is an active mind, when you are alert, when you are aware, when you are conscious. Then, if mind relates contact with the object, then only mind receive the knowledge about that object.

So, therefore, you find that, the active mind, it is responsible for cognizing an object. Therefore, they said that, it is a process in which the mind actively reaches out to objects


and illuminates them. If the mind is passive, the knowledge that we gain cannot be considered as a valid knowledge.

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- ❖ Alexander is a realist treats knowledge as a mental act.
- ❖ He says, "Every experience may be analyzed into two distinct elements and their relation to one another; namely the act of mind or awareness and the object of which we aware, and that one is an---ing & the other an---ed".
- ❖ Naiyayikas reject this by stating that the act theory of knowledge as a grammatical prejudice & excludes knowledge from the category of action.
- ❖ What is the nature of this activity?


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Before moving to the second question, whether knowledge is a relation or not, there are few point that you must know, that there is a scholar known as Alexander, who is a realist. He said that, **that** knowledge is a mental act and for him, every experience may be analyzed into two distinct elements and their relation to one another, namely the act of mind or awareness and the object of which we aware and that one is an i n g form and the other one e d form. What Alexander meant here is that, he is saying that, when mind actively contact with that object, this is in the process to cognize the object. Once mind receive that object in a full form, then, he or she cognize that object; that means, one is the process involving for **cognize the**, cognizing the object and the second one, after cognition of the object. Therefore, he put in a grammatical form, one is i n g form, which is in a very continuous; another is e d form, which means after cognition; that means, you have already cognized that object. In this case, Naiyayikas put a counter argument by saying that, Alexander try to confuse with the grammatical prejudice of the notion cognition and cognize.

Further, they said that, by stating the act of theory of knowledge as a grammatical prejudice and excludes knowledge from the category of action. What they said that, Alexander, whatever way of explaining the process and the product, that means, the

process where the mind is relating to the object and after that, cognizing that object. This process and product, Naiyayikas rejects it and said that, the act of theory of knowledge is grammatical prejudices. And further said, by doing so, by putting this thing in a grammatical prejudices manner, it excludes knowledge from the category of action. Because, according to Naiyayikas, what is the nature of this activity? They said that, if mind is an active and relate to the object and cognize that object; if this is so, what is the nature of activity? The mind, really act here with all alertness, but what is the nature of activity. So, there they said that, the nature of activity cannot be a physical activity like motion or like movement. Further, they said that, it neither can be a physical activity nor can be a mental activity. Because, at all if you consider the knowledge is an mental activity, then, the whole question still remains that, any activity happens in the mind is not very true or valid.

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- ❖ It can't be any kind of physical activity like motion, force.
- ❖ The existence of any activity in the mind or consciousness is a highly questionable fact.

**Relation**

- ❖ Two elements- for relation
- ❖ Although the relation between the subject and the object takes the form of knowledge, but knowledge itself is not a relation.


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What Naiyayika said that, it cannot, the knowledge cannot be any kind of physical activity like motion and force. The existence of any activity in the mind or consciousness is highly questionable fact; that means, they first reject the physical ground. They said that, this cognition or the knowledge, you cannot consider as a physical activity like force or motion. However, you cannot even consider as a mental activity; because, the existence of any activity in the mind; because, we cannot see what is happening in our mind while cognizing an object. Therefore, they claim that, any activity happening in our

mind while cognizing an object is highly questionable fact. Therefore, Naiyayikas refute the first statement or the first question saying that, knowledge cannot be an activity.

Further, said that, further they attempt to answer the question, whether knowledge relation or not. They say that, it is the subject and object, when they relates with each other or connects with each other, then, the knowledge emerges; that means, the subject, the cognizer able to cognize the object which supposed to be cognized; that means, in one hand, there is a cognizer and another hand, there is a cognition and the third step, there is a process, where cognizer able to cognize the object. He is saying that, here subject and object involved for emerging a knowledge; however, knowledge itself is not relation. So, in this ground Naiyayikas rejects that, knowledge cannot be a relation.

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**Quality**


- ❖ As physical qualities are perceived by our sense organs, in the similar way, knowledge can be perceived by our *mind* (manas) as the special sense organ.
- ❖ Thus, knowledge can be considered as quality.
- ❖ Whose quality is this?
- ❖ Is this the quality of body, mind, senses, or something other than these?
- ❖ Naiyayikas said, it is not the quality of body
- ❖ It is not the quality of mind, because through mind knowledge can be perceived & mind is nothing but the combination of body and senses.

The third question remains, a Naiyayikas attempts the third question, saying that, as our physical qualities perceived by our sense organs, in the similar way, knowledge can be perceived by our mind as the special sense organs. Here, Naiyayikas very clearly mentioned, they say that, **that** as our sense organs involved for cognizing an external object, for cognizing an object and its external qualities or accidental qualities, in the same way, mind is a special sense organ; however, they never say, it is an sixth sense organs or it is an internal sense organ; they said mind is a special sense organs, can cognize the knowledge.

However, here knowledge cannot be the quality of mind, because, it is through mind the cognition of knowledge is possible. Therefore, knowledge cannot be the quality of mind. Then, question arises that, now, we, Naiyayikas claiming that, knowledge can be a quality because, it is known through the mind, like, we know many things through our senses experiences and we know the things because of their qualities. Therefore, they are saying that, it is through mind, we know there is a knowledge; however, the knowledge cannot be a quality of mind. Then, question arises, whose quality is this, if knowledge cannot be a quality of mind, is it a quality of body or is it a quality of sense organs or is it a quality of something other than this.

At first, they, **they** clearly rejected knowledge cannot be a quality of mind. Then, the question arises can knowledge be a quality of body? Then, there they says that, body is subject to born and subject to death; subject to start and subject to end; that means, body perishes after some time, but the knowledge remains as it is. Therefore, knowledge cannot be the quality of body, because once body dies, then, knowledge suppose to die, if the knowledge will be a quality of the body. So, therefore, they say that, knowledge cannot be the quality of body. Further, they said, knowledge cannot be the quality of our sense organs, because, different sense organs involve differently for cognizing an object. Then, how this quality will be responsible or how this quality will be addressed in different sense organs differently for, **for** cognizing the different objects.

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- ❖ For Naiyayikas, knowledge is the quality of immaterial and conscious substance known as '*soul*'.
- ❖ Knowledge appears as the result of the relation between the soul and the body.

**Classification of Knowledge**

- ❖ Naiyayikas: Knowledge is of two types
- ❖ Anubhava (Presentative cognition)
- ❖ Smruti (Memory or representative cognition)
- ❖ The objects are directly presented- anubhava
- ❖ The objects are indirectly recalled- smruti
- ❖ All knowledge mayn't be treated as valid knowledge
- ❖ Valid knowledge= yathārtha

Therefore, the same quality cannot be found in a different form. They reject the question by saying that, that knowledge cannot be the quality of sense organs. Therefore, they submit that, knowledge is the quality of soul. They explain that, knowledge is the quality of immaterial and conscious substance known as soul; that means, they define soul as an immaterial and conscious substance, because, first they say that, whenever you talk about a knowledge, whenever we talk or discuss about a knowledge, it relates to an object; it stands out for an object. So, therefore, they say that, soul is a substance, a substance of immaterial and conscious, where knowledge remains. Therefore, they say that, knowledge is a quality of the substance soul and soul for them, is an immaterial and consciousness.


Further, they said, knowledge appears as a result of the relation between the soul and the object; the soul and the body. They explain it clearly. They said that, we need five components to have a knowledge of an object. The first is that, we need a soul. Then, soul relates to the mind; then, mind relates to the body; then, body relates to the sense organs and the sense organs relate to the object for cognizing that object. And, all this process involved in all the times for cognizing an object. Therefore, knowledge emerges. Therefore, we the human being say that, we attain knowledge or we accumulate knowledge or we achieve knowledge. What happens? The soul relates to the mind and mind connects to the body and body has a sense organ and sense organs contact to the object. As a result, again, it is a reverse form, try to analyze the features of the object and henceforth, cognizing the object in its full form. In this way, we, the human beings cognize the object. So, this is the way Naiyayikas treat knowledge under the metaphysical perspectives.

Now, we will see classification of knowledge and how they classified knowledge. For them, knowledge are of two types - one is Anubhava, that is presentative cognition. What they mean is, presentative means, when an object is presented before the cognizer and the cognizer able to cognize that object, it is a presentative. Therefore, they say that, it is a Anubhava. A cognizer can cognize an object which is presented before him or her. In this case, they said that, this is a presentative in nature. Further, they said that, there are representative cognition also there; that means, it is a smṛiti or memory; that means, we able to recapitulate what we had experience, say some times back or some years back or some decades back; if we could able to recapitulate it in its original form, in the same

way that we had seen or experienced in the past, then, we find that, all these experiences relate to that reality or relate to the phenomenal world and henceforth, our cognition will be a valid one.

I repeat, according to Naiyayikas, there are two types of cognition - one is presentative; another is representative. The presentative, where the cognition or the cognized object is presented before the cognizer and the second one is representative cognition, where it is because of our mind, we are able to recapitulate some of the memory of the past events, in the way we had experienced in the first; if you are able to do that, then, both presentative and representative knowledge will be valid one.

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**Classification of Knowledge**


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- ❖ Valid knowledge = yathārtha



Therefore, they said that, the objects are directly presented in case of Anubhava, whereas, the objects are indirectly recalled in smruti. However, they strongly claim that, all knowledge may not be treated as valid knowledge, because, we find that many times or many of the situations where we cognize the object, where our cognition is not a valid one; mistakenly we cognize rope as a snake; however, it is a cognition. Therefore, Naiyayika said that, though we cognize many things, however, all cognition cannot be valid cognition. Therefore, they said that, valid knowledge is known as yathartha and invalid knowledge is called ayathartha.




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- ❖ Valid presentative knowledge- Pramā
- ❖ Invalid presentative knowledge- apramā
- ❖ A knowledge is valid only when there is the right apprehension of an object or 'yathārthānubhava'.
- ❖ Thus, in order to be valid, a knowledge must correspond to the reality.
- ❖ A valid knowledge is the manifestation of the object as it is.
- ❖ Knowledge is presentational in character but not valid (ayathārthānubhava).

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And now, we will see, how they explain these are the terms. Valid presentative knowledge, presentative knowledge is Anubhava; that means, the object is presented before the cognizer and if the cognizer able to cognize that object in its full form, it is valid presentative knowledge; it is known as Prama. But there are many situation, where the object is presented before the cognizer and the cognizer not able to cognize the real nature of the objects in its full form. Therefore, here we find, it is a presentative in nature, but not the valid cognition. Therefore, they say that, invalid presentative knowledge is known as aprama. A knowledge is valid only when there is the right apprehension of object or yatharthanubhava. If you see that yathartha, anubhava; now, you mix this two terms; yathartha means a valid knowledge; anubhava means which is presentation, the presentative knowledge. The first one is valid and presentative; then, the individual or cognizer can have apprehension to that object. And if this so, you say that, your knowledge about that object is a valid one or say Prama. So, therefore, they say that, Prama is the valid presentative knowledge and aprama is the invalid; however, it is a presentative knowledge.


Now, further they said, in order to be valid knowledge, one must correspond to the reality of the objects; because, Naiyayikas are realist; because, anything can be explained, is explained through logically and also correct thoughts, and also able to cognize; whenever you cognize the object in empirical world, it should be very concrete; it should, we should cognize the object in its full form. Therefore, they said, in order to

have a valid knowledge one must correspond to the reality; that means, the object should find in the reality. A valid knowledge is the manifestation of object as it is. If you identify a glass of water as a glass of water, without any further identification, then, your knowledge will be the valid knowledge and that valid knowledge is the manifestation of the object, because, it manifests the glass of water.

Further, they said, knowledge is presentational in character, but not valid; that, I have already said, how is yatharthanubhava; that means, the object is presented before the cognizer and the cognizer not able to cognize the object with some or other barriers. Therefore, the knowledge that he or she generates on that object is known as yatharthanubhava; that means, is a presentational character, but not valid. Now, if this is so, something is presented for us and we could not able to cognize that object and henceforth, our knowledge about that object cannot be considered as valid, and therefore, Naiyayikas say that, if this kind of knowledge one accumulate, it is called as Aprama or invalid knowledge. And under Aprama, they said there are three types of knowledge; one is doubt; another is error; the third one is Tarka or hypothetical arguments; people also said, Tarka means hypothetical reasoning.

Now, we will be discussing what happens when somebody is in doubt and how doubt arises and when somebody doubts, whether cognition occur in concrete form or not. What happened in case of a error, and how Tarka will be considered under the Aprama.

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## Nyāya - Apramā

- ❖ The Nyāya School: apramā – Not- valid presentative knowledge.
- ❖ Apramā includes three types of knowledge:
  - ❖ Doubt (Samsaya)
  - ❖ Error (Viparyaya)
  - ❖ Tarka (Hypothetical Arguments)


**DOUBT**

- ❖ It is an indecisive cognition.
- ❖ It is the oscillation of mind between certain positions.
- ❖ The cognizer is unable to decide about the content of the cognition.
- ❖ There are four arguments, as a result doubt arises.



Now, first, we will be talk about the doubt. Doubt is an indecisive cognition; that means, the object will be presented before the cognizer and cognizer will be in a dilemma to cognize that object, because the cognizer not able to identify all the features of that object. Henceforth, it is the cognizer, identify the object, some other form, where the object is not; it is the oscillation of mind between certain positions; that means, the two things have the same features and the cognizer not able to cognize that object in this concrete form; cannot give a particular name of that object. Therefore, he is in a dilemma; the cognizer is unable to decide about the content of the cognition. There are four arguments. As a result, doubt arises. As I said that, doubt arises, because, the cognizer not able to identify the objects in its fullest form; because, in his or her mind some other content involved. Therefore, he or she is in a dilemma to identify that object with a particular name. Henceforth, the knowledge about that object is not a valid one.


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Now, what happens in case of a doubt. Something is presented before the cognizer. Some object is presented before the cognizer. The second step, cognizer is not able to decide the cognition, because, certain alternatives are equally forcing the cognizer to cognize the object. Whenever the cognizer try to cognize that object, certain other forces, alternative forces, imposing him or her to cognize that object differently with a different name. As a result, it finds in the form of interrogation. When certain alternatives are equally forcing the cognizer to cognize that object, it is resulted in the form of interrogation.

For example, whenever a cognizer able to cognize a rope which is lying before him or her, in that time, he or she finds that, the same kind of features he finds in kind of snake. Therefore, he or she is confusing, whether that object is a rope or a snake, because, the feature of rope and the feature of snake more or less similar, and many times overlapping with each other. Therefore, the cognizer not able to cognize the object, because of the oscillation of mind, for taking a particular situation; that how really to cognize that object when both the contents are overlapping with each other and as a result, the doubt arises. Here, you can see that, there is a presentational knowledge, but the knowledge is not valid. Therefore, the doubt comes under Aprama, according to Naiyayikas. I have given an example; the snake and the rope are alike; as a result, we are in a position of doubt to cognize the object.

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Now, doubt arises because of five reasons. Doubt is based on the common properties. I said, what is the common properties. There are few common properties you find, snake as well as with rope. Therefore, the cognizer not able to take a decision, whether that object which is lying before him or her is can be called a rope or a snake. It is because of the common properties. Because of the common properties shiningness, we many times confuse that, whether the object is a shell or a silver, though it will be presentative in its nature, though it will be lying before us. So, because of common property also, doubt arises.

Sometimes, because of peculiar qualities of an object also doubt arises. For example, if you take the quality sound, sound which you hear, right. If you take the quality sound, now, sound cannot be the quality of the substance, say eternal substance, neither can be a quality of a non eternal substance. I repeat sound is a quality, cannot come from the eternal substance nor from the non-eternal substance; eternal substance like soul, spirit, god and non-eternal substance like chair, table, pen, etcetera. So, therefore, being the peculiar qualities of the ether or akasha, it really causes the doubt that, where sound comes from and which quality is this, and what is the substance where we find sound is quality.

So, in this case also, the cognizer not able to cognize, from which substance the sound comes from. So, therefore, there is a doubt and hence, though it is presentative, though you can hear the sounds, but still, we cannot make out from which substance it comes from. Therefore, we are in a doubt. The third point we have mentioned here is that, doubt is based on the conflicting testimony. Doubt also arises because of the conflicting testimony; different people given different opinion on a particular issue. As a result, the cognizer is not able to decide about the cognition. Take an example. Let us take Upanishads. Different Upanishads, say Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Taittiriya Upanishad, Isha Upanishad, Chandogya Upanishad, there are so many Upanishads, right. Different Upanishads has a different opinion on the concept atman. If this is so, then the cognizer or the human being cannot able to describe or identify what is the true nature of atman and who is the atman. So, here doubt arises.


The fourth step, I said, doubt also is based on irregularity of perception; that means, lack of uniformity. You do not find the same thing in all the places. For example, if there is a water in a tank, you can identify, water in a pond you can identify, but if you see in a long distance, there is a mirage; you think that, this may be the water or this may be the mirage; because, whenever you think about the water, the concept mirage or the attribute of the mirage comes to your mind. And, whenever you think of the mirage, the attribute of the water comes to your mind. Therefore, you are in a dilemma to claim about that object, to identify that object with its true nature. It just happens because of the lack of uniformity.

The fifth point that I said, the doubt is based on the irregularity of non-perception. What we mean here is that, what Naiyayikas rather means here is that, that there are many

things exist, but we cannot perceive that. For example, every tree survive because of there is a water in the root, but we cannot see whether water exist in the root of a tree or not; what we see, only is the root. Here, it is the lack of non-uniformity of the nature. Because, whenever a tree grows, we need to pour the water in a root; that means, water is the basic element the root needed for the survival of the tree, but however, in this case, we could not cognize the water in the root which is there in the soil; but still, we infer that, there may be the cases, water is there; therefore, the tree survives. Therefore, you can find the green leaves in the tree.


Henceforth, in this situation, though the human being, though the cognizer not able to cognize the object, the water in the root, still in a dilemma, saying that, whether water exist in that or not; because if water does not exist, then, the tree cannot survive; and if at all water exist, then, it cannot be seen. In this case, it is a dilemma arises, for in the case of a cognizer; cognizer not able to take a particular decision while cognizing that object. The cognizer are not sure to cognize that object with a particular name, because the two alternative features equally forcing him to cognize an object different, with different name. As a result, the cognizer not able to cognize that object and in this way, doubt arises. Henceforth, doubt are presentational in nature, but it is a invalid.

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**Error**

- ❖ Error is the inverse of valid knowledge.
- ❖ In this case, an object is cognized as having certain characteristics those really fall outside of its being.
- ❖ Thus, it is a wrong apprehension, in which the object is taken for what it is not.
- ❖ All error is subjective.
- ❖ In error, the content of cognition is misplaced.
- ❖ Error lies in the determinate cognition.
- ❖ The object exists elsewhere is predicated on sensation.

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
Further, we will see error. What happens in error? Error is a inverse of valid knowledge. In case of an error, an object is cognized as having certain characteristics those really fall

outside of its being. And, all error is subjective; what they mean is that, in case of a error, you cognize an object and you found that, the features by that which you cognize that object, which are not there with this object; these features are found in some other places, with some other object; and this is the situation where error lies. For example now, you cognize a rope as a snake by attributing all the features of the snake to the rope. Now, later you find that, this is not a rope, because, you know that, the features that you have imposed on that object, on the rope and as a result you cognize a snake, which is not a correct one. So, therefore, in case of an error, what happens? We cognize an object with certain features and later, we say that, 'oh my God, these features are not found in that object; as a result the object may not be named as the so and so; it has a different name'.

In the case of rope and snake, you find that, the attribute of a snake you imposed on the object rope and henceforth, you cognize that object as a snake; and later, you rectify. This is your error, because you cognize a rope as a snake. What happens here that, because, you know the attributes of the snake and somehow, the object rope appears similar to the snake, you impose all the quality or attribute of a snake on the rope. As a result, you are in a confusion state or you cognize that object wrongly. So, therefore, all error are subjective; because, in case of error, the cognizer already cognize the object with some name, but in case of doubt, the cognizer not able to given even a correct name of that cognition, because he is in dilemma to cognize the object with this name or that name.

So, therefore, all error are subjective, because it is, **it is** because of the cognizer, he or she cognizes the object differently because, he or she attributed some of this quality of an object which is not there in front of him or her; however, he or she imposes those qualities on that object which is present before him or her. So, this is all about the error and if you see that, in error also, it is presentational in character; the object is presented before the cognizer and, **and** in addition to that, the cognizer fails to cognize the object as it is. So, therefore, error also comes under Aprama, as an invalid knowledge.

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## Tarka

- ❖ Tarka is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any argument.
- ❖ We ask whether any contradiction would follow if the given conclusion is accepted as true or rejected as false.
- ❖ If we find any contradiction by accepting the conclusion as true, then the argument is invalid.
- ❖ If we reject the conclusion as false and found contradiction, then the argument must have been valid.

NPTEL

Now, Tarka is the last. Tarka or hypothetical arguments, people say even hypothetical reasoning. Now, we will see that, how Tarka **can be** comes under Aprama or invalid knowledge. Here, saying that, it is a presentational in nature, but it is invalid. Because, Tarka is an argument; is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any argument. Whenever there is an argument, we try to validate, whether the argument is a valid or not. We see, whether the conclusion is supported to the given premise or not. In this case, the question arises here, because in an argument we find few propositions; and the conclusion is derived based on the propositions taken together.


Here, the question arises, whether any contradiction would follow if the given conclusion is accepted as true or rejected as false. I am putting the question further. The question arises in case of argument that, whether any contradiction would follow if the given conclusion is accepted as true or rejected as false; that means, if you accept that as true and you find that, with your acceptance, that you accept that the conclusion is true, in the same time, you find there is a contradiction in the argument; then, the argument is invalid.

But if you claim that, if you reject that the conclusion as a false, that you find there is a contradiction in the argument, then, you simply claim that, the argument must have been valid. If you would not have **been** reject the conclusion as a false, the argument have




been valid. So, therefore, all things are presented before the cognizer, but the cognizer not able to really identify whether the conclusion is valid or not. He is saying that, if you accept the conclusion is true or conclusion is valid and you found that, there is a contradiction in the argument then, the whole argument will be invalid; but if you reject the conclusion is false and found contradiction in the argument, then, the whole argument must have been valid. So, this is the way they put doubt as a (()), error as a (( )) and Tarka as a hypothetical argument. These three components come under Aprama or invalid knowledge.

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**Smṛti (Memory)**


- ❖ Presentative cognition (Anubhava)
  - Objects are directly presented
- ❖ Representative cognition (Memory)
  - Objects are indirectly recalled
  - a reproduction of previous knowledge
  - a retrieval of past experience
- ❖ Memory is a knowledge due to one's own past.
- ❖ In case of memory, we retrieve the past experiences in the form of images, or ideas in the same form as it was experienced in the past on a particular time.



The further question arises, in case of Smṛti. The Smṛti is a representational knowledge, right. I said that, knowledge are of two types - one is Anubhava, which is presentative in nature and another is representative in nature is known as Smṛti. In case of Smṛti, we able to recapitulate the information which we had experienced in the previously or which we had known in earlier time. So, therefore, they are saying that, if you could able to recapitulate all the information that you had in the past, in a particular order with a sequence, and it relates to the empirical world or it relates to the phenomenon of the empirical world, then, **then**, Smṛti knowledge or Smṛti as a cognition will be valid one. But whatever knowledge, if you could not able to retrieve it, or recapitulate, in a logical sequence way, and the way that you had experienced earlier, then, that knowledge cannot be considered as a valid knowledge.


So, therefore, they said that, it is basically a memory which find in the soul. As a result, we could able to recapitulate some of the information. What Naiyayikas strongly claims is that, that whenever you experience some of the object, some of the events or some of the phenomenon, you realize the true nature of the object and having the impression of that object; and the impression is imprinted in your mind; and whenever you interact with the same kind of object in the future, the mind recapitulate all the information or the impression that it held in the previous. Therefore, I have written here that, memory is knowledge due to one one's own past. In case of memory, we retrieve the past experiences in the form of image or ideas, in the same form as it was experienced in the past on a particular time.

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- ❖ The past experiences is due to the impressions of objects and it retained in the soul.
- ❖ When mind comes into contact with such type of objects in later period there is a remembrance of the corresponding original experiences.
- ❖ Memory is being considered as a cognition tool because of the permanence of soul.
- ❖ Thus, memory is such type of knowledge which arises solely out of the impressions of previous experiences and pertains in the permanent soul.

 NPTEL

And after that, I said the past experiences, is due to the impression of objects and it retain in the soul. There are three things here, in case of memory. Memory helps you to recapitulate the information. Now, here what Naiyayikas saying that, whatever you had a information that was in the impression form, accumulated in your mind. The past experience is due to the impression of the object and it retained in the soul. And, when mind comes into contact with such type of objects in a later period, there is a remembrance of the corresponding original experiences.


So, basically, they are making a relation between soul and mind. The first point they saying that, please remember, the first point they said that, in case of Smruti it is a

representational cognition or a representational knowledge. In Smruti what happens? Whatever the impression we had earlier, we had in the past, it was accumulated or it was stored in the form of impression in the soul; and mind has a interaction with that soul. Once the mind in the later period, finds the same kind of object or counter at the same kind of object, then, take the information from the soul and try to relate that object and hence, the mind could able to gather all the information, which it was stored earlier in the soul, in the form of impression.

So, therefore, there is a relation between mind and soul. The knowledge we had in earlier, it was stored in the soul; then, mind has a link with the soul; when mind interact with the same kind of object in the future, then, mind held's a relation with the soul and mind able to take all the impression which is stored in the soul. So, in this way, Smruti or memory works. And, as a result, you find that, if this kind of link follow, then, mind able to recapitulate all the information that in the same form, that could have accumulated previously or in the past. So, basically there is a game between mind and soul here, or the knowledge that stored in the soul; how the mind relates with the soul and take all the information and able to recapitulate the same information with its same sequence.

So, this is the way Nyaya say that, if this is, the this is way memory functions or memory able to recapitulate the information, then, memory can be consider as a valid cognition; though it is a representational in nature. Then, people claim, if this is so, then, what about dreams. Yes, memory is being considered as a cognition tool because of the permanence of soul. Here, you can identify that, Naiyayikas clearly said that, soul is permanence; because, for them soul is immaterial and also consciousness, full consciousness. So, memory is functioning, is being consider as a cognition tool because of the permanence of soul. The soul remains permanently, though body dies. Thus, memory is such type of knowledge, which arises surely out of the impression of previous experiences and pertains in the permanent soul.

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- ❖ Memory is divided into two forms
- ❖ Yathartha (true)
- ❖ Ayathartha (False)
- ❖ The memory will be true *iff* it has some valid presentations and it has an agreement with the real nature of the remembered objects, otherwise false (ayathartha).
- ❖ Through 'bhāva' and 'bhāvanā' one can remember anything with a particular name.
- ❖ What about dream?

NPTEL

Now, memory is divided into two forms, as I said, yathartha, true or ayathartha is false. What is true? The memory will be true, if and only if; now, you can see, iff, I have said in a short form, and with italic, that is stands for if and only if; the memory will be true if and only if, it has some valid presentation and it is an agreement with the real nature of the remembered objects; otherwise, it is known as ayathartha or false. What they saying? Whatever knowledge you had in the past, if by the help of memory, if you could able to recapitulate the same impressions, with the same sequential order, with the same logical argument that you had seen or experienced earlier, and it is relates to the phenomenon involved, then, this knowledge, this Smruti is to be true or this cognition it is true, but if you fails to recapitulate the information the way you had experienced earlier, then, the cognition will be false. So, therefore, the false cognition is known as ayathartha and the true cognition is known as yathartha, though these are representational in nature.

Further, they said that, it is due to bhava or bhavana, it is due to bhava or bhavana one can remember anything with a particular name. further, through bhavana or and bhava, one can remember anything with a particular name; that means, when you have bhava, that means, there is a emotion you attached; soul has a component emotion; you emotionally attach to the object and identify the object with its true nature in its fullest form. Bhava is emotion and bhavana, you realize the object in its fullest form. If you can do that, you can remember that object for a longer time. The impression of the object store in the soul for a longer time; that means, you can able to recapitulate the same


information which you had encountered in the past, if you realize that object in that time through your bhava and bhavana.

Therefore, they are saying that, bhava and bhavana is also equally important for recognizing an object or identifying an object or cognizing an object in its true form, with all its features. If you can do so, then, memory can able to recapitulate all the information that was accumulated in the form of a impression and stored in the soul. Hence, memory also plays a role for retrieving all the information that you had in the past. When memory encounter this same kind of object or same sets of object in later period also, can able to recapitulate the information that, **yes**, in the past, you had also the same kind of experiences.

So, basically, it is a chain from memory to soul and memory helps to recapitulate all the information which is stored in the soul, by seeing there is a object presented before him or her while encountering an object in the future. It is a representation, because never is presented before the cognizer. It is this cognizer who able to recapitulate what is happened in the past and try to retrieve it in its correct form. So, therefore, the knowledge areas are representational; it is not presentational. It is a representational in one hand, and also, it is valid, because, whatever you present, you present as it is, the way you had experienced in the past. And, it is also a logical sequence follow. And, it relates to the phenomenal world or relates with the object, facts or events of the phenomenon world. And, if this is so, then, the memory knowledge is a valid cognition. It is a representational in nature; however, it is called prama.


Now, if this is so, people claim that, what about dream? People also had a dream in the night and also, in the morning time, they able to recapitulate some of the dreams. So, do you also consider dream, the knowledge will be a valid knowledge? So, now, let us see, how Naiyayikas reacts to the concept dream as having the retrovate of knowledge, as in dream also, we able to recapitulate some of the messages that we had seen in the last night. However, whether we will consider the dream as a valid knowledge or not, now, let us discuss.

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- ❖ Dreams are considered as memory cognition but it is not a true memory cognition.
- ❖ It is a false memory cognition.
- ❖ In a state of dream, we experience about something but often we don't recollect those events in an orderly or systematic manner.
- ❖ Nyāya: dreams are intrinsically false memory.
- ❖ It is not true in character.
- ❖ They said, we are in dream due to the imperceptible influences of our past desires and actions (adrusta).
- ❖ Adrusta- unseen force.



Dreams are considered as memory cognition. There is no doubt of it, but it is not true memory cognition; it is not yathartha, because, it is a false memory cognition, according to Nyaya philosophy; it is ayathartha; that means, it is a representational nature, but we could not able to recapitulate all the information in a sequential way or in a logical way, in the same way we had experienced in our dream; because, in many parts of our dream, we, **we** forget, when we wake up. And, as a result, we could not able to speak all the sequential dream, what we had seen in the last night.


So, therefore, they are saying that, it is a memory cognition; dream is a memory cognition, but however, this is not a valid cognition; because, we are not sure what we had seen in the last night and as a result, we could not able to present it in a sequential way. But if you see, in case of Smruti or memory, we could able to recapitulate all the information in the same order as we had experienced in the past. Therefore, they said that, dreams are intrinsically false memory; it is not true in character. Further, they say, we are in dream due to the imperceptible influences of our past desire and action. What he saying that? Many people has a many desire to do in their life and many people also tries to do many actions in their life; try to engage themselves to, **to** achieve many more things.

However, due to some or other reason, they could not do it; as a result, the way they had planned to do things, the same way, it comes in their dream; because, it is due to duty or

so much ambitious and anxieties, something appears in your dream; because, that is not fulfilled in the empirical world. And, this is the cause, where we all people had dream in the night and all dreams are not true or yathartha, because, the way you have seen it, is not a particular order; sometimes, you see there is a tiger chasing and immediately you find that, there is there is a moon and immediately you find that, there is a sun rise and immediately found, someone is moving with, **with** his or her bike. So, therefore, there is not sequential or causal chain from one to another, step by step.

Henceforth, they said that, dream is a memory cognition, but it is not representational in its true nature. And, we people had a dream because, there is a unseen force works behind that, and what is that unseen force. The unseen force is nothing, but we had a anxiety desire, which is beyond our purview, which could not be solved, which cannot be resolved in our day to day activities, in the empirical world. Therefore, the same things, which we had imagined, it was stored in the impression form and we are see in this night. Therefore, memory is a valid cognition, where dream is not a true cognition. They said that, it is a false memory cognition, dream is a false memory cognition.

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Now, this is the graph that I am showing you, so that, you can understand what Naiyayikas mean. Naiyayikas discuss about knowledge; knowledge, under the epistemological ground and metaphysical prospective. Knowledge is known as buddhi. Then, they said that, knowledge are of two types - one is presentational cognition or

anubhava; another is representational cognition. Presentational cognition means where the object is presented before the cognizer and henceforth, the cognizer able to cognize the object in its true form.

So, therefore, in case of anubhava, you find is a valid knowledge and invalid knowledge; invalid knowledge because, it is a presentational; the object is presented before the cognizer, but the cognizer not able to cognize the object due to some or other reason. Therefore, they said that, under invalid or Aprama, we find doubt, error and Tarka or hypothetical arguments. But in case of valid knowledge, we find perception, inference, comparison and test, verbal testimony or sabda. What they mean is that, whenever you, we cognize an object in its true nature, we need the sources through which we cognize an object; one is perception; another is inference; third one is comparison and fourth one is verbal testimony; that will be comes under valid.

Now, the left side, if you see, Smruti is an representational cognition; that means, nothing is presented before the cognizer; the cognizer able to recollect the information, what he or she had in the past. And, if his or her recollection in a particular order, as it was experienced earlier, then, it is a true, true memory or yathartha; if he or she does not able to recapitulate the information in its correct form, then, the knowledge of memory, though it is a representational, it will be known as false memory or ayathatha. So, this is the way you understand that, how Nyaya in a realistic prospective, expresses their view on the concept knowledge or jnana. Thank you.