Indian Philosophy

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Module No. # 05 Lecture No. # 17 The Nyaya Philosophy

Welcome to this session, this session again we will be continuing with the Nyaya philosophy. The last two classes, we have discussed Nyaya epistemology and how Naiyaikas treats epistemology. Further, how Naiyaikas also consider knowledge under the epistemological prospective as well as metaphysical prospective. We said that, knowledge according to Naiyaikas it is Anubhava, it is a presentational and also it is the representational, it is a Smruti.

Anubhava means, we recognize an object which is presented before us and representational; Smruti means, there are many facts, events or objects we cognized in the past and we encounter the same object or the similar object at present. Therefore, the memory try to recapitulate all the information which was stored in the soul in the form of a impression and try to relate to the objects which is presented before him or her.

Therefore, they are saying that knowledge are of two types, one is representational which is presented before us and the representational means, the knowledge which was already there which was already experienced, now we have to be retrieved by the help of mind. After that we said that, that all cognitions are not valid cognitions; that means there is much cognition which is presentational in character, but not valid. There also we have said that how doubt and error, and further we have argued that, how tarka is a hypothetical argument come under aprama, aprama means invalid knowledge.

We have also said that Smruti are of two types, because many times, we try to recapitulate some of the information in the exact way that we had experienced in the past and there are many times, there are many situations, where we could not able to retrieve all the information that we have experienced in the past. So, there are two types of

memory; in the first case, it is true because, the mind able to recapitulate all the information as it was experienced. Therefore, the knowledge over here is a true one or a valid one; however, if the mind could not able to retrieve all the information that was accumulated or gathered or experienced in the past, then the knowledge is not a valid one.

Further, Naiyaikas also explained saying that, why the knowledge of dream cannot be considered as a valid knowledge. Though in few situations, we could able to trace out some of the information which we had seen in the last night in the form of dream. So, now, in a broad category, last time also I have shown you in the form of graph that, how knowledge is divided and what are the Naiyaikas opinions on the term knowledge.

This class particularly, we will be discussing Prama and Pramana. Prama means valid knowledge, what are the conditions required for having a valid knowledge or it is the case that, valid knowledge automatically happens? What are the essential elements we require for having a valid knowledge?

In addition to that, we will also discuss in this class that, what Pramana is; we know roughly Pramana means, the means through which we accumulate the valid knowledge, but is it the case or Naiyaikas say a different opinion. As you know that in many occasion, we said according to Nyaya, they have accepted four Pramanas; one is perception or pratyaksha, second one is inference or anumana, the third one is comparison or upamana and the forth, the last one is known as verbal testimony or sabda.

Now, we will be discussing, what we mean by Pramana and why Naiyaikas given emphasis on Pramana and what are the essential elements required having a Pramana. So, all these things comes together today's class content. So, we will be discussing one after another in a logical, sequential, even argumentative way.

Now, the first we will be saying what is Prama and Pramana. Knowledge in a broader form means, true belief on an object carries the assurance of its truth. What Naiyaikas said is that, whenever we have knowledge, whenever we claim that we have a knowledge it means that, there is an object on which we have knowledge. And in addition to that, we know all the features of the object, in the form which supports that object; that means, we never identify some of the features of that object and later found that, these are the


features are not found with that object. That means, the features that we identify for having knowledge of an object, it conform to that object.

Therefore, they said that, whenever we identify object, we identify in its true nature. Therefore, knowledge for them is nothing but, tautology; tautology in symbolic logic you find, it means that all the cases if a purpose is not true, it is said that this is tautology; that means, it is the only options true one. So, in the same way Naiyaikas said that, knowledge means, you have a valid knowledge.

You have valid knowledge means, you identify that object and further also, you could able to explain all the features of that object, which is confirmed to that object. If these are the things will be available with you, then you can able to cognize the object and you can henceforth claim that, you have a knowledge of an object and once we have a knowledge of that object, you can say it is a Prama or a valid knowledge. The means through which, you identify or cognize that object, the means is nothing but, Pramana is a source, the source for cognizing Prama is nothing but, Pramana.

Further, they said a knowledge or cognition is to be valid when it is satisfied the three conditions. As I promise that, we will be discussing Prama, Naiyaikas here clearly said that to have a Prama, it should satisfy three conditions. What are the three conditions? In a Sanskrit sloka, they put it Asamdigdha, Yathartha, Anubhava; I repeat what are the three conditions according to Nyaya philosophy? To have a valid knowledge are those Asamdigdha, Yathartha and Anubhava. Asamdigdha is the first condition, second condition is Yathartha and the third one is Anubhava. That means, once you have Asamdigdha, Yathartha and Anubhava, the knowledge that you gain on a particular object you can claim valid knowledge.

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Now, let us discuss what is meant by Asamdigdha. Asamdigdha means, decidable cognition, the cognition you decide whenever you identify an object, you give a name to that object; that means, you identify or cognize an object with a particular name and this implies that, you know how the object is different from other object, is different from other phenomenon or is different from other features of that object. Once you identify an object with the particular name, your identification is the correct, if all the features that you identify or all the features through which you identify that object, if these are the features find with that object.


Therefore, Naiyaikas claims that, there are three conditions involved to cognize an object and henceforth your knowledge will be valid or Prama. The first one is Asamdigdha, anything that you cognize it should be decidable cognition, you cognize with a particular name. Then it is truthfulness, Yathartha means truthfulness; that means, all the features through which you identify that object, the object should conform to these features. At any such cases, this kind of situation should not arise for example, you cognize that object with some features and later you find that, that features is not available with that object. If this is the case then, your knowledge would not be valid. So, therefore, they are saying that Yathartha is condition; truthfulness should be fulfilled for cognizing an object.

The last one they said Anubhava. Anubhava means presentational in character, anything that you cognize, it should be presented, anything you cognize it should be in presentational nature; that means, the object should be presented before you. If these are the things you find, then your knowledge on that particular object will be a valid one.

What are the conditions? I repeat, first is Asamdigdha means a decidable cognition, the second one is Yathartha, that means, truthfulness about that object and the third one is a presentational in nature, that means, whenever you cognize an object, the object should be presented before you. With these three conditions, Naiyaikas rejects doubt, error, tarka and also Smruti as a valid knowledge, because in case of Smruti, it is a representational in character.

So, since they have not recommended, the knowledge can be representational character therefore, in this ground Smruti can be rejected. Now, this doubt or samshaya, error or viparyaya and tarka or hypothetical reasoning or arguments will be valid because, there will be no decidable cognition. And these are the cases therefore, by considering these three conditions, Naiyaikas rejects knowledge, which is not valid; these are doubt, error, tarka and Smruti, now we will be elaborating further, you can read my slides.

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I have written here, memory is excluded, because it is not presentational in character. Further I said that, other three other three means, doubt, error and tarka are excluded

from the valid knowledge because they are neither true nor definite and not even assured in their character. Henceforth, any knowledge to be valid, it should be satisfy three condition, one is Asamdigdha, Yathartha and Anubhava. Asamdigdha means an assured cognition, which is distinguished from problematic and hypothetical knowledge.

What it means, there are many knowledge is problematic for example, mathematical knowledge. For example, you have intuition for a particular object; however, you never find all your intuition is correct for that object, it is called problematic knowledge. Hypothetical knowledge that means, if then condition involved, if x then y and there are many times you do not find x; however, you find y.

Therefore, they are saying that, the problematic knowledge and hypothetical knowledge cannot be a valid knowledge because in these cases, we do not find any kind of cognition which is a deciding. That means, any decidable cognition or the cognition with a particular name you would not find, if at all you are finding in later period, you find that the features through which, you are finding all the features are not conforming to that object. Therefore, in Asamdigdha they clearly said that, the valid knowledge is distinguished from problematic and hypothetical knowledge, it is based on your firm belief, but all firm belief are not Prama.

For example, bhrama or illusion; in case of illusion, you can also identify an object with a particular name; however, in later period you find that whatever name through which you identify that object, it is not the same object. The example I had given in the last class, if you remember, I said in that hot summer, you find mirage from a long distance you find it looks like water, but however, the mirage it is not same as water. Therefore, it is because of your illusion or bhrama you concluded that, you cognize the object say water, which find in a distance from you, but when you comes closer to that object, you find it is a mirage. In this way, in case of bhrama, though we can identify an object with a particular name, however, that is not a valid knowledge.

The last point I said, Prama implies something more than the subjective certainty; that means, if you consider only Asamdigdha as a condition you find that, it is not only one individual cognizing a particular object having a particular name, it is more than one individual, cognizing a particular object having a particular name. That means, whenever I am cognizing that this is the duster; that means, it is not me only, other people cannot


vary on my cognition of that object, other people also equally say that this is duster, because we commonly share a fact that, this object having so and so features as a result this object's name is known as duster.

In this case, they said that, that Asamdigdha while cognizing an object with the particular name, you should be not be confined with your subjective knowledge, rather the cognition always leads to either inter subjectivity or objective knowledge. That means, more than one people cognize that same object with the same name, then only your cognition will be valid one.

Now, moving towards the second condition that is Yathartha, in case of Yathartha, you find that truthfulness is a criterion which oppose to error, mistake or wrong. The knowledge is true, when it is not contradicted by its object, what they mean is that whenever you identify an object, you identify a particular object because of its features, because of its characteristics, whether accidental characteristics or essential characteristics.

However, it is because of the characteristics you cognize an object with a particular name or you identify an object. What they are saying that, it is the features through which you cognize an object and the features through which you cognize the object, it should conform to the object, then only your knowledge will be valid, but in any other cases, your knowledge cannot be considered as valid, so this condition known as truthfulness or Yathartha.


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Further, they said to know a thing is true, when we know its characteristics, which is characterized to that object. Thus Nyaya said that, a truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence to facts; that means, that any moment we cognize an object, the object or fact you find in the empirical world. Therefore, Naiyaikas are realist, because whatever they are talking all their discussions, you find it relates to the phenomenal world or the objects, facts or events, those are found in the phenomenal world.

The last condition is known as Anubhava. It is a presentational in character; that means, while identifying an object, it is not the case that you identify an object with a particular name and also you identify an object with certain features, the conditions are not limited to that. They are saying that, to do all these things also, the object should be presented before you; the object should be available before you, that is mean by Anubhava. The object is a presentational in character; it cannot be representational in character. It is presentational in character because it is grounded in the object, you see the object, infer the object, anything you do the object will be presented before you and with these three conditions, you can say that, any knowledge you have on a particular object is a valid knowledge or known as Prama.

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Now, we will be discussing Pramana, what is Pramana and how Naiyaikas given emphasis on the term Pramana. The four elements are necessary for knowledge is to be valid; they are saying that to have any kind of knowledge, we need four components or four elements. The first one is congiser, congiser means the subject, who will be cognizing the object and you know that, congiser in one hand is a subject has to cognize an object and in another hand, there is an object which is to be cognized.

Apart from this, you find there is an instrument, there is a means to cognize that object; that means, congiser, then object, then you have an instrument for cognizing that object and after that, you have cognition to that object. There are four elements therefore, require to have cognition, the particular object or a valid knowledge. I repeat in a valid knowledge, we need four elements; as an indispensible element, we have Prama, these are congiser as a subject, object which is to be cognized and the instrument through which the object has to be cognized and the fourth after this, the congiser have the cognition; that means, the knowledge, accumulated knowledge. So, these are the four elements badly required or essentially required to have a Prama or valid knowledge.


They said that, Prama Karanam Pramanam, what it means? To have a valid knowledge, we need the means through which we can accumulate the valid knowledge. Therefore, Prama in the left side you can see Prama, it means valid knowledge; Karanam means; it

is the means or the path through which we accumulate Prama and the path is nothing but, Pramana.

Therefore, they are saying that Prama Karanam Pramanam, the term Karanam means the instrument or the chief cause of Prama. As you know Pramana means, the source of valid knowledge, it provides the valid knowledge about objects. The quoted one that you find in Nyaya's text that, Pramana defines as the cause of valid cognition of objects in as much as gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves. The same way they are repeating they are saying that, whenever you cognize an object with its features, make sure that all the features should find in that object, then only your cognition will be valid one, but in any other cases your cognition cannot be considered as a valid one.

The last point I say, Pramana and Prama are invariably related with each other. If you find that, to have a valid cognition, we need the correct means to accumulate the valid knowledge. The correct means is nothing but, Pramana and according to Nyaya philosophy, there are four Pramanas; one is perception, inference, comparison and testimony. In this sense, Naiyaikas submits that, Prama and Pramana both are closely connected with each other, to have a Prama means we need Pramana and Pramana is required for having Prama.

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


Continuing further, they said that by the help of Pramana, the congiser possesses the right knowledge about the object. Therefore, Pramana means Karana to acquire Pramana; that means, Pramana is the means to achieve or attain the valid knowledge known as Prama. Now, the difference we will make. So that, we can understand clearly, what is mean by Karana and what is mean by Karana? So, there are two things, do not be confused. We said that Prama, Karana, Pramana; that means, the means through which we cognize an object, the Pramana is a means through which we cognize an object. So, here Karana is a means, but Karana implies cause, Karana implies cause where as Karana is understood as a means or the media. So, there should not be any confusion between these two terms.

What Naiyaikas explain about cause is that, cause is an invariable, unconditional and antecedent of the effect, where as the effect is an unconditional, invariable and consequent of the cause. You find in both the cases, cause and effect; in case of cause also you find invariable and unconditional, in case of effect, also you find invariable and unconditional, the two term. However, you find that in case of cause, it is invariable unconditional antecedent of the effect and in case of effect, you find that invariable unconditional in addition to that consequence of the cause.

So, therefore, you find there is a close association relation between cause and effect, if there is an effect, there must be a cause; if there is a cause and there must be an effect. So, in this way Prama and Pramana are closely connected or related with each other. They are saying that understood the same spirit, how cause and effect are related, in the same way Prama and Pramana both are related with each other. To have a Prama, we need Pramana and Pramana helps to accumulate a valid knowledge, which is known as Prama.

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
Now, you know what cause is and what effect is. Now, we will know there are three kinds of causes and how Naiyaikas, explain this three causes. The first they said that causes are of three kinds the first one is Samavayi or constituent cause, the second one is Asamavayi, it is a non-constituent cause and the third one is Nimitta or efficient cause.

In case of first one, what they said is the material cause. Samavayi is nothing but, materials cause, a consequent cause without that no effect can be produced. If you say cloth is an effect, then its material cause is thread. So, thread here is a Samavayi or the material cause.

Then what is non-constituent cause, Asamavayi is saying that when these two threads comes together and there is a colour on that, you find each cloth have a colour as well as thread. And the combination of colour and thread is nothing but, Asamavayi or non-constituent cause; that means, though these are not directly involved to produce an effect. However, their association with this material cause is really importance for producing an effect, their association contributes significantly for producing an effect.

The last one is Nimitta Karana, Nimitta means it is an instrument. A human being also involved Nimitta and the power of machine and the electricity and the process of making some effect, all these things to be considered as Nimitta or Karana, now we will be elaborate it further.

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Samavayi or constituent, it is the material cause or inherent cause, which is the substratum in which the effect inheres. That means, any part of the world if you see there is an effect that means, it implies there is a cause; that means, in all the cases effect exist in its material cause prior to its production. So, therefore, material cause is its cause where the effect exists prior to its production, if you say curd is the effect, then curd existed in the material cause milk prior to its production, if you say cloth is the effect then cloth existed in the thread prior to its production. So, here thread is the material cause, where as the cloth is the effect. It is term inherence is to be remembered or to be understood here.

Further they said, it is the material cause, the constituent or Samavayi is the material cause or inherent cause, which is substratum in which the effect inheres for example, thread of a cloth.


Now, what is Asamavayi, how Nyaya philosophy describes Asamavayi or non-constituent cause? Now, we will see, it is known as non-inherent cause; that means, Asamavayi is a cause, it never find in the matters or in the material cause, but somehow associated with the cause, he is saying that, though it is not found in the material cause, but is associated with that material cause, it helps to produce the effect, it determines the effect, when its stands as an inherence of attribute of the constituent cause. For example,

contact of the threads, contact between threads and colour, all these can be considered as non-constituent cause.

They said that, this non-constituent cause cannot be treated as a material cause; however, their association towards the material cause, it helps to produce the effect and the third one they said that, in case of a Nimittai or efficient cause, how it really helps to produce an effect. He is saying that Nimittai or an efficient cause, it is neither the constituent nor the non-constituent cause of an effect, in case of Nimittai he is saying that Nimittai is a cause it is neither constituent nor non-constituent, neither Samavayi nor Asamavayi. In this case the human being, the intellect of the human being involve because, we need an instrument to produce an effect from the matters or material cause. The material cause never automatically produces anything or any effect, if anything is produced from the material cause; it is someone who designed it and what effect to be produced.

Take an example; say pot is made of clay. So, here clay is the material cause and pot is the effect. Question arises can clay automatically produce the pot? We agree to say that it cannot be. So, because it is the some human being with his or her instruments produces pot from the clay. Therefore, we find that, there is an indispensible element involved in the form of cause for producing an effect from the material cause. However, though there is an association between cause and effect still, we find an instrument, we find a human being, and we find some kind of necessary instrument to produce the effect from the cause. So, these are the cases is nothing but, Karana or the chief.

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The way they said that, Nimittai or the Efficient Cause is not a passive substrate, I mean which the effect inheres because, the effect which is produced, it never inheres in the efficient cause. It only inheres in the material cause; it never inheres in the non-constituent cause. Therefore, the Nimittai Karana is in between responsible for producing an effect from the material. He is saying that, it is an agency, agency to be understood agency that acts on both constituent as well as non-constituent causes and makes them produce the effect. For example, if the effect is cloth, then the loom is the efficient cause. What is the word loom means? Naiyaikas explains here, the word loom means, machine, electricity, the power of machine, the process of making etcetera.

The human intellect involved can be also considered as a Nimittai or the efficient cause. It is all together this the power of machine, power of electricity and also the process of making, all this together helps to produce an effect from the material cause. So, therefore, it is called as Nimittai, Nimittai Karana, Nimittai cause.


Thus, the efficient cause is regard as Karana, which plays the vital role in case of producing the effect, because, so far what we have known is that, there are three types of causes one is Samavayi, Asamavayi and Nimittai. And Nimittai is an instrument cause or efficient cause, which helps to produce effect from the matter and no such causes can do that, the material cause cannot automatically produce the effect, neither non-constituent

cause or Asamavayi cause is responsible for producing the an effect from the material cause automatically.

Therefore, he is saying that, it is a Nimitta is to be understood as Karana, that how that Nimitta is become. So, indispensible for producing an effect from the cause, in the same way Pramana is indispensible for producing a valid knowledge known as Prama or say Pramana is a Karana or efficient cause, this is responsible to produce a valid knowledge known as Pramana.

Now, the example they have given just to consider the spirit, how they mean, when they said this in Nimitta cause. What they mean, what they have understood when they explain the term Nimitta or efficient cause. In the same way, you try to understand that, Pramana is a Karana, but not Karana; Pramana is a Karana which is an efficient cause, you say is a Karana through which we can accumulate or gain a valid knowledge known as Prama.

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Now, moving further, the first two are general causes or rather conditions of the effect, where as the last one is actually the operative cause, without efficient cause the effect is not possible. That means, if there is no instrument, there is no human being involved, the no power, no electricity involved, no machine involved, can the cause automatically produce the effect? It is not possible; therefore, they are saying that without efficient

cause, the effect is not possible. In this regard, Pramana is the unique operative cause or Karana of valid knowledge.

Now, we will see factors of Prama, what are the factors of Prama? That means, whenever we have a valid knowledge, what are the factors are responsible to help or to get the valid knowledge. Whenever we have a valid knowledge or we can whenever we claim that we have knowledge on a particular object, what are the factors responsible to accumulate that knowledge of an object.

The first one is they said Pramata, it is a subject, the second one is Prameya, it is an object, third one is Pramana or the method of valid knowledge. When they said that this subject they have given the emphasis, any knowledge we have in this world, it is the subject who accumulates that knowledge. The object like chair, table, pen, duster, and etcetera cannot accumulate the knowledge. So, therefore, it is the subject or the congiser will be cognizing that object and henceforth, the knowledge will be retained in the congiser's soul. Therefore, any knowledge we require or anything we consider as a knowledge, it is enhanced in the congiser who has cognized that, so the subject is a basic requirement for have cognition.

In addition to that, they said that Prameya is an object; when they said object, you should understand also, both existent and nonexistent objects. Existent objects like chair, pen, bicycle, you know all these things, which are available in this phenomenal world, which you can see what nonexistent objects is. If I say milk sea, you know milk, you know sea, now you can imagine a picture in a form and refer to the worldly affairs, it is said that this is called nonexistent of objects. If I said that, golden mountain, now you know, what is gold and you know what is mountain, now you can frame a picture of what is golden mountain and try to relate to the phenomenal world or try to correspond to the phenomenal world then, you say that this is nonexistent objects.


Further, they said that, there are positive facts and negative facts, all these things deals with objects. What are positive facts? The facts those are found in the phenomenal world, those can be referred in the phenomenal world or empirical world. What are the negative facts? Negative facts means, you try to conceptualize some of the situation in the form of impression, though it is not found in the particular situation.

For example, if I say there is no elephant in a class room, you understood this concept because, you know that if there is an elephant in the class room, how the situation should be and how it appears, but in absence of elephant also, you can imagine a situation of there is an elephant in the class room. What he is saying that, though elephant does not exist in the class room, still you can have an imagination, you can have a picture in your mind and the picture can be referred to the empirical world, it is called negative facts.

So, therefore, whenever they say that any knowledge we have, it refers to object; please understood object means, both existent and nonexistent objects, which includes positive facts as well as the negative facts. So, in a very broader frame, they said that knowledge means it refers to an object and any knowledge we have that means we have knowledge about that objects.

The last one they said its need Pramana, the congiser in one hand and the object in another hand is not enough to have knowledge about that object, we need a Pramana. That means there is a means or media through which to cognize that object, if you can do. So, then, the knowledge will be known as a valid one.

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


Further, they said, why we require all these? We require all this because whenever we have knowledge, we are not necessarily referring to the objects to the find in the phenomenal world. What we are referring also there are many situation, it is a concept, it

is an idea, the here Naiyaikas said that also the idea is and concept can be referred to an object. The knowledge of an idea, the knowledge of an object, and the knowledge of a concept can be referred to an object.

For example, if I say again Golden Mountain, this is an idea; this is a concept, which refers to an object. In this way, we have to understand the concept they have discussed, as a why we treats in the way that, whenever we have a knowledge refers to the objects of the world and therefore, they submits that we need three essential factors for cognizing an object to have a valid knowledge or Prama. One is subject, another is an object and the third one is Pramana. So, without these three we cannot able to accumulate any valid knowledge.

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Now, we will be discussing the theory of validity or Pramanyavada. As you know that Pramanyavada, Pramana means the means of accumulating or achieving a valid knowledge and valid knowledge is known as Prama. Now, Pramanyavada means a theory of validity; that means, whenever we cognize an object, we cognize because of some other factors responsible.

Factors means, intrinsic factor as well as the extrinsic factors; extrinsic factors means, there is a light minimum distance etcetera and the object is not hiding, it is presented before us and intrinsic means, all our memory should function well, we are not caught

with jaundice disease, we are in a healthy climate condition, we are healthy and also we are behave like an ordinary human being, we are equally fit to cognize an object. Therefore, they are saying that whenever there is cognition, it deals with both internal condition as well as the external condition.


What Naiyaikas intrinsic is means that, the effect exist in its material cause prior to its production and what extrinsic means, the effect after production is different from the cause. There are two types of concept here, further they said that, the knowledge is valid or invalid sometimes it depends on the conditional situation, sometimes it depends on the external condition, sometimes it depend on the internal conditions, because there are many situations. Since a person is affected with the jaundice disease, everything appears to him or she is yellow; however, the nature of that object is not yellow, the attribute yellowness may not be finding to that object and henceforth, the knowledge he or she has to that particular object and with a particular name cannot be consider as a valid knowledge.

In the same way, there are many kind of external conditions, matters when we cognize an object. If it is a dark room, a human being though he is a normal human being cannot see anything in the dark. So, whatever knowledge he have in that room on a particular object, that may not be a valid knowledge, because we need a sufficient light to cognize that object and also we need a minimum distance to cognize that object. If a object is placed in a long distance, we cannot claim that object with a particular name because we need a particular distance to cognize an object and we cognize all its feature, which we also needs to be a confirmative to that object. Therefore, they said that the validity and invalidity depends on the internal and external conditions also.

There are two types of Pramanyavada, one is Svatah Pramanyavada and another is Paratah Pramanyavada. What is Svatah Pramanyavada means, the knowledge will be valid or invalid depends on say internal condition or intrinsic factors. What is Paratah Pramanyavada? Paratah Pramanyavada means the knowledge which is a valid or invalid depends on the external conditions. If the external conditions are good then, the knowledge will be valid, though some other parameters have to be there. The subject, object, the instrument and the means of cognizing that object, apart from all these, we have say, internal and external conditions required.

So, there are two types of Pramanyavada that we can see, one is Svatah Pramanyavada another is paratah Pramanyavada and different schools has the different opinion on this two Pramanyavada. There are many times people claim that the knowledge will be invalid, it may be depends upon again intrinsic factor as well as extrinsic factor. The invalid knowledge is known as apramanya, the invalid knowledge is known as apramanyavada, where as valid knowledge is called Pramanyavada, because valid knowledge Prama and the means through which we get the valid knowledge is Pramana.

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Therefore, they are saying that any knowledge we have called Pramanyavada, the particular means through particular Pramana, we gain a knowledge known as Prama. So, here you find, there are four kinds of knowledge, Naiyaikas are talking about. One is Svatah Pramanyavada, another is Svatah apramanyavada, the third one is paratah Pramanyavada and the fourth one is paratah apramanyavada. What is Svatah Pramanyavada means?


The validity of the knowledge is depends on internal conditions or intrinsic condition. Svatah apramanyavada means the invalidity of knowledge depends on the internal conditions or intrinsical nature. The third one paratah Pramanyavada; that means, a knowledge is valid depends on the external condition and the fourth one is paratah apramanyavada, what it means? The knowledge is invalid depends on the external condition.

Now, we will see what are the schools, what are the systems prescribed how knowledge can be valid and how knowledge can be decided, whether based on internal or external condition, whether the valid knowledge can be an intrinsic or extrinsic and what are the system's opinions, we will discuss.

Here, I will just read it for your help. This theory, theory means Pramanyavada, this theory expresses about when the knowledge will be true and when it will be false. Svatah Pramanyavada it is constituted and determined by intrinsic condition it is self-evident; it is intrinsic because the effect is found in the cause. Paratah apramanyavada on the other hand, it is constituted and ascertained by extrinsic conditions, it is extrinsic because the effects is different from cause, the effect is a new phenomenon which is not found in the cause.

So, now you can know, what is intrinsic and extrinsic according to Nyaya philosophy and how they mean, when they speaks about Pramanyavada. Basically, their aim is to identify the knowledge we have, whether the knowledge is a valid or invalid. If at all valid, under which condition it is valid, if it is invalid, why it is invalid and under which condition it is invalid. Now, let us discuss schools opinion, different system have their given their own opinion to consider whether knowledge will be valid or invalid depends on whether intrinsic or extrinsic factors.

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Now, schools opinion if you can see that, the Nyaya as a realist philosopher, they said that paratah Pramanyavada. What they mean is that, the knowledge is valid or invalid depends on the extrinsic factor, validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic. Contracting to this view, samkhya philosophy or samkhya system claim that, Svatah Pramanyavada; that means, the validity and invalidity of knowledge are intrinsic here Svatah is stands for intrinsic and Pramanyavada is validity or invalidity knowledge.

Buddhism, buddhism has given two view on Pramanyavada, first they say that, Svatah apramanyavada. That means, a knowledge will be invalid which it depends on its intrinsic nature, a knowledge is to be invalid which depends on the intrinsic nature and paratah Pramanyavada means a knowledge is to be valid depends on its extrinsic factors or extrinsic in nature. Therefore, Buddhism has a two opinion the knowledge will be invalid depends on intrinsic factors and the knowledge will be valid it depends on external factors.

The fourth schools you know vedantins as well as mimansikas, combinedly they argued that Svatah Pramanyavada and paratah apramanyavada; that means, knowledge will be valid, when it is supported by the internal conditions or intrinsic conditions and knowledge will be invalid, when it is supported by the extrinsic condition.

So, all these things features, you must know and henceforth, you can have a comprehensive knowledge about Nyaya, Prama and Pramana. I hope this session will be helpful for you to understand, what Prama is and what Pramana is. The next session we will be discussing perception, what are the types of perception. According to Nyaya, perceptions are of two types, one is ordinary, and another is extra ordinary, which we will be discussing in the next class, thank you.