

Indian Philosophy
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Module No. # 05
Lecture No. # 21
The Nyaya Philosophy


Hello students, today, we will be discussing nyaya philosophy again in continuation to inference. As you know that we have said in the previous classes that inference is a second source of valid knowledge according to nyaya philosophy. For them to have an inference, we need a vyapti relation.

What is a vyapti relation? They said that vyapti relation is a universal concomitant and invariable relation between hetu and sadhya between major term and middle term and in any kind of inference that you find indispensably, the vyapti relation as such. Therefore, vyapti relation plays an important role in case of an inference. Further, we said that hetu are of five types and how hetu plays both positively and negative rule to have an inferential knowledge. We also discussed all this in details.

In today class, we will be discussing the grounds of alumina, the grounds of inferential knowledge. What are the grounds for having an alumina or inferential knowledge? According to naiyayikas, there are two grounds for an inferential knowledge. One is logical ground, another is psychological ground. A logical ground for them is nothing but a vyapti relation. They said that if you understand the vyapti relation, then you know that the logical ground of having an inferential knowledge.


Then further also they discussed the logical ground. Apart from the logical ground, there is another ground that we find to have an inferential knowledge is known as psychological ground or they said that Pakhyata. So, now we will discuss what first logical ground is. Then we will further discuss what is the psychological ground to have an inferential knowledge which is known as a valid Pramana, according to nyaya philosophy.

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Logical & Psychological grounds of Anumāna

- ❖ There are two grounds of Inference.
 - i) Logical
 - ii) Psychological
- ❖ Vyāpti is considered as logical ground of anumāna.
- ❖ By the help of Vyāpti relation, we establish Sādhyā in Pakṣa.
- ❖ Vyāpti is a relation between hetu and Sādhyā.
- ❖ It is of two types;
 - i) samavyāpti
 - ii) asamavyāpti

 NPTEL

There are two grounds as I said to you, there are logical and psychological. Vyapti is considered as a logical ground of alumina or inferences because as you know that vyapti relation is an indispensable relation to have an inferential knowledge. They explained vyapti relation is an invariable universal and concomitant relation between hetu and sadhya between the middle term and the major term. Sadhya stands for major term and hetu stands for middle term. The middle term also known as a linga, you can call it hetu, linga or middle term.

So, anything you call it you should constantly keep the same word for whole explanation. Otherwise, sometimes if you say hetu, sometimes if you say linga that means it will be a confusing set. Whatever word you want to use for a particular term for middle term let us say you want to use the linga as a middle term. Go on use the term uniformly while answering a particular question. So, stick to that, so that it would not be confusing neither to you nor to the evaluators.

Now, further I said that vyapti relation say between two terms, one is middle term and another is major term. What they saying that by the help of vyapti relation, we establish sadhya in pakhya.

Sadhya is a major term and pakhya is a minor term. Here is must tell you that if you have listened to me in the last class and also you have understood what is an inferential

knowledge, I said that whenever I will refer I will refer to the smoke and fire relation. That how smoke and fire are closely related with each other for having a vyapti relation. What is meant by middle term? What is meant by major term? What is meant by minor term?

We have also explained in relation to fire and smoke and the hill. We said that fire is a major term, hill is the minor term and the smoke is the middle term. The argument in this way it is proposed that the hill is smoky. Wherever smoky is fiery that means wherever there is a smoke there is fire. Therefore, I conclude or we conclude that therefore the hill is fire or you can find fire in the hill. So, in this way you find there are three prepositions involved to have an inferential knowledge. So, what they saying that it is because of the vyapti relation we establish sadhya.

Sadhya is a fire on the hill is the pakhya. Therefore, I said my third point by the help of vyapti relation we establish sadhya in pakhya. Vyapti is a relation between hetu and sadhya. This is a repeatedly I said and further I am saying it is of two types. Vyapti are of two types, one is samavyapti and another is asamavyapti.

Samavyapti means there are two sides relation. That means by seeing a smoke, you can infer fire and by seeing a fire, you can also infer smoke. So, therefore, while inferring by seeing one to another, you can also inversely infer the situation that is called samavyapti. Asamavyapti is also known as Visamvyapti that means we can only infer from one to another side but inversely we cannot do so. Therefore, they said that it is only one way traffic that asamavyapti.

However, in case of samavyapti you find in both sides we can infer. Now, let us see how naiyayikas explain it. I will give an example before moving to the further slide. In case of samavyapti, it is said in this way if you know that what is the effect, you know that where it comes from. That means, if you know the curd, you know that certainly it comes from milk and if you know that milk you know that after such and such condition it will transform to the curd. So, in both sides you can find the relation that is samavyapti.


There are many cases also there that you find in day to day activities. For example, if you see a mango. Mango a mixture of yellow and red color and neat and clean and it looks very good. Once you take a slice of that mango and you find tasty. Now, this knowledge

helps you to infer that in all the cases whenever that kind of mango appears you say that the taste of that mango will be sweet and sometimes, somebody has given the slice of a mango and if you eat it and find that the taste is sweet, you immediately infer that this slice may belong to that particular mango having this red and yellow color mixture and having neat and clean.

So, in this way you find both sides of relation in case of samavyapti. Asamavyapti it is only one side of relation. For example, if I say that men are mortal. That means if there are men, there can be mortal or they will be dead after sometime but inversely I cannot say that all mortal beings are men because there are many other creatures also after certain time they die, after certain time they extinct. So, therefore, here **I have to** we have to go from one side certainly not in inverse side.

Now, we will see how exactly naiyayikas explains about this. Now, we have understood these two concepts, samavyapti and asamavyapti with my examples. Now, we will see what is naiyayikas interpretation in case of samavyapti and asamavyapti?

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Samavyāpti

- ❖ It is an equipollent concomitance relation between the two terms (hetu & sādhyā).
- ❖ We can argue from one to another and vice versa.
- ❖ We find the equal extension of these two terms.
- ❖ Since these two terms are co-extensive, we may infer either of them from the other.
- ❖ It is an universal proposition where subject & predicate distribute.
- ❖ It would correspond to the western logic as UA & UN propositions.
- ❖ There is a samavyāpti between cause and effect, substance and attributes.

NPTEL

In case of samavyapti, what naiyayikas said that it is an equipollent concomitance relation between the two terms hetu and sadhya. That means these two terms hetu and sadhya, the smoke and fire should be invariably related in such a manner that if you can see perceive one thing, immediately you can infer other things in any side from any

corner. That means, if you can see there is a smoke in one side, immediately you can infer fire and if you see the fire, you can immediately infer the smoke because they have a concomitance and invariable inseparable and universally related with each other. That means, there is a no such instances where you have seen the smoke without fire or you have seen the fire without smoke.

So, this is the only condition. They said that because of this condition it is an equipollent concomitance relation between these two terms, hence for samavyapti works here or samavyapti functions in this aspect. Further, they said we can argue from one to another and vice versa. We find the equal extension of these two terms.

What is that equal extension? That means, if you see the fire, equally you can infer with the evidence saying that there is smoke and if you see the smoke, equally this is extendable with same condition you say that there may be fire. So, while seeing the fire, you infer a smoke and while seeing the smoke, you can infer the fire. So, therefore they said that these two terms are co-extensive, the equal extension of these two terms. Henceforth, these two terms are co-extensive and we may infer either of them from the other.

Further, it is a universal proposition where subject and predicate distribute. Now, you must understand what I mean here as I said that nyaya is a logician, the Indian logician or nyaya system is a school, people considered as a logicians because they consider three aspects in all cases while arguing on certain fact or an issue.

The first one is psychological, the second one is logical and the third one is philosophical and whenever they talk about the inference, they refer to the Aristotelian concept of deductive inference.

How these three propositions, three terms involved and how these three propositions functions together and how the conclusion supports to the given premises taken together. So, while referring that their inferential knowledge to this deductive argument, they said that here you find minor term as a paksa, major term as a sadhya and middle term is known as hetu.

Here you find according to Aristotle, they said that there are four kinds of propositions. You find universal affirmative propositions, universal negative propositions, particular affirmative proposition and particular negative propositions. If you go back, then you find that they said propositions are of two types based on quantity that is universal and particular.

Further, they said that propositions are divided into two based on the quality that is affirmative and negative. Now, mixture these two that means based on the quantity and quality, you find propositions are of four types. One is universal affirmative, the second one is universal negative and the third one is particular affirmative and the fourth one is particular negative.

The first one represents as all or stands as all. The second one stands universal negative stands is no, then particular affirmative stands as some and the particular negative stands as some not. If I say that all men are mortal that means, this proposition belongs to universal affirmative proposition.

The predicate completely affirms the subject, so here you find the term all. If I say no human being is perfect, it is a universal negative proposition. If I say some cows are white, it is a particular affirmative proposition. If I say that some roses are not red in color, then it is a proposition or particular negative propositions. Here, some not you find.

In this way, if you find that universal affirmative proposition only subject part is distributed. What is distributed? The whole entire denotation has to be taken into the consideration, then only this part is to be distributed. Aristotle said that there are two parts involved in a proposition. One is subject part, another is predicate part.

The subject part is to be distributed in case of a universal affirmative proposition and in case of universal negative proposition, the subject and predicate both part has to be distributed. In case of particular affirmative proposition, neither subject nor predicate is distributed but in case of o propositions or in case of particular negative propositions, you find the predicate part is distributed.


So, therefore respectively in case of a proposition or universal affirmative proposition, you find subject part is distributed. In case of universal negative or e proposition, you find both subject and predicate part is distributed. In case of particular affirmative proposition or I proposition, you find neither subject nor predicate is distributed. In case of particular negative proposition, you find that predicate part is distributed.

So, this is the way you find the term gets distributed. What they said naiyayikas is that in case of samavyapti, since it is two side traffic. By seeing one side, you can infer to other side and also by seeing the other side, you can infer to this side. So, since it is two way traffic what they said is that it is a universal proposition where subject and predicate has to be distributed. Universal means both universal affirmative and universal negative.

So, therefore you find they said it would correspond to the western logic as UA transfer universal affirmative and UN stands for universal negative proposition. There is a samavyapti between cause and effect in substance and attribute. What they mean is that by seeing the effect, you can infer to the cause and by seeing the cause, you can infer into the effect.

The example I have given milk and curd. Further, I have given an example of mango and its quality, taste, sweet. Said that by seeing the substance mango, you can infer its quality or taste and in other way by having the taste of that slice of a mango, you can infer to the mango itself. So, therefore samavyapti operates in both sides, from one side as well as from the other side.

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- ❖ We may infer the cause from the effect, the substance from the attribute and vice versa.
- ❖ Examples:
 - All rational beings are men & all men are rational beings
 - Whatever is produced is non-eternal & whatever is non-eternal is produced.

Asamavyāpti

- ❖ Asamavyāpti = Visamavyāpti
- ❖ In this case, we can argue only from one side.
- ❖ It is a relation of non-equipollent concomitance between the two terms.



So, now we will see that what the example is given by naiyayikas in case of samavyapti. They said that we may infer the cause from the effect and substance from the attribute and vice versa. The example they have given that all rational being are men. Now, you consider this as a sentence.

If you say that all men are rational being, then it is a correct, equally correct. That means, by seeing the rational being, you can say that these are men and by seeing the men, immediately you can infer they are rational being. So, that means both side you can infer.

Second example they have given, whatever is produced is non-eternal. Anything can be produced in this earth, it will destroy. Therefore, it is not eternal and further, you can also make a statement saying that whatever is non-eternal is produced. So, that means in both side you can have an inference. So, this is called as samavyapti.


Now, we will be seeing what is asamavyapti? As I said asamavyapti means only one side we can infer it, not in reverse way. Also example I have given if I say that all men are mortal, I cannot say that all mortals are men because there are many animals, reptiles, insects also with mortality, they have the mortality.

Therefore, only from one side we can have an inference, not from other side. What naiyayikas explained here is that in this case, in case of asamavyapti we can argue only

from one side. It is a relation of non-equipollent concomitance between the two terms. The two terms means hetu and sadhya, they say fire and smoke.


That is an invariable variation. So, here you find samavyapti but in this case, in case of asamavyapti he is saying that inference is possible but it is from one side, not in the reverse side. Therefore, it is a non-equipollent concomitance relation between hetu and sadhya.

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- ❖ It is an unequal extension between the two terms.
- ❖ It is not an co-extensive because we may infer from one to another but not inversely.
- ❖ It corresponds to the western logic UA proposition, where only the subject part is distributed.
- ❖ Example:
 - i) All men are mortal. But all mortals are men.
- ❖ Vyāpti: it is an universal, invariable, unconditional and concomitance relation between hetu and sādhya.
- ❖ Vyāpti as a logical condition of inference may be defined either positively or negatively.

 NPTEL

Now, continuing further they said that it is unequal extension between the two terms. Equal extension means by seeing one, you can infer others and in case of asamavyapti, it is unequal extension. That means by seeing one, you can infer others. However, by seeing the others you cannot infer that one. Example, I say by pursuing x, you can infer y, however by pursuing y, you cannot infer x.

So, this is the understanding of asamavyapti relation is a logical ground for having an inferential knowledge. They said that it is not a co-extensive because we may infer from one to another but not inversely. It corresponds to the western logic universal affirmative propositions only because in case of universal affirmative proposition, you find the subject part is distributed, not both subject and predicate part.

In case of samavyapti, he said that universal proposition that means, it may be universal affirmative and universal negative together. So, therefore you find subject and predicate

part is distributed but here, you find *asamavyapti* refers to in western logic, only universal affirmative proposition where only subject part is distributed.

So, now I hope that you are now clear. What is *samavyapti* relation? What is *asamavyapti* relation to have an inferential knowledge? The example that I have given, the same example I have written here. So, therefore now you can understand what is *vyapti* relation? How *vyapti* relation is logical ground for having an inferential knowledge?

In addition to that you know that there are two types of *vyapti*. One is *samavyapti*, another one is *asamavyapti* or *visamvyapti*. In case of *samavyapti*, you find two sides relation. That means, by seeing the one, you can infer the other and by seeing the other, you can infer the priority one but in case of *asamavyapti*, by pursuing *x* you can infer to *y*. However, while pursuing *y*, you cannot infer to *x*.

So, this is the way you have to understand *samavyapti* and *asamavyapti*. Further, they said *vyapti* relation we explain it in this way. It is a universal, invariable, unconditional and concomitance relation between *hetu* and *sadhya*. If any one of the component will be missing, then this relation cannot be a *vyapti* relation.


So, therefore to have a *vyapti* relation, we must find that *hetu* and *sadhya* will be having the universal relation, invariable relation, unconditional and concomitance relation and it should be find always. If this is so, then based on this relation you can infer the situation. *Vyapti* therefore, is a logical condition of inference, may be defined either positively or negatively.

Now, we find how this *vyapti* relation can be explained both positively and negatively. As you know that *naiyayikas* also define something, explain something negatively. For example, if I say this is my pen. According to *naiyayikas*, they say that this pen is not chair, this pen is not table, this pen is not tree, this pen is not duster.

So, they try to eliminate through the elimination process, they try to conclude on a certain issue, they try to establish certain fact or they try to argue on a certain existence of an object. So, now we will see that how this *vyapti* relation can be found, both

positively and negatively and how it becomes the ground, the logical ground for having an inferential knowledge?

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- ❖Vyāpti is a relation between two terms based on four factors.
- ❖Anvaya
- ❖Vyatireka
- ❖Phuyodarsana
- ❖Tarka

Anvaya

- ❖It is an affirmative inference.
- ❖This is based on UA proposition.
- ❖It is a permanent relation.
- ❖In this case, we perceive these two things together always.

 NPTEL

Now, vyapti relation is between two terms. As you know that it is a hetu and sadhya is based on the four factors. One is anvaya, the second one is vyatireka, the third one is phuyodarsana and the fourth one is tarka.

In case of anvaya, you find it is an affirmative inference. This is based on universal affirmative proposition UA transfer here, universal affirmative proposition. It is a permanent relation between this hetu and sadhya. In this case, we perceive these two things together always. That means what anvaya try to express is that, that in all the cases this hetu and sadhya should be positively found.

If in any instances you find smoke and never find fire, then the vyapti relation never exist, hence for whatever you inference that on the hill there is a fire that will be wrong or invalid knowledge.


Therefore, they say that vyapti can be explained in positive sense. That means, in all the instances that you have seen so far or experienced, so far you find that fire and smoke hetu and sadhya will be fine together in all the places. This is the feature states by anvaya.

Now, the second one is vyatireka. Vyatireka contrasts to anvaya. This negatively says that there should not be any such cases where you find fire without smoke or you find smoke without fire that means, negatively establishing some fact.

The invariable fact between these two terms hetu and sadhya and if you can negatively establish that there would not be any such condition where fire and smoke can be separated. We say that fire exists without smoke and smoke exists without fire. So, this is also a negatively establishing a condition where it helps us to infer some kind of object which turns to a valid one.

Now, in anvaya also if you find I have given you an example say that whatever smoky is fiery. So, therefore you find all M is P. M here stands for as a middle term and P stands for the major term. In reference to the nyaya logicians, you find M is a middle term stands for hetu and P as a major term stands for sadhya.


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Vyatireka

- ❖ It is a negative inference.
- ❖ This is based on UN proposition.
- ❖ It contradicts to Anvya.
- ❖ The process of contradicting is, contradict the predicate part of the Anvya and placed in the subject part of Vyatireka and contradict the subject part of the Anvya and placed in the predicate part of Vyatireka.
- ❖ Example; Whatever is not fiery is not smoky.
(All not-P is not-M)

 NPTEL

Now, we will see how vyatireka, they have explained. In case of vyatireka, they say that it is a negative inference. This is based on universal negative proposition. In case of anvaya, you find it refers to universal affirmative proposition where subject part is distributed but here, he is saying that it is a universal negative proposition. It corresponds or based on the universal negative propositions.


It contradicts to anvaya. The process of contradicting means the subject of the anvaya will be placed in the predicate of the vyatireka in a contradiction form and also the predicate of the anvaya contradicts and placed in the subject form of vyatireka. So, that means there I have given all M is P.

So, here you find all not P is not M because the P what you find here the subject part which is neglected here in vyatireka, you find that is positively in case of anvaya. The explanation I have given in this way contradict the predicate part of the anvaya and placing the subject part of vyatireka and contradict the subject part of the anvaya and place in the predicate part of vyatireka.

Example, I have said whatever is not fiery is not smoky. That means, all not P is not M.

What they say is that there should not be any such cases where you find one without the other. So, this is one of the conditions has to be satisfied in the vyapti relation to have an inferential knowledge.

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Phuyodarsana

- ❖ It implies the repeated observation of two terms together.

Tarka

- ❖ It is needed for proving the validity of arguments.
- ❖ It helps for removing the doubt of the argument or the fact.
- ❖ Whenever there is doubt, it is arrested by Tarka.
- ❖ If there will be no Vyapti relation, then the fallacy arises known as *petitio principii*.

 NPTEL

The third point they said that phuyodarsana; that means, it implies the repeated observation of two terms together. Before inferring by seeing the smoke you are inferring that there may be fire on the hill. He is saying that you can infer only when in your past you have observed many of the situations positively.

He is saying that constant observation you have done in your past. Therefore, you accumulate the information and find that this major terms and minor terms are closely invariable inseparably related. Hence, for you are inferring without not even seeing fire over there on the hill, without seeing even fire over there, by just seeing a smoke you can infer the situation that there may be a fire on the hill.


In case of tarka, tarka stands for as a hypothetical reasoning or hypothetical argument. That means, in a hypothetical basis you argued. There are many situations if you cannot argue properly, the whole conclusion will be invalid because your argument is not systematic, your argument does not follow the logicity.

Therefore, they said that it is needed the tarka or the hypothetical argument or hypothetical reasoning is needed for proving the validity of arguments. It helps or assists for removing the doubt of the argument of the fact. That means, if you can able to argue on a particular fact in a logical and coherent way, your argument will be valid and if your argument is not valid, then you find that your arguments somewhere are not logical.

Consisting this concept or holding this concept, naiyayikas said that this tarka or the hypothetical argument helps for removing the doubts of the argument or the fact. Further they say wherever there is a doubt; it is arrested by tarka or hypothetical argument. You said that if something is wrong in your conclusion, you say that your argument may not be follow properly logically or sequentially. Therefore, they say that if there is no vyapti relation as such, then the fallacy will arise known as *petitio principii*.


That means, if there will be no vyapti relation where hetu and sadhya will be concomitantly, universally, invariably related with each other, the inference will be would not be possible. Again you go back to that circle saying that you perceive the smoke, you cannot infer the situation, therefore the fallacy known as *petitio principii* which is in a circle. Therefore, you find that the importance of logical grounds to have an inferential knowledge according to nyaya system.

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The Psychological ground of Inference

- ❖ 'Paksata' is considered as the psychological ground of inference.
- ❖ It is primarily concerned with the possibility of inference.
- ❖ It is the relation between paksa and hetu.
- ❖ In this case we want to infer something on the minor term.
- ❖ Prāchīna Nyāya: There are two conditions for Paksatā.
 - i) Lack of certainty (Siddhyabhāva)
 - ii) Desire to infer (Sisādhayisā)

 NPTEL

Now, we will see the psychological grounds for having an inferential knowledge. What is the psychological ground? When I say the psychology something comes to your mind that is mental exercises.

Now, we will see how this is really mental exercise stands to the ground to have an inferential knowledge and it is not limited to that. Whatever knowledge we have through the inference, it should be a valid knowledge. That means inference as a pramana certainly leads to pramana.

Now, we will see how psychological ground helps to have an inferential knowledge. They said that paksata is considered as a psychological ground of inference. It is primarily concerned with the possibility of inferences. Again here you find there is a relation between hetu and sadhya and however, they focused here is that in case of psychological ground, the more concerned over here the relation between paksa and hetu, hill and smoke. That means, once you see the smoke over there, then you have anxiety to infer certain situation and anxiety comes because of your mental exercises and because of your mental exercise, you try to retrieve all the past information what you had seen both positively and negatively, in case of fire and smoke.

What you have seen in the past? How fire and smoke is related in various evidences, all things you can accumulate or retrieve through your memory. So, therefore in case of


psychological ground the most important part is you find paksa and hetu to be related or there is a relation between hetu and paksa. Further, they said in this case we want to infer something on the minor term. Minor term means hill. By seeing the smoke, now you want to infer something on the hill.

So, for that there are two conditions to be involved. One is you are not certain whether there is a fire or not, lack of certainty and the second one is you must have a anxiety or desire to infer certain situation. There are many situations you have seen something perceived something but you do not have any anxiety desire or an inclination to infer something. There inference does not work because to have an anxiety, to have an inferential knowledge you try to bring all your past evidences, experiences and based on that past experiences which is known as vyapti relation, you try to impose on the object whether your inferential knowledge will be correct or not. Based on all this functions together, it is a mental function.

Therefore, prachina nyaya said that there are two conditions involved for having paksa. One is lack of certainty, another is desire to infer. For example, if you show me a pen I will just see it I say that this is a pen and further, I do not want to infer anything on it. That means, here inferential knowledge cannot work, would not function but if I have a desire to know further about that pen and whatever thing I infer, I say that this pen may be good, whenever you write with this pen it is very smooth because of my earlier experience, because of the earlier evidences that I have gathered in the form of experience. It will be retrieved from my memory and imposed on that object.

So, therefore by seeing the dot pen, I can infer the situation that this pen writes smoothly. So, here he is saying that there are two conditions invariably related. One is lack of certainty and the cognizer who is trying to infer certain situation. He or she must have a desire to cognize that object through the inferential knowledge.

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- ❖ Paksatā consists in the presence of doubt about Sādhya (fire).
- ❖ Here, doubt does not only imply the absence of certain knowledge about something but also a positive desire or will to know it.
- ❖ Thus, doubt as a condition of inference involves both the absence of certainty about something and the desire to have certain knowledge about that thing.
- ❖ Modern Naiyāyikas: Inference is caused by 03 possible conditions, these are;
- ❖ Absence of certainty + desire to infer
- ❖ Absence of certainty + absence of desire

Now, further they said that there are three conditions where inferential knowledge is possible based on the psychological ground. One is absence of certainty, desire to infer and the second one is absence of certainty and absence of desire. The third one is presence of certainty and presence of desire, we will discuss. Before that we will just see how other points naiyayikas made it. Naiyayikas said that paksata consist in the presence of doubt about the sadhya.

He is saying that it is a psychological ground. You have a doubt whether it is right or it is correct for you to infer that fire on the hill or not. By seeing the smoke whether it is correct from your side, from your point of view to infer whether there is a fire exist on the hill or not. So, here the doubt really arises. What they are saying is that doubt never limits to only a particular field saying that you have to doubt only without searching for its further truth.

He is saying that doubt does not only imply the absence of certain knowledge about something but also positive desire or will to know it. That means, just having a doubt is not sufficient enough. You must have a desire, you must have a will to know something about it and then only the inferential knowledge will work here. It is a psychological ground.

Further, they said that thus doubt as a condition of inference involves both the absence of certainty about something and the desire to have certain knowledge about that thing. First you say see a smoke, now this is certain for you. Now, based on the smoke now you immediately infer because you have seen the past experience and after inferring also, you are not sure because you are in doubt because you are not seeing the fire with the smoke. He is saying that. Since, you are in doubt and anxiety to infer this situation; you could able to do that.

You could able to infer the situation because of your past experience retrieved through the memory and imposed on that object and you know that how this vyapti relation functions here between hetu and sadhya. So, therefore these are the conditions where psychological ground plays a role to have an inference.

As I said, that modern naiyayikas said that inference is caused by three possible conditions. These are I have already discussed with you that absence of certainty, cause, desire to infer.

Now, I will give an example which helps to understand that absence of certainty and you have a desire to infer the situation and how here psychological ground plays a role to have an inferential knowledge which will be known as a valid knowledge or pramana. For example, when in a fine morning you get up from the bed and go for a walk, you see that the whole road is full of leaf, both dried leaf as well as green leaf. Further, you find there are drop of water on the leaf. Then once you will go further walk after certain point, you find that there are few places water is floated. Few holes are filled with water. Then once you go and go on, you find that further there is some mud.

Then you may think that this is because the cause of the monkey family. Monkey might be doing that but however, you have a desire to infer. You infer that may be yesterday there is a rain because of this all that appear in the mud. Here is a lack of certainty. You are not sure about saying that absence of certainty who has done it.

Then you have infer the situation, then you thought that it may be a monkey family but later you conclude that because of your previous experiences of rain water and after rain what the situation happens. Based on that, you infer the situation that you said that may be yesterday night there was a rain. As a result in the morning, it is find in this way, the


situation are in this way. So, here you find that your inferential knowledge, it is based on these two factors. One is absence of certainty and the second one is you have a desire to infer.

The second point they said that absence of certainty cause absence of desire. In that case also, we can infer certain situation naiyayikas has explained. Suppose, you know that there is a lightning and after that thunder when there is a lightning you are not sure about it because it just immediately disappears. You may think that maybe because of your some eyesight problem or some immediately the light reflects on your eye, you are seeing that. However, this is not correct.

Therefore, it is an absence of certainty. Once there is a lightning in the sky, you are not sure about it and after that thunder come; you need not infer it because of the association with lightning and thunder in your previous experience, you need not infer that without inferring things comes automatically. So, here also inferential knowledge work what they said is that there are many cases where you see the lightning but you cannot hear the thunder. That means there may be a mild thunder where the sound is not audible to us.


So, in this case also inferential knowledge is possible because here you find absence of certainty and absence of desire.

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- ❖ Presence of certainty + Presence of desire
- ❖ There is only one condition where inference is not possible, i.e.
presence of certainty + absence of desire to infer.
- ❖ If every inference must involve at least three steps, then what is the chief cause(karana) of inferential reasoning?
- ❖ Prāchīna Nyāya: **Linga**
- ❖ Mīmāṃsikas & Vedāntins: **Vyāpti**
- ❖ Navya Nyāya : **Vyāpti**
- ❖ Navya Nyāya (later view): **Tritiya linga parāmarsa**
- ❖ It means consideration of middle term for the third - times.

 NPTEL

The third point they said the presence of certainty and the presence of desire. That means, the example I will give you which helps to understand. According to Descartes he is saying that I think therefore I exist. When you say that I think that means a certainty. Thinking being your thinking being is certain. There is doubt further arises whether this thinking being leads to any kind of certainty of your existence or not.

So, since there is anxiety, since there is a desire comes within you. Therefore, you try to infer of your existence. Therefore, the famous sentences made by Becker saying that I think therefore I exist. Here you infer the situation about your existence. Here, you find both in case presence in certainty and also your presence of desire for helping us to have an inferential knowledge.

Here, you find the knowledge is a kind of psychological ground. So, in this case these three conditions where psychological grounds also a cognizer to infer a certain situation and the inference knowledge here will be termed as a valid knowledge but only one condition where inferential knowledge is not possible that is the presence of certainty, but you have not any desire to infer.

When some object exist before you, but after that you do not want to infer something. That means, you just see the smoke on the hill and after that you do not have any desire to infer whether there is a fire exist or whether there is a fire does not exist. There nothing of this sort. Just you see something ends there. You have knowledge of that object where your sense organs contact and after that your knowledge will stop there.

This is then inferential knowledge does not work here. So, therefore, a cognizer must have a desire to infer certain things, then only inferential knowledge to be considered as a valid knowledge or a pramana to have a pramana.

Further, they said that if every inference must involve at least three steps. What are the three steps? The first step is as you know the hill is smoky, it is a minor term and the middle term then you find wherever fire, there is a smoke. Here, you find the major term and middle term and the last one you find there is a relation between paksa and sadhya, major term and minor term.

He is saying that these three steps are involved to have an inference. If these are the three steps, what is the real cause or *karana* or *nimitha* cause or the proximate cause for having an inferential knowledge?

Now, you find different systems, different scholars even in *nyaya*. Among them they have given their different opinion and however, they have established their opinion. If you see *prachina nyaya*, they said that *linga* or *hetu* are middle term is the *karana* or is the proximate cause for having an inferential knowledge.

However, you find *mimasikas* and the *vedantins*. They said that it is not *linga*; it is a *vyapti* relation because whatever we infer based on the *vyapti* relation. If we have not seen in our past experiences that how this *sadhya* and *hetu* closely related in case of universal, concomitance, invariable, indispensable relation. Then we could not able to reach to a situation or a position where we could able to infer that there is a fire on the hill.


Therefore, they said that it is a *vyapti* relation. *Mimasikas* and the *vedantins* say that it is a *vyapti* relation which helps us to infer something by pursuing something. So, therefore for them *vyapti* is the *karana* or the *nimitha* cause to have an inferential knowledge.

Further, you find *navya nyaya* said that it is a *vyapti* relation *navya nyaya* also agreed saying that *vyapti* relation to be is a rudimentary as a principle cause for having an inferential knowledge. Without *vyapti* relation, no one can have any kind of inferential knowledge. The letter *navya nyaya* said that it is a *tritiya linga paramarsa*. That means the middle term has to be perceived three times.

If this is the case, then only the inferential knowledge will be turns into a valid knowledge. Otherwise, at any such cases the inferential knowledge cannot be treated as a valid knowledge. Now, let us see what they mean by *tritiya linga paramarsa*. They said that it is not three propositions enough to have an inferential knowledge. We need at least five propositions to have an inferential knowledge.

Now, let us see how they considered the five propositions as an inferential knowledge and how they explained this? *Tritiya linga paramarsa* is an important aspect or an approximate cause to have an inferential knowledge.

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- ❖ Example;
 - i) The hill is fiery.
 - ii) Because of smoke.
 - iii) Whatever smoky is fiery.
 - iv) So the hill is smoky.
 - v) The hill is fiery.
- ❖ First: the character of the paksa(hill) is related to Sādhya (fire).
- ❖ Second: there is invariable relation between hetu and Sādhya.
- ❖ Third: the hetu is found in relation to the minor - term.

NPTEL

Now, tritiya linga paramarsa means the linga has to be observed three types. The example I have given here they said that the hill is fiery because of smoke. Further, I said the third sentence whatever smoke is fiery. So, the hill is smoky, therefore the hill is fiery. You find that either of the two, either first two or the last two, if you just delete it still the inferential knowledge maintain its own stand point having the vyapti relation.

However, the letter navya nyaya said that we need these five kinds of propositions because the first case where the paksa and fire related when you say that the character of the paksa is related with the sadhya fire, you find that hetu relation because you infer that there is a fire on the hill because of the smoke. Here, smoke is the middle term or a hetu the first time you have seen that first time the hetu appears.

The second time he said that there is an invariable relation, you have seen in your past. In your past, in many occasions you find that where there is a lamp is burning, you find there is a fire and smoke. Wherever there is a candle light, you find there is a fire and smoke. Wherever something is burnt some wooden is burnt, you find that there is a fire as well as smoke.

So, all this issue together, here also finds smoke and fire related with each other. That means it is a second time where the smoke has to be observed or smoke is to be perceived. Now, two times you can perceive linga. The third time they are saying that the

hetu is found in relation to the minor term. Lastly, you conclude that because of this I am inferring fire on the hill.

So, therefore, they explained there are three types a hetu is to be observed. As the result, these tritiya linga paramarsa play a neither cause approximate cause to have an inferential knowledge.

I repeat in the first case, when you have observed the hetu when you see a smoke on a hill and second time you observe the hetu when the smoke and fire related with each other invariably with vyapti relation in your past experiences.

The third one, when you infer the fire on the hill, there you find that smoke is there. So, in this way they have explained that three times the hetu is to be observed or perceived, then only the inferential knowledge will be valid. Otherwise, in any such cases inferential knowledge may not be a valid knowledge or Pramana.

So, this is the way logical and psychological ground help to have an inferential knowledge. Thank you.

So, I will just brief it out what I have said so far. I said that logical and psychological grounds for having an inferential knowledge.

In case of logical ground, we said that how vyapti relation is important. While explaining vyapti relation we said that there are two types of vyapti relation. One is samavyapti and another is asamavyapti. In case of samavyapti, we said that it is two way traffic. By seeing one, you can infer others and by seeing the other, you can infer the earlier one but in case of asamavyapti which is known as Visamvyapti, in this case you find only one side relation. That means, by perceiving x, you can infer to y. However, by perceiving y, you cannot infer to x.

After that, we discussed that how really that positively and negatively vyapti can be explained. That anaya, vyatireka, phuyodarsana and tarka and after that, we have discussed how this psychological ground responsible for having an inferential knowledge.

While discussing these psychological grounds, we have discussed that how this hetu and the minor term is related with each other. There we have said that there are two conditions involved, one is lack of certainty and the cognize has a desire to infer, then only inferential knowledge is possible.

Further, we said that there are three conditions where psychological grounds help to have an inferential knowledge. One is absence of certainty. You have a desire to infer; then we said that then you have absence of certainty and absence of desire.

Further, we said that presence of certainty and presence of desire. In three conditions psychological grounds helps to have an inferential knowledge. Further, we said that only one condition where inferential knowledge not supported by the psychological grounds or inferential knowledge is not possible. That is the presence of certainty but absence of desire to have further inferential knowledge.

You do not have a desire to infer and this is the psychological ground we have discussed all this.

Thank you so much.