

**Indian Philosophy**  
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**Module No. # 08**  
**Lecture No. # 35**  
**The Vaisesika Philosophy**

Welcome to this session. In this session, we will discuss the third and fourth category of Vaisesika philosophy. We were discussing about substance or dravya and also the second category is guna or quality as you know. According to Vaisesika, there are seven categories or padarthas. Padarthas stands for the object and having a particular name.

Further, they said that to be a padartha, it has to satisfy three features. One is astitva, the uniqueness of that object. The second one is that we can think of it, we can know that object, knowability. The knowability characteristics must satisfy that object. The third one is nameability. There is a name we must give to that object. So, that object will be identified with having a particular name. So, therefore, three things, three qualities, three characteristics or three features that we need to find in an object, so that we can say that, that element or object is known as padarthas, according to Vaisesika philosophy.

What are these three? One is astitva and by considering these three features, they said that there are seven padarthas. What are those seven padarthas? They are dravya, gun, action, samanya, samavaya. Then we have vishesha and abhava. I repeat Dravya or substance, guna or quality, action or karma, samanya or generality, then samavaya or inherence, then vishesha or particular and the last one is known as abhava or non-existence.

The first six we had mentioned by Kanada and the last one are mentioned by the later thinkers. So, therefore in total we find seven categories and further, I hope you might have remember as I told you that for them there are nine substances and out of nine substances, few are eternal and few are non-eternal. We had already discussed about all these things. Today, we will discuss about the third category or padartha known as karma

or action and also we will discuss the fourth category which is known as samanya or generality.

Now, let us discuss karma or action. We will see how vaishesika really argue that action or karma is an independent padartha among other padarthas and how they will explain that action. Let us discuss. Before discussing vaishesika's standpoints on action, we must understand there is a common understanding of action when I say karma. What you mean when I say karma. You mean there is an action. If I say that please do not do that karma that means, please do not do that action. If I say that, that action is good that means, I am identifying to a particular action stating that this is good or this is resulted a good value for you as well as for the society.

If I say that bad karma results the bad effect, good karma result the good effect or good karma bear the good food. What we understand from my sentences is that there is karma, there is an action, there is a motion, there is a movement and of course, if an individual is doing some or other actions, there will be a result for that. Therefore, now in our common understanding, we have understood that karma stands for action or a moment. The vaishesika system also agreed to that but they have a particular standpoint or they have a different way of explaining action. Now, that point we need to discuss in this class.

Now, broadly if you find that action is of two types, one is metaphysical action, another is epistemological action. Metaphysical action talks about that every action has a result. As I said as you sow, so you reap. The famous sentence you might have heard many times as you sow, so you reap. If you have understood the content, you have study skills, you have done better in your examination, you can score good grade. If you have fix for a particular ambition in your life, then you try to do the action for that certainly you may reach to that goal.

So, in this way there is karma and that karma leads to some of the effect that you call metaphysical. When we talk about metaphysical, we think about something existence. Existence means existence in the phenomenal world. If you study hard, if you do labor you can succeed something exist, something empirical, something evidential that is a metaphysical understanding of action. Many people might have told you or there is a story always people told that in the previous karma you might have done something

good, as a result in this birth you are taking a human being shape or because of your past karma and that were good, therefore you have taken the birth of a human being, not animal, not reptiles nor any creature.

If you might have done the bad karma in your past life, then certainly in this life you will be having some creature or lower animal, even a plant even. That is a story people believe it. You know karma theory as you do in your action; it has a result in future that is a metaphysical implication of understanding karma or action.

There is another perspective for understanding the term karma or action that is known as epistemological perspective. When I talk about epistemology, I mean that there is knowledge involved it. How we should understand that action? What really helps us to understand that a phenomenon which is known as action that is an epistemological perspective. Where from we can derive that action does action have some qualities? Is it the case that action exists independent of any other thing? Where we can find action?

So, if all these questions are the epistemological questions, all these questions try to understand the concept, action or karma and particularly Vaishesika philosophy worry about that. Therefore, they have found out many of their arguments on understanding the concept action and they claim that they submit their view that action is an independent category like guna, substance and then you have abhava or non-existence so and so forth.

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## Karma (Action)

- ❖ It is the third padārtha in the list of seven padārthas.
- ❖ Karma theory is grounded in action.
- ❖ It can be understood in two perspectives; metaphysical & epistemological
- ❖ As we sow, so we reap- metaphysical perspective
- ❖ Epistemological perspective encompasses two pivotal questions.
- ❖ Can we claim action is a product of Guna?
- ❖ How is it rational to consider conjunction & disjunction are caused by action?



Now, let us see how Vaisesika really emphasized on action to understand it from the epistemological perspectives. Karma, it is the third padartha in the list of seven padarthas. As I said, there are seven padarthas mentioned by vaisesikas and this is the in the list it is the third one, prior to that we had discussed dravya and guna. Karma theory is grounded in action that is a common understanding. If I say do not do that karma, then I simply mean that do not do that action. Therefore, whenever one talks about karma, it always implies some kind of actions.

The further I say it can be understood in two perspectives. One is metaphysical, another is epistemological. As we sow, so we reap is a metaphysical perspective which talks about the existence, something evidential. Now, epistemological perspective encompasses or embraces two pivotal questions. What are those? Can we claim action is a product of guna. This is very interesting, we had already discussed about substance and guna. Now, the question comes, can we really think of or can we really claim that action is derived from guna, can we say so? This is a question or is it that case that guna derived from action.

If you remember when we were discussing guna, we said that guna or quality does not have further quality. It never generates any action rather for its own existence; it requires some element that is known as substance. Therefore, guna cannot exist independently of it, for its existence it requires substance.

Now, one question remains here, then is it the case that we derive action from guna. You say simply no because quality does not generate any actions. It never even stands as a material cause for the conjunction and disjunction of any two objects. Therefore, we cannot derive action from guna; neither guna can be derived from action. These are two independent padartha or independent categories.

Then question arises, where it resides? How can we find action in a particular element or a component or a substance or an object? How can we find an action in an object? That means it presupposes that action resides somewhere and here, vaishesika claims that actions subsides in substance. It does not exist independent of substance; it does not have an independent existence. For its existence; it requires substance like guna. Guna cannot exist independently, for its existence and it requires substance.

In the similar way, action cannot exist independently. For its existence, it requires substance. So, therefore if I move a chair, it is the substance which moves and because of the action over here, I could able to move the substance known as table. So, therefore substance has actions but action cannot exist independent of substance.

The further question they said how is it rational to consider conjunction and disjunction are caused by action? Can we claim that because of the action, we find the conjunction between two objects or disjunction between two objects? How can we claim that because of action we find conjunction and disjunction in the substances and what is the justification for that? Now, these are the questions really subsumes the epistemological perspective for understanding the concept action or karma.

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❖ Kanāda defines action as:

“Eka dravyam ajunam samyoga  
vibhāgesu anapeksa karanam eti  
karma laksanam”.

❖ It expresses that karma resides in a substance, does not possess any attribute, but an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction, such is the mark of action.

❖ Action is not itself a property but it is the cause of the properties of a substance.

❖ Quality can't be an action.

❖ Like Guna, Karma can't exist independent of substance.



Continuing further, by asking these are the questions. Now, Kanada as you know the founder of the vaishesika philosophy he defines by writing the sutra. He said that eka dravyam ajunam samyoga vibhagesu anapeksa karanam eti karma laksanam. What it means? This is in sanskrit sloka. He explains that karma resides in a substance; karma cannot exist independent of it. Further said that it does not possess any attribute, action is the one which does not possess any attribute. Like a substance possesses attribute but a quality does not possess any further quality. In the same way action does not possess any further qualities.

Then in the third point, he said that it is an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction. Such is the mark of action. First, action resides in a substance, it does not have any qualities but it is the cause for the conjunction and disjunction between two substances and this is the mark of action. Now, Kanada clearly defines what really action is and if all these feature, we will find we can say that this is the action.

Then further they said that action is not itself a property but it is the cause of properties of a substance. It is a very interesting and philosophical. Action is itself not a property because as you know that action is different from quality. Quality is an independent padartha and action is an also independent padartha, according to vaishesika. Therefore neither quality can be an action nor can action be a quality, so this is rule now.

These two are independent category but the question here is that it is because of the action, it is because of the movement in a substance we find different attributes in a

substances. We identify a substance of having different attributes. Thus, they said that neither quality can be an action nor an action can be a quality but because of that action, we find different qualities in a substance.

For example, you as a student, now you are moving or you are working. Working is also an action. There is a movement. You move from x to y, so the distance let us say 10 kilometers you go by walk. In the time of x the energy you have, the potentiality you have, the anxiety you have to go to y, certainly it is something positive but once you reach to the y, then some of your qualities deteriorated. You do not have that energy and potential to walk further.

Henceforth, it is because of the action we find different qualities in a substance. Thus, I repeat I said that vaishesika clearly emphasized that although an action cannot be derived from guna, an action cannot exist independent of substance, yet actions create some moment in a substance. As a result, we find different features in a substance that is the uniqueness of the action.

Now further, quality cannot be an action. As I said like guna, karma cannot exist independent of substance. So, now you can find the uniqueness of an action and how really vaishesika defines the uniqueness individuality of action which is known as astitva. Now, the two other features remains, one is its knowability. We know what action is because it defines. Kanada clearly defines what an action is. Therefore, we can think of that action, we can know of that action. Nameability, there is a name and what are those names that we are going to discuss in this class.

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- ❖ Karma is different from Guna.
- ❖ Guna is a passive property whereas, action is dynamic and transient feature of a substance.
- ❖ So it is regarded as the independent cause of the conjunction & disjunction of things.
- ❖ All actions must subsist in corporeal substances, such as earth, water, light, etc.
- ❖ But actions can't subsist in eternal substances like space, time, soul, etc.
- ❖ No motion is found in eternal substances, because they can't change their position.



Now, continuing further they said that karma is different from guna. Karma is different from guna and also vice versa. Guna is different from karma because these two are independent category or padartha, according to vaishesika philosophy. Guna is a passive property where as action is a dynamic and transient feature of a substance. Guna is a passive feature.

Suppose, I see an apple, say its color is red that is a passive feature which lies in the substance apple but what is action. If I will drop that apple from the basket, it will fall on the earth and once it will fall on the earth, then it takes a different shape. It would not remain as I had seen some time back. Therefore, because of the action we find different properties in it and action here is a dynamic. It is not passive like qualities and because of the dynamic nature, it identifies as a separate one or it is identify as an independent padartha among seven padarthas.

Then they said it is an independent cause of the conjunction and disjunction of things. All actions must subsist in corporeal substances. Further, by explaining action they said that, that action that we find in our day to day activities, certainly it relates to the objects that we find in the phenomenal world. Any action that we are talking about certainly it relates to the different objects that we find in this phenomenal world.




For example, if I say that I have moved the chair from place x to y chair we find in this earth. I say that my dot pen I am now moving my dot pen from this corner of table to that corner of table, therefore there is a movement. So, anything that we talk about action and movement that all we find in this corporal world in the empirical world but action we cannot find in case of eternal substances like soul, mind, space, etcetera because there is no movement we find in all these substances.

They are the ultimate atoms and they exist eternally. We do not find any motion or action in the eternal substances because their positions are unchanged. They remain as it is; they are eternal all the time. Therefore, we do not find any kind of action or movement in the eternal substances.

We find action or movement in the empirical substances or the substances those found in the empirical world but we do not find motion in the eternal substances because their positions are fixed and unchanged. Wherever you find motion, there must be change in it. Wherever you find a motion, movement or action you find there is a change or some sorts of change we can observe in it. Since, eternal substances are eternal, timelessly, permanently we do not find any change in them. Therefore, we do not find motion or movement in case of eternal substances.

The same thing I have written here. I said that all actions must subsist in corporal substances such as earth, water, light, etcetera but actions cannot subsist in eternal substances like space, time and soul etcetera. No motion is found in eternal substances because they cannot change their position. Same thing I have explained to you.

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Now, moving further as I said that actions are of different types, there are five kinds of action mentioned by vaishesika philosophy. What are those five? Now, you might have seen in your life time that whenever we pull out the spring, the spring gets expanded. Whenever we leave the spring, then the spring compressed, isn't it? It is a motion whenever you throw, say an object to the sky, it goes up till certain distance, then because of the law of gravity it falls down.

So, therefore you find that there is an upward movement, there is a downward movement, there is an expansion, there is a contraction and there is a motion. Isn't it? The same thing Vaishesika categorically said that we find five kinds of action. One is utksepana; upward movement, then avaksepana; downward movement, then akunchana; contraction, then prasarana; expansion, then gamana which is known as locomotion.

Now, discussing the first point utksepana, what they have explained is that it is the cause of the contact of a body with some higher region, for example throwing a ball upward. As I said that whenever we throw an object towards the sky, we find that it goes to a certain extent. So, it is an upward movement because of there is a force involved in it. It goes up and in this case, you find it is the cause of the contact of a body with some higher region. Then automatically it falls down because of law of gravitation.

So, therefore it is said that it is the cause of the contact of a body with some lower region. Then example I have given over here that throwing a ball from the house top, immediately it will fall. See there are many ripe fruits; it falls down from the branch of a tree.


Then further there we find akunchana. Akunchana means contraction, compress you say that. It is a cause of such closer contact of the parts of the body as it did not previously exist. Akunchana, now if I leave a spring on the table, you find it is in the akunchana shape. Now, if I tight all my fingers if you see in my hand, if I tight all my fingers that is clinching my fingers, it is not in the original position. The original position may be I am free. Once I am clinching my finger that means, I am tightening all my fingers. In the same way you find spring and how it happens because of the movement the parts of the body that is different parts. Therefore, I said it is the cause of such closer contact of the parts of the body as it did not previously exist. My fingers if you observe, it is as usual but if I wish to clench it, I can clench it that is a contraction.

Now, expansion, again if I will try to move each part of body from another in a distance, then I can just do that. So, now you can see that each finger of my hand now making a distance from another finger. Therefore, now opening my fingers, so this is called prasarana. Whenever I am clenching, it is known as contraction and whenever I am just expanding it, it is an expansion that is called prasarana. The same thing I have written here, I said that it is the cause of the destruction of previous closer contract among the parts of a body.

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- ❖Prasārana (Expansion)  
It is the cause of the destruction of previous closer contact among the parts of a body, e.g. opening one's clenching hand.
- ❖Gamana (Locomotion)  
Walking, riding, climbing, etc. are included in gamana



For example, opening one clenching hand, previously it was in contraction. Now, once I move it then we find that each finger have some distance from other finger. Therefore, I said that opening ones clenching fingers, instead of hand you can say that clenching fingers.

Now, the last part, the last kind of action which is known as gamine or locomotion where you find that walking, you are riding your bicycle, you say swimming, climbing a coconut tree and so and so forth all these include as locomotion or gamine. So, therefore in total we find five kinds of action. One is upward movement, second one is downward movement and third one is akunchana or contraction. The fourth one is prasarana or the expansion and the fifth one is gamana.

Now, you can see how Vaisesika talks about the reality and why we call vaisesika's are realistic philosophers? Why they belong to a realism school because whenever they talk about something on some issue, it deals with the phenomenal world and deals with correctly the phenomenal world, not in a imagine situation. Therefore, they are realistic in that sense. Now, I believe that you have understood the third padartha which is known as action. That is why it is in independent category as like guna substance and other categories.

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## Sāmānya(Generality)

- ❖ It is the 4<sup>th</sup> category of the Vaisesika padārthas.
- ❖ Things of the certain class bear a common name because they possess their common nature, like; cow, horse, etc.
- ❖ Generally speaking, something common among the objects of experience is called generality.
- ❖ But any notion of commonality can't be considered as sāmānya: Kanāda
- ❖ He defines, sāmānya is that which is eternal and resides in its individuals of having the inherent relation.
- ❖ In other words, commonality is eternal and having inseparable relation with its distinct individuals.



Now moving further, now we will discuss the fourth category which is known as samanya or generality. Now, before discussing Vaisesika standpoint, now we will discuss. Let us have a common understanding what we mean by generality. Once we can understand the generality, then I believe it will be very helpful for you to understand the Vaisesika standpoint on the concept samanya or generality.

What is generality? Let us say the word horse. When I say the word horse or utter the word horse, I mean all the horses of different kinds in this world, both past, present and future. I never said that this horse or that horse. What I utter the word is that horse. Here, horse is a general term and horse is having certain features because we have argued that a substance consist of some qualities and actions. A horse can ride that is an action. A horse has certain features some color, size, shape these are the qualities **ok**.

If this is the case, then the question arises, is it the case that whenever I talk about the horse, I talk about all the horses ranging from the past, present and future and is it the case? Further, that whenever I talk about the horse, the same kind of features and action should find in each individuals of that horse. This is a provisional statement. We will discuss on this, how far vaisesika agreed on this concept or whether they do not agree on this concept at all.

Now, further question arises. There are different kinds of horse, we find some horses are very small, some horses are very tall, some horses are run fast and some horses do not. If there are many features are different from one horse to another horse, what basis, on

which ground we can claim that horse stands for a generic term or a horse stands for a particular class of animal. This is another question, now let put this question as a provision.

Now move further, there is another question. Again, its interestingly it arises that if at all we are claiming that because of the horseness, we find that x y z all animals belongs to the class horse, although they have a different features in it. Now, if this is so, then what is that horseness is about where it resides, what is really the horseness? Let assume that whatever you talk about the horseness, we accept that is the generality, then where it resides? How we take this? Can it exist independent of a substance? Can it exist independent of quality as well as action? What really is it? How we can understand this concept generality or commonality?

Now, all these issue that Vaisesika have discussed while discussing the concept samanya or generality, now the three questions that I have stated to you that is the concern for the Vaisesika. For understanding the concept or ideas, samanya or general, now let us discuss what is Vaisesika standpoint on this concept?

It is the fourth category of the Vaisesika padarthas. Things of the certain class bear a common name because they possess some common nature; things of the certain class bear a common name because they possess some common nature but not the feature. I repeat things of the certain class, bear a common name because they possess common nature. What is that common nature and how we can understand the common nature that is the question?

He said that we see different horses. Horse x, horse y, horse z and because of that commonness because of that horseness, we identify that these are the animals belong to a class horse, although they are different from their features. Someone may be tall; someone may run fast, someone may not run fast so and so. Although, their features are different from one to another but because of the commonness, we identify that x y z animals are known as horse.

Here, if you see that the argument, the logical argument they say that because of that commonness that is the identity that is the uniqueness and we can think of that uniqueness. Although, horse x, horse y, horse z are different from each other because of

their features but something is common among these three. Therefore, we call them that these animals are horses and because we see this uniqueness, we identify the generality and generality has a particular identification in this context.

Further, we can think of what is that commonness makes us to claim that these three animals having a particular name horse. Here, we find *astitva*; here we find which is knowable or thinkable. The last one is namable, we name that objects or name those animals as horse. Therefore, *samanya* is an independent category among other categories as like *guna*, substance and action.

Therefore, say that whenever I talk about the cow, whenever I talk about horse, it implies that the horseness in an animal. It implies that there is a class exists and in that class, there are different individuals exist. Although, they have a different features yet they have a one particular nature and because of that nature, we able to identify that animal belongs to a particular class and we name that class, let us say cow, horse so and so forth.

Now, moving further they said that generally speaking something common among objects of experiences is called generality. We find something common among horse x y z, therefore we say that this commonness is nothing but the generality or *samanya* but any notion of commonality cannot be considered as *samanya*. Anything that you find common cannot be considered as *samanya*.

For example, if you see say juice, a fruit juice, a glass of fruit juice, then you see a glass of water. Then you then if you see a glass of salty water, then if you see a glass of other color liquid, all are liquid. There is a commoner liquid but can we say all these belong to a particular class. This question arises.


Say for example, cow also have an animality, dog also have an animality, fox, horse there are many animals they have also animality features. Can we claim? Can we bring them in one class? Can we claim all these animals cat, horse, dog, etcetera to a one category saying that these are known as *exodus* or something we cannot say? So, because although some commonality we find but there are differences.

Now, for that reason Kanada said that any notion of commonality cannot be considered as *samanya*. He define *samanya* is that which is eternal and resides in its individuals of

having the inherent relations. He said that samanya is eternal, samanya is eternal and it resides in all the individual members of that class, then only we can find out what is samanya, what is the commonality among them.


Further, I am repeating what vaishesika said. Vaishesika said that samanya is an eternal, samanya is eternal and it resides in all the individual members of that class. Henceforth, they have given a unique distinction to the concept samanya or generality. Further, they said in other words, commonality is eternal and having inseparable relation with its distinct individuals.

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- ❖ Nyāya-Vaishesika: the 'class essence' corresponds to the 'class concept'.
- ❖ The universal inheres in all the individuals belonging to a class.
- ❖ Example; 'cowness' inheres in all individual cows.
- ❖ There are many cows but 'cowness' is one.
- ❖ Individual cows may subject to birth and death, but 'cowness' is eternal.
- ❖ Sāmānya is of different kinds depending on its expansion.
- ❖ These are;

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Continuing further, nyaya-vaishesika further said the class essence corresponds to the class concept. What is the class essence? You find that there are different individuals say different horses, horse x, horse y, horse z. There is an essence among all the members of that group and that essence is nothing but the generality or the commonality. Therefore, they said that if you can understand the concept class essence, it corresponds to the class concept; class essence corresponds to the class concept.

Now, further they said that universal inheres in all the individuals belonging to a class as I have discussed with you. The example they have given cowness inheres in all the individuals of the cow. There are many cows but cowness is one. So, they make here



clear distinction when they said that there is a generality. We find which is known as class essence or the class concept. There they said that the individual cow is different from the notion generality of the cow. Therefore, they said that cowness is the class essence that we find among all the members of that particular class, say cowness we find among all these cows that we find both, past, present and further.

Therefore, they say that the individual cow may subject to birth and death. An individual cow may subject to go to that cycle of birth and death but the cowness as an essence which remain unchanged which is an eternal. Therefore, they said that cowness is an eternal and permanent phenomenon that we find among all the individuals of the cow.

Therefore, cowness is a unique of its identification; it is a unique in its nature. Unlike, an individual cow, it never perishes; it never falls in the cycle of birth and death. Further, they said that, that there are many cows but cowness is one. Individual cow may subject to birth and death but cowness is eternal, it exists timelessly.

Samanya is of different kinds. Further, they said that after explaining the concept, after elucidating the concept samanya they said that samanya is of different kinds. It depends on its expansion and there are three kinds of samanya they have clearly emphasized. Now, let us discuss what are these three kinds of samanya?

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- ❖ Para sāmānya (larger extension)
- ❖ Aparā sāmānya (the nearest or ultimate proximate)
- ❖ Parāpara sāmānya (which exists in between para and aparā sāmānya)
- ❖ Example; Animal hood– para sāmānya  
Being hood– parāpara sāmānya  
Manhood– aparā sāmānya
- ❖ According to Kanāda, community and particularity depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence.
- ❖ They are conceptual constructs.
- ❖ They have ontological existence.



Para samanya, it is a larger extension Para samanya. Then aparā samanya, it is a very lower part of generality or the ultimate proximity and neither Para nor aparā the in between place, we find some generality which is known as parāpara samanya. I will give an example, Para samanya which is a larger extension. In that case, I say animal hood when I talk about animal, it includes all the creatures. It includes say tiger, bears, lions, deer, monkey, human being so and so forth. The domain over here is so big, wider and vast that is a generality because among all these creatures, we find animality. Therefore, I say animal hood.

Now, if I will be narrowing down the concept or samanya of animal hood, I will find being hood. Being hood talks about all human being having male, female, children each and every one. Therefore, you can see that although, being hood falls under the broader extension of generality animal hood but still if I can narrow down the concept animal hood, we find being hood. In other word, being hood has generality, may be part of the generality animal hood.

Now, again if I will be narrowing down my generality concept of being hood, I can say man hood. So, man hood here it talks about only to those male or male siblings. It never talks about children or talks about any women. Therefore, you can say that the man hood is the ultimate proximity of having the generality. We find different man that is man hood and there is a common essence among all the men. Therefore, we find man hood.

Again, if I will be expanding it or if you want to man hood in being hood, then we find men, women, children so on and so forth. Again, if the being hood we want to incorporate in the animal creatures, then we can say animal hood. So, therefore being hood is the in between or the mediatory which connects both that para samanya and apara samanya. Therefore, it is known as parapara samanya. Here, Para samanya stands which is a larger extension. It stands for animal hood apara samanya stands for a man hood and in between that parapara samanya which stands for the being hood. So, in this way Vaisesika system argued that how we can understand the concept samanya or generality.

Further, they said, who said? Kanada said community and particularity depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence. The community as I say that community of class say cow, community say horse, community say dog, community say human being and particularity particular cow, particular horse or particular human being depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence. If I say that cow that means, I mean that all the cows, all the members of that cow belong to a particular class cow. So, it is an intellect because of the intellect, we can understand how many cow, how many possibly members of cow exist or belong to that particular class.

When I talk about horse, I can understand because of my intellect, how many members of that horse can belong to that particular class which is name as horse. Therefore, they said that community and particularity depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence. Further, they said that all these are conceptual construct. Whenever I talk about it is a horse, it is true that I cannot perceive all the horses or members of the horses in this earth because I have a limited knowledge.

I cannot see both past, present and further but certainly, I can conceptualize the fact that in the past also those are the animals which already dead. They may belong or they may fall under the class say cow. Even in future because of the essence of cowness, I can claim that these are the animals may be belong to the concept cow if they have so and so essence and features.

Further, they said that while explaining that the samanya is a conceptual construct, further they said that they have ontological existence. The samanya as you can see that is a conceptual construct, it has its ontological existence. They said that because of this

commonness, we identify a particular animal which belong to a particular class. We identify a particular horse by stating that this horse belongs to a particular class name as horse. Although, he or she does not have some of the features which we suppose to see in that animal, we suppose to claim in that animal yet we can claim that animal as horse.

So, therefore they said that they are conceptual construct, although they are conceptual construct yet they have an ontological existence. Now, in the next class we will see Buddhist criticism that how really Buddhist criticize the nyaya-vaishesika concept on samanya and how nyaya really defends their standpoint by saying that how their explanation on the concept samanya is a unique one. Further, we will also argue that how logically both Buddhist school and nyaya-vaishesika school argue with each other for establishing the concept samanya or generality that we find in the form of class among all the members of a particular class.

I hope you have now understood the concept action as an independent category and samanya is an independent category and few elements remains to discuss about samanya. We will discuss in the next class. Thank you.