

Indian Philosophy
Dr. Satya Sundar Sethy
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Module No. # 08
Lecture No. # 36
The Vaisesika Philosophy

Welcome to this session. In this session, we will discuss samanya, the remaining part of samanya that is a generality. Then apart from that will discuss other categories or padarthas of the Vaisesika philosophy. As you know, that Vaisesika philosophy accepts seven kinds of padarthas or categories.

What are those dravya or substance, guna or quality, action or karma, samanya or generality, Vishesha or particularity, then inherence or samabhaya, then the last one abhava or non-existence.

So, therefore, you find that, that according to Vaisesika, there are seven categories dravya, guna, karma, generality, particularity, then inherence and the last one is abhava. Kanada was the founder of Vaisesika system who proposed first six categories and the last one was proposed in the later period by the Vaisesika thinkers. As you know, they have also discussed about nine kinds of substances and out of nine kinds they said that some are eternal and some are non-eternal.

Moving further, when we have discussed samanya, we have also covered some of the issues. To recap what we had discussed in a very brief way. According to Vaisesika philosophy, samanya means generality whenever we speak, whenever we utter the word cow, dog, horse, table so and so forth, it stands for the general term. Why it is so because we are not identifying a particular cow or a particular table over here, rather all the table that exists both past, present and in future.

So, therefore, in total whatever objects, whatever table available in this earth, it refers whenever we talk about table. Whenever we talk about cow, it refers to all the cows that exist in this earth.

Therefore, they said that the generality find in all the members of a class and this is the essence. As a result, we can claim that that animal is different from other animal. Although, some of the features of that animal is different from another animal belong to the same class.

An example let I will give. Cow x and cow y. Cow x has certain features say its color is black and its height is more than he is a healthy cow **ok**. On the other hand, if I say that cow y, cow y is a thin animal, short in height, eats less grass and so on and so forth and its color is white.

Now, you can see that the two animals cow x and cow y, although they are having different features yet we claim them that these two animals belong to a particular class known as cow. Here, according to Vaisesika philosophy they said that there is a cowness which is the essence that in the individual cow x as well as in the individual cow y.

Because of this cowness which is an eternal feature that we find in the cow x and the cow y. As a result, we can able to claim that although these two animals are of having different features, yet they have some commonality and that commonality is nothing but the generality that is called cowness.


Therefore, they say that cowness is an eternal one; the generality is an eternal one. It has its own identity and it can be thinkable and at the last, they said that it can be nameable in the form of generality. As you know that whenever they talk about padartha, they said that padartha stands for an object which must satisfy three features. One is **gyatya**, **avidhyatya** and astitva. Gyatya means it has its unique existence, Avidhyatya means we can think of it, we can know about it and the last feature Astitva means it can be nameable.

So, therefore in the case of generality, you find these are three features. So, generality is something which is eternal, which has its own unique existence, which can be thinkable that how this cowness inheres in all the members of cow those live in this earth.

How the cowness is an essential quality, is an essential element that inheres in all the members of cow having a particular class known as cow? So, therefore they said that it can be thinkable and nameable that you can see that we said that generality.

Generality is a name stands for that element which is common to all the members of cow belonging to a particular class known as cow. So, therefore in this context, they said that as like dravya, guna and action are the independent padarthas. Samanya or generality can be considered as another independent category, according to Vaisesika philosophy.

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Sāmānya (Generality)

- ❖ It is the 4th category of the Vaisesika padārthas.
- ❖ Things of the certain class bear a common name because they possess the common nature like cow, horse, etc.
- ❖ Generally speaking, something common among the objects of experience is called generality.
- ❖ But any notion of commonality can't be considered as sāmānya: Kanāda
- ❖ He defines, sāmānya is that which is eternal and resides in its individuals with inherent relation.
- ❖ In other words, commonality is eternal and having inseparable relation with its distinct individuals.

NPTEL

The same thing what I said I have written in my slide if you go through. I said that it is the fourth category of the Vaisesika padarthas. Things of certain class bear a common name because they possess the common nature like cow, horse etcetera.

The same thing I said that whenever we talk about cow, horse, it does not imply a particular cow or horse. Rather, it implies all the cows those exist in this earth, all the horses those exist in this earth. Therefore, it is because of the cowness, it is because of the horseness, we could be able to identify a particular class where we find so many members in that class. Moving further, they said that generally speaking that something common among objects of experience is called generality.

Something common among the objects of experience is called generality. We find there is some commonness in cow x, cow y, cow z and so on and so forth and that commonness is nothing but the generality on the account of Vaisesika philosophy.

Further, they said that any kind of commonality cannot be considered as samanya. For example, we can also find there are other sorts of commonality in different objects. For

example, if you want to talk about say solid objects. Then you talk about tree, then you talk about table, talk about laptop, talk about computer, talk about say your television and so and so forth.

You can even talk about a fruit which is a solid, although the solid is a common among all the objects that I had told you now but that commonality is very rare. It is a different way of considering the generality. Therefore, they said that Vaisesika philosophy categorically mentioned that all the commonality that we find cannot be considered as generality. To consider something generality, we must find that it belongs to a particular class and it inheres all the members of that class, then only we can find the generality.

Another example, I will give for example, if I say liquid then we have water, you have juice, you have kerosene, you have edible oil so and so forth but here, we cannot find the commonality. Although, the very rare commonality you find that is all are liquid but apart from that these are two different classes, they belong to different classes.

For example, juice cannot be water; water cannot be a liquid like kerosene, kerosene cannot be a liquid like edible oil but certainly you can make the distinction. You say that water belongs to a particular class, juice belong to particular class, kerosene other liquid belongs to particular class and edible oil belongs to a particular class.

Here, you can find different kinds of water. Muddy water, clean water and semi-clean water so and so forth. In case of juice, you find apple juice, orange juice so and so forth. So, see these are the members of that class; one class never overlaps with other. On the other hand, the edible oil belongs to a particular class. It cannot be same as the kerosene and petrol, diesel so on and so forth. Therefore, although all this liquid that I have said having a common feature liquidity but all those cannot brought under a particular class.

Therefore, commonality has a particular meaning over here, according to Vaisesika philosophy. They say that if you say water, you can say that water x, water y, water z because of the proportion it has the purity it has. Based on the purity, you can say that these belong to a particular class known as water but certainly you cannot say that water is same as kerosene and something which is in liquid form.

Therefore, they categorically mention that although we find a little common among varieties of objects, yet commonality should not be understood in that spirit. Rather, it should be understood in the spirit where we find that a particular word refers to a particular class and all the members of that class must have a common features or essential features that inhere in each of them .

If this so, then we can say that here we find the commonality. They further also said that samanya is that which is eternal and resides in its individual with inherent relation. In other words, commonality is eternal and having inseparable relation with its distinct individuals.

Lastly, vaishesika philosophy they mentioned that the generality or the commonality that we are talking about which is known as samanya, it is eternal. It neither creates nor can be destroyed. It exist all the time as it is without any change but if you find those members belong to that class, they are subject to creation and destruction. They fall on the cycle of birth, growth and death.

However, the samanya or generality or the commonness that we find among all the members of a class that is eternal. There may be a situation where we find that all the cows, all the individual cows of a particular country may die because of some disease but the cowness concept remain same it is.

The coyness concept will exist as it is understood as it is, without having any different opinion. Therefore, the last point they say that commonality is eternal and having in separable relation with its distinct individuals.

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Buddhists' Criticism

- ❖ The Nyāya-Vaisesika notion of sāmānya is a myth.
- ❖ According to Buddhism, our experience is confined to individuals only, but not to universal.
- ❖ For them, on the basis of 'svalaksana' (unique individuality) we know sāmānya.
- ❖ Svalaksana is known through perception or experience whereas sāmānyalaksana is known through inference.
- ❖ Sāmānya is not an object of perception but object of inference.
- ❖ Vaisesikas said that sāmānya is not an induction. It is an objective approach to a class.



Now, let us discuss how Buddhist criticizes the concept of generality given by vaisesika thinkers and also, further will discuss how nyaya-vaiesika defends Buddhist view and claim that samanya is an independent padartha like dravya, guna and so and so forth.

Now, let us proceed with what Buddhist really think about the concept of samanya and how they criticize the nyaya-vaiesika concept of samanya or generality. Buddhist in the first point, they said that the notion of samanya claimed by nyaya- vaiesika is a myth because our experience is confined to individuals only but not to universal.

Whenever we talk about cow, immediately we refer to a particular cow that we have experienced, that we have perceived but we cannot refer to all the individuals of cow those live in this earth. Therefore, the concept generality is a myth.

Whenever a child or any individual understand a particular object, certainly he or she understand that object by virtue of referring to a particular object of that such kind. If it is so, then our experience never talks about the generality, rather our experiences in conformity to our perception talks about a particular individual of having so and so feature.

Therefore, commonality cannot be accepted in the crude sense because commonality cannot be perceived. What we perceive is that it is only the individual object. Further, they said that on the basis of svalaksana that is a unique individuality, we know samanya.

Buddhism said that each object has a different feature. We identify a particular object by cognizing its different features. If it so, then we find svalaksana, the uniqueness in that particular object. Because of that uniqueness that exist in the particular object, we able to identify that object of having so and so name.

Therefore, they said that the commonality that nyaya-vaishesika talking about which is a myth, rather they should talk about that svalaksana that uniqueness that we find in a particular object or in a particular animal that uniqueness helps us to identify that object.

Hence forth, our perception raise to the uniqueness talks about that object as it such but nevertheless, they said that it is because of the uniqueness, we could able to identify the object of having so and so name. They reject the few. That is because of the commonality we could able to identify object.

No, they further said that we are clearly rejecting the view as nyaya- vaishesika said that because of the commonality, we identify object of having so and so name because according to Buddhist, each and every object have a certain unique feature and because of the uniqueness, we able to identify that object of having so and so name.

Further, they said svalaksana is known through the perception or experiences, whereas samanyalaksana or the generality of the commonality as said by the nyaya- vaishesika is known through inference. Samanya is not an object of perception but object of inference. Now, Buddhist claims over here that svalaksana really helps an individual to identify an object of having a particular name.

Then further they said that because of our perception, because of our experiences we identify object but nyaya- vaishesika talked about the samanyalaksana depends on the individual or the conniver's inferential knowledge. It cannot be perceived, it cannot be experienced.

How can we perceive the commonality? We find in all the members of cow belonging to the particular class known as cow. How can we do so, that is beyond to our perception? It can only be inferred and as you know that inferential knowledge require many more conditions for its validation and if one condition is lacking in some or other form, then the inferential knowledge is not correct.

Therefore, Buddhist said that whatever nyaya- vaisesika talks about samanyalaksana as a commonality that we find in all members of a particular class that is a myth. That is not a valid one. In this context, nyaya- vaisesika defends Buddhism. They said that samanya is not an induction; it is an objective approach to a class.

They said that it is not an induction. What is an induction? Induction helps us, induction expresses that by knowing x y z of a particular members in a class, we can talk about the whole class. If an individual knows a particular member, then another member of a particular class, then he or she can able to frame some ideas about that class. That is an induction.

Here, nyaya vaisesika is saying that we are not talking about the induction, we are not establishing that generality is a concept that we derive by the help of induction. No, rather they claim that it is an objective approach to the particular class. It is an objective approach of our understanding that because of the commonality, we could able to identify that x y z all these cows belong to a particular class known as cow.

Here, we already aware of fact that cow x have a different features and cow y also having different features. They may not have the equal features yet because of the commonality, we able to claim that there is a generalness we find among all the members of cow belonging to a particular class known as cow.


Therefore, according to nyaya- vaisesika that generality concept is not a myth; it is an objective understanding towards the objects of the world. It is an objective understanding which refers to a particular class which refers to variety members belong to that class.

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Buddhists' Criticism

- ❖ Buddhists: we can't consider 'common-essence' is the sole criterion for sāmānya.
- ❖ It is so because there are certain animals called cow, not because they possess any common essence, but they are different from other animals, which are not cows.
- ❖ So there is no universal but the name with a negative connotation.
- ❖ Nyāya-Vaisesika said that there is the same universal in all the individuals of a class.
- ❖ Further, there is no universal subsisting in another universal.

Thus, sāmānya is an independent padārtha among others.



Now, further Buddhism said that we cannot consider common-essence is the sole criterion for samanya. Buddhism again counter act, they said that you the nyaya-vaishesika you are talking about the common-essence which belongs, which exist. If all the members of a particular class that we cannot accept. We cannot accept because of the commonness we can able to identify the generality.

Because of the common-essence, it is the sole criterion to us. Because of the common-essence we can able to identify the generality feature among all the members of a class. The reason they have stated here, they said that there are certain animals called cow, not because they possess any common-essence but they are different from other animals which are not cows.

Here, Buddhist very empirically, very evidentially argued that whenever we talk about cow, we know that what cow means. What are the possible features that we must find in a cow and the same time, we know that how cows are different from dogs, cows are different from horses, bullocks and other animals.

Therefore, they say that it is not because of the common-essence we could able to identify the generality of a particular class, rather there are differences. Whenever we talk about a cow, we know that cows are not same as horses, bullocks so and so forth. So, here you find the differences, here we find the distinction, the differentiation between cows and other animals and this also helps us to identify whether a particular animal is cow or not.

Therefore, they said that there are certain animals called cow, not because they possess any common-essence but they are different from other animals which are not cows. Here, they had given an example. They said that bullocks and cow if you look from a distance, you find both are belonging to a particular class say either you say bullock or say cow.

Now, when you come closer because of so and so features, you could be able to distinguish that cows are not bullocks or in other words, bullocks are not cows. Here, you find majority of the features are same between cows and bullocks and because of some of the unique features that you find in bullock as well as cow, we could be able to identify that why we call that animal as a bullock not as a cow.

Therefore, they say that it is the distinction which helps us to find out a particular object of having a particular name, further they say. So, there is no universal but the name with a negative connotation helps us to identify a particular object of having a particular name. In this regard, nyaya- vaisesika defends Buddhism. They said that there is the same universal in all the individuals of a class. There is no universal subsisting in another universal.


They said that whenever you talk about bullock, whenever you talk about cow, you find that bullock belongs to a particular class; cow belongs to a particular class.

As I have stated to you that water belongs to a particular class and water cannot overlap. In the class of edible oil, juice belongs to a particular class; it cannot overlap in the water class.

Therefore, they say that each class has its own unique, uniqueness, unique identity and unique individuality of its existence. Therefore, one class never overlaps with other. Therefore samanya satisfies all the features of **gyatya, avidhyatya** and astitva. Henceforth, it can be considered as one among the other padarthas on the view of vaisesika philosophy,

You might have already known that in the last class I said that there are different samanya; parasamanya, apara samanya and parapara samanya. So I hope, now it is very clear to you that how nyaya-vaishesika really establishes the concept samanya or generality as an independent padartha among other padarthas.

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Particularity (Viśeṣa)

- ❖ It is the 5th in the list of Vasiesika's categories.
- ❖ Particularity is the extreme opposite of the universal.
- ❖ Visesa means the unique individuality of substances which have no parts.
- ❖ Thus, it is eternal.
- ❖ It pertains to the eternal substances like, time, soul, etc.
- ❖ How do we distinguish mind from soul?
- ❖ We have to admit that the existence of some unique characters in each of the eternal substances, as a result they differ from each other. (e.g. mind ≠ soul)
- ❖ That 'uniqueness' is nothing but the visesa.

NIPITEL

Now, we will move to another category known as Visesa. What is Visesa? Visesa stands for particularity. Whenever we talk about Visesa, it always refers to the particularity. Particularity means the ultimate atom in a particular object. The ultimate atom is known as particularity, according to Visesa philosophy.

So, a question may come to your mind that is at particular table or a particular chair, can we at all call to that object is a Visesa.

Here, nyaya- vaisesika said that no, chair is a conglomeration of its parts and Visesa here does not have any. Further, it is the ultimate atom, it has its unique existence and it is not the conglomeration of all parts. It is the last atom you can say so. This is the spirit, they explain the concept Visesa. This is the spirit on which they said that one need to understand the Visesa or particularity. Visesa or particularity, it is opposite to the generality because generality talks about here the common-essence which we find among all the members of a particular class but here Visesa or particularity talks about the ultimate atom that we find in a particular object and which is not conjoined with any other objects. That is what they say Visesa is another category, another padartha satisfying three features, again **gyatya, avidhyatya** and astitva, said that particularity is the extreme opposite of the universal.

Visesa means the unique individuality of substances which have no parts. If we talk about a particular chair, particular table, it has parts. Once the chair will be broken, it has different parts but Visesa as it such it does not have any further parts. It is unique in its nature, it has a unique existence and it has its own identity.

You say that it is because of that ultimate atom, we can construct many more objects but if we ignore, if we ruled out the existence of ultimate atom, then we cannot think of any object because it is the ultimate atom which is really responsible for the construction of a particular object which is gross in nature. The ultimate atom is subtle in its nature. You cannot perceive it as we perceive the gross object, say particular table, particular chair and so on and so forth.

Therefore, they said Visesa means the unique individuality of substances which have no parts. It is eternal in its nature; it pertains to the eternal substances like time, soul etcetera.

Now, if you remember what we had discussed in substances, we said that according to vaishesika philosophy, there are nine kinds of substances and out of those few are eternal and few are non-eternal. Now, here while explaining the concept Visesa or particularity vaishesika philosophy said that the particularity pertains to the eternal substances like time, soul so on and so forth.

Now, how do we distinguish mind from soul because mind is an eternal and soul is an eternal because they are not coming under the purview of creation and destruction. They are not coming under the cycle of creation and destruction. They are beyond that, they exist as it is eternally permanently and timelessly. Therefore, they have a unique identity. They said that time is an eternal substance and soul is also eternal substance.

If you see the vaishesika dravya, then the question arises how time is different from soul? Is there any commonality we find among them are not sure. If there is no commonality why we say that these are eternal?

Here, vaishesika philosophy clearly defines that although time, space, soul so and so forth are eternal substances, yet they have a unique identity. They have an ultimate atom because of that ultimate atom, time is different from soul. It cannot overlap with each

other because of the space has a particular or ultimate atom; it differentiates from other eternal substances. What is that which makes the time as an eternal substance different from other substances?

Here, the special element which helps the two eternal substances differ, this is nothing but the Visesa. It is because of the Visesa, we are able to identify x as an eternal substance different from y as another eternal substance. The same thing vaishesika clearly stated in their argument. They said that it pertains to the eternal substances like time, soul etcetera.

Now, responding to the question that how do we distinguish mind from soul. They said that we have to admit that the existence of some unique characters in each of the eternal substances, as a result they differ from each other. They said that time is an eternal substance, soul is an eternal substance. If they differ with each other because of the Visesa, because of the ultimate atom in both sides has their unique existence and this is the way one needs to understand Visesa or particularity. One should not confuse Visesa with a particular or ordinary objects that we can perceive in this earth like table, chair, tree, cow etcetera, although there are a particular or an individual object or individual animal. However, they are not particular in that sense.

Particular, according to vaishesika philosophy is the ultimate atom which has its own unique existence. It never conjoins with any other objects. It is not the conglomeration of parts like an example I will give the atomic sentence.

Atomic sentences are those sentences which are ultimate, which are not conjoined with any other sentences, which are not to be considered as a combined sentence. It is the elementary sentence, it cannot be splitted further.


In the same way, the particularity or the ultimate atom cannot be splitted, cannot be divided further. It does not come under cycle of creation, destruction or birth or death. It never decays, it is eternal as it is permanent that we find in all the time.

Therefore, they said that like other categories particularity or Visesa is also satisfying three features known as *astitva*, *gyatya*, *abhidhyatya*. Hence, they claim that uniqueness is nothing but the Visesa. Therefore, Visesa will be considered as one among the other *padartha*.

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- ❖ Two ultimate particulars are not alike.
- ❖ There is a uniqueness found in every anu.
- ❖ Each atom has a separate individuality and uniqueness.
- ❖ *Viśeṣa* should not be understood as ordinary particular objects like chair, tree, pen, etc. which has parts.
- ❖ Prasastapāda: "particulars are those, which inhere in ultimate substances are called *anteyah* and as they distinguish their substrates, they are called *visesah*".
- ❖ Generality and particularity are absolute terms.



Now, further they claim the two ultimate particulars are not alike. The ultimate atom of soul and the ultimate atom of the space are not same as like they said that one particular class never overlaps with another class because each class has its own unique identity.

In the same way, they said that no two atoms are same in their nature because these two are different. There is a uniqueness found in every anu means atom here, there are plenty of anu that we find. However, each anu has its own identity, own existence, own uniqueness.

Therefore, one anu can never overlaps with other and further, they said each atom has a separate individuality and uniqueness. *Visesa* should not be understood as ordinary particular object like chair, tree, pen etcetera which has parts.

Prasastapada is a scholar in vaishesika philosophy. He said that within quote and unquote particulars are those which inhere in ultimate substances are called *antigay* and as they distinguish their substrates, they are called *Visesa*.


I repeat further, Prasastapada said that particulars are those which inhere in ultimate substances are called *antigay* and as they distinguish their substrates, they are called *Visesa*. Now, you can see the clear distinction that how they made really particular is an ultimate atom and claiming its unique existence, they establish that *Visesa* or particular has a unique space, has a unique existence among other padarthas.

It cannot equalize with others neither it can be derived from others. It has its own uniqueness. Therefore, it exists uniquely. They said generality and particularity are absolute terms in this sense. Why absolute term? Because in the one hand generality has its own uniqueness, it has its own existence; it has its own stand point.

On the other hand, Visesa or particularity has its own uniqueness and has its own stand point, although they are two extreme. We find Visesa in the one hand; we find the ultimate atom which has no parts. On the other hand, when we talk about generality, we find that is the commonness which find in all the members of a particular class.


Therefore, these two extremes we can find while explaining, while we are trying to understand the objects of the earth but nevertheless this two ultimate extreme are having their own existence or having their own uniqueness. Henceforth, samanya and Visesa are considered as a padartha among other padarthas, according to vaisesika philosophy.

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Inherence (Samavāya)

- ❖ It is listed as 6th category in the Vaisesika philosophy.
- ❖ It is the relationship between two things; like the container and the contained.
- ❖ For example; oil and oil seed
- ❖ Samavāya is different from samyoga.
- ❖ Samyoga or conjunction is a temporary and separable relation between two things. (e.g. keeping hand on the table)
- ❖ Samavāya is an eternal and inseparable relation between two things. (e.g. rose and its fragrance)



Now, we will move to the inherence or samavaya. It is the sixth category which is mentioned by Kanada? What is that inherence? Now, before in a very common platform what is inherence? Inherence relations are those relations which cannot be separated, which cannot be eliminated from the substance.

The relation is so tight that one cannot be thinkable without the other. For example, if I say that oil seed and its oil. If I say that the fragrance of rose and the rose flower. We

cannot take away fragrance of rose from the rose flower; we cannot take away the oil from some other things. If at all we can take oil, we need oil seeds.

So, therefore oil seed is the container and oil contained in it in the same way the inherence relation. Oil and oil seeds are having the inherence relation with each other. One cannot be separated from other or one cannot be derived from other sources. For example, we cannot get oil from any other seeds. We cannot get oil from say mango or say banana so and so forth. To get the oil, we need oil seeds because these are having the inherence relation.

If you want to have a cloth as a product, then it has an inherence relation with the thread. Thread cannot be taken away from the cloth, so here the inherence relation to be understood in this way. It should not be understood in the sense of conjunction. For example, if I put my hand on the table, my hand is conjoined with the table. This can be separated. My hand can be taken away from the table and can be placed in other place.

Therefore, inherence relation is different from conjunction. Conjunction should be understood in this way. Conjunction means there is an association, this association can be separated. Conjunction means there is an addition and this addition can be subtracted.

However, inherence relation is a relation which cannot be subtracted, which cannot be dissociated from its substance. For example, if I say the rationality of a human being, it is an inherence relation.

If an individual has a judging power, has a capacity to take a decision on particular context, then he or she must have the rationality attitude. Of course, that rationality may vary from person to person, time to time and place to place but the rationality as such then element of rationality must lie in case of that individual. Otherwise, that individual cannot able to take any decision on any context.

Henceforth, the spirit over here to understand inherence relation is different from conjunction. The same thing said by the nyaya- vaisesika thinkers because they are the realist. Because of the realistic approach, we are celebrating nyaya-vaisesika views on many of this context.

In regard to the inherence relation, they said that inherence or samavaya is an independent category among other category. Why because it has its own unique existence. It can be nameable and it can be thinkable said that it is the relationship between two things like the container and the content. You cannot separate the container and the content because they are having the tight knit relation with each other. They are having the inseparable relation with each other. An example, therefore I have given oil and oil seed.

We can derive oil only from oil seed; we cannot derive oil from other seeds. Therefore, these two things, oil seed and oil are having the relation in the form of inherence. So, therefore inherence relation cannot be separated. Inherence relation cannot be derived from one to other. Inherence relation cannot be dissociated from one to another; it has to exist in the container itself.

Samavaya is different from Samyoga. Samyoga talks about the conjunction. Conjunction means two things can be conjoined and two things can be separated from each other. Where we find that? When we conjoin these two things, their existence has no issue and we do not find any problem when we add two things together. In the same time, when we separate two things from one to another, we will also having no problem and they have also equally have their own existence but the same thing may not be applicable in case of inherence relation because inherence relation is the kind of relation where one needs to be attached with the other all the time eternally and permanently.

Therefore, they say samavaya or conjunction is a temporary and separable relation between two things. However, the samavaya is an inherence relation, cannot fall in the top and cannot be brought under that purview. Which purview? The purview of making the distinction between two things and after distinction also these two things exists uniquely and we do not have any problem by making the distinction from one to another. That is a conjunction.

In case of samavaya or inherence relation, they say that one thing has to be associated with other thing and their association is a permanent association. We cannot dissociate one from the other. We cannot say that one exist without the other. This is the inherence relation.

Samavaya is an eternal and inseparable relation between two things rose and its fragrance. Now, if you smell something you say that this smell from rose because we are acquainted with that smell and therefore, you say that the fragrance of rose cannot be dissociated from rose. However, we know other fragrance as well. Whenever we smell other fragrance, we say that this is not the fragrance from rose or this is not the fragrance from so and so flower.

Therefore, it is noted here that, that each fragrance is associated with a particular substance. Therefore, one cannot dissociate from other, one cannot be separated from other.

We cannot say that we find a glass of water in a rose, nothing of this sort. A particular thing must have a capacity to produce something because of that inherence relation. Therefore, they said that inherence relation is different from conjunction; it should not be understood in the form of conjunction.

Therefore, inherence or samavaya has its unique existence, can be nameable and can be thinkable. Therefore, it is coming under the list of padarthas mentioned by Kanada. I hope, now it is understood to you the six padarthas and their unique existence which is explained by the nyaya-vaishesika system.

In the next class, we will discuss abhava or non-existence which is added later in the category of vaishesika philosophy. Thank you.