

Indian Philosophy
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Module No. # 08
Lecture No. # 37
The Vaisesika Philosophy

Welcome to this session. In this session, we will discuss Abhava or non-existences as the seventh category of Vaisesika philosophy. As you know that Vaisesika system was propounded by Kanada, then after Kanada there are many developments happened in Vaisesika philosophy. So, in total there are many scholars contributing their opinion, their intellectual resources for the development of this system.

Kanada said there are six categories or padarthas. In later period, Sivadithya is another thinker or scholar in Vaisesika philosophy; he added another category in the list of six categories. So, therefore, we find seven categories in Vaisesika philosophy.

The seven categories are dravya, guna, action, samanya, samavaya, visesa and abhava. The last category abhava or non-existences is added by Sivadithya in the later period but the first six categories are mentioned by Kanada. We have already discussed all the six categories which are having positive in character or positive in nature. The last category remains and it is also an equally important category according to Vaisesika philosophy.

Vaisesika philosophy or the explanation of the Vaisesika philosophy cannot be completed without the discussion of abhava or non-existence. According to some of the Vaisesika scholars, they said that abhava is an independent category or is an independent padartha as like dravya, guna and so on and so forth.

The reason they have given by stating that, that abhava also satisfies the three features. What are those? First one is **gyatya, avidhyatya** and astitva. So, these three features we find in case of abhava or padartha. Therefore, they claim that abhava is an independent padartha among other padarthas.


Today, we will discuss how vaishesika scholars explained the concept abhava and what they mean when they talk about abhava. For our general understanding, before going to the vaishesika philosophy, let have a common understanding what we mean by abhava.

Abhava means something is empty, something is void. That is abhava. Suppose, you say that there is no air in this room, you imply that there is no oxygen in this room because you are feeling suffocation in this room. So, therefore abhava means something is not there. If you say that there is no chair in this room that means, the chair that you are referring that may exist in other room or in some other places. However, that particular chair does not exist in that particular time in that room but we can identify the non-existences of chair in that room.

Therefore, here non-existence became an astitva. It has its own identity and further, it can be knowable. We can know about it, we can think about it. How we can understand the concept non-existence of something in a particular place and in a particular time?

Now, further we can give a name to that particular chair which does not exist in this room, may be available in that room or may be available in some other places. Therefore, according to vaishesika philosophy, abhava is an independent category. Now, I believe you might have very common understanding what abhava means.


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Abhāva (Non-existence)

- ❖ The last and seventh category is known as abhāva or non-existence.
- ❖ It is added later by Vaishesika thinkers.
- ❖ It is the negative category whereas other six categories are positive in character.
- ❖ This padārtha conveys that every experience has its counterpart in the external world.
- ❖ For example; when we see a particular place without a jar, we experience the absence of jar in that place.
- ❖ Similarly, when the jar is destroyed, there is the absence of that jar again.

❖ Is it the case that Kanāda did not aware of abhāva?

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Now, let focus very clearly what vaisesika said about abhava. Abhava for them is a non-existence and it is the seventh category among other category of vaisesika philosophy. As I said, it is added by Sivadithya and endorsed by many other vaisesika thinkers by claiming that abhava should not be understood as the negation of existence. No, non-existence for them also equally has an independent category; it has its own identity.

We can understand this non-existence independently from others. An example they have given. If I say that there is no tree in front of John's house, now the non-existence of tree in front of John's house is understood by each and every one. The negation over here stands as an existence for our understanding. What we have understood from this sentence is that there is a person living in a particular house, the person name is john and in front of his house there is no tree. Henceforth, abhava becomes an independent category among other categories.

Further, they said that this category conveys that every experience has its counterpart in the external world. If you say that god exist, many other thinkers they believe that god does not exist. If one claim that, that there is neem tree exists, other equally claim that neem tree does not exist.

So, therefore the existence and non-existences depend on the spacious temporal condition. Whenever one talks about that something exist that means, the thing which exists, it exist by occupying a particular place in a particular time. Therefore, existence and non-existence depend on spacious temporal conditions. We cannot say that something exist without occupying a particular place, without signifying a particular type.

If you say that Alexander the great existed in the past, then you say that in so and so time, in so and so kingdom. Therefore, we must understand the concept existence and non-existence in relation to the spacious temporal world which cannot be understood independent of spacious temporal conditions.

Vaisesika thinkers also accepted that the first six categories which are mentioned by Kanada are positive in character. Why because if you say that dravya that means, substances they refer to a substances which exist before the cognizer. There are also they

said eternal substances but further they said that eternal substances can be known by the help of the qualities and actions that they have in it.

Further, they said about guna. As you know that guna cannot exist independently of substances. That means whenever they try to explain the things, it is in positive in nature but the last category which is known as abhava mentioned by Sivadithya said that it is a negative character. It is a negative feature of understanding the non-existence of a substance of having a particular type in a particular place.

Therefore, they say that if we can understand that a chair exists in a particular room of having a particular time, we can also equally understand a chair or that particular chair does not exist in that particular room in a particular time. Therefore, they said categorically saying that this padartha, abhava has a padartha or category conveys that every experience has its counterpart in the external world.


For example, when you see a particular place without a jar, we experience the absence of jar in that place. Similarly, when the jar is destroyed, there is the absence of that jar again. Now, there are two things they are claiming. We can think, we can judge a situation claiming that this object or a particular object does not exist in that place, in a particular time that non-existence we have understood.

Now, further non-existence they are talking about that is they said that if there is some object or some substance exist for all of us, now that substance is destroyed or broken, then also we find the non-existence of that substance. However, though we find some pieces of that substance, yet the substance as it was found in its original form that is lost. Henceforth, they said that there are abhava. In this way, we can understand the concept abhava.

The first thing that we can know the abhava in relation to the spacious temporal condition. The second is that when a particular substance is destroyed, we find the non-existence of substance. Now in this context, other scholars from other schools Buddhism, other the Vedantins and many other schools even Mimamsikas schools, they have asked a question. Is it the case that Kanada did not aware of the concept abhava? Whenever he talked about six categories, it seems that he does not know or he did not aware of the


concept abhava. Many scholars refused this argument. They said that it is not so. Kanada was very much aware of the fact abhava.

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- ❖ Some Vaisesika thinkers denied the fact.
- ❖ They viewed that Kanāda is aware of 'moksā' which means freedom from sufferings (negation of pain).
- ❖ Negation of suffering is a fact, from this it implies that he was well aware of the fact 'abhāva'.
- ❖ Abhāva is of two kinds.
- ❖ Samsarga abhāva (relative non-existence)
- ❖ Anyonya abhāva (mutual non-existence)
- ❖ Samsarga abhāva means the absence of something in something else.
- ❖ It is relative to particular space and time.

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While establishing the argument stating that Kanada was aware of the fact abhava, they said that Kanada also discussed about Mukhya. Mukhya means liberation. Liberation means detach from worldly pain, detach from the physical pain and mental pain that each and everyone find while living in this earth.

If a person can understand the concept of detachment from something a negation of pain, he or she must understand the concept the negation of existence as well. Therefore, by referring to the concept, they said that Kanada was very much aware of the concept Mukhya or liberation which implies the liberation of pain, the liberation of suffering. It is a negation of pain. Therefore, we cannot claim that he was not aware of the concept abhava. He was very much aware of the concept abhava but may be for him abhava is understood in the absence of existence, nothing more or it is a negation of existence. So, therefore they established that Kanada was also aware of the concept abhava whenever he mentioned about the six categories.

Further, abhava is of two kinds that we find Samsarga abhava and Anyonya abhava. Samsarga abhava talks about the relative non-existence and Anyonya abhava talks about

the mutual non-existence. Now, broadly we find two kinds of non-existence, one is a relative non-existence, another is mutual non-existence.

Now, let us discuss what is relative non-existence? If I say that x is related to y, z is related to b. So, the relation that you can find out, some sort of relation we find between two elements. To have a relation, we require at least two elements, two components, two objects, two things or anything at least two in numbers.


Therefore, whenever you talk about relative non-existence, we must be aware of the fact that it has a relation between two things. Two things not necessarily may be different. Whenever I say that a table is different from chair, here table and chair are two different objects but in case of relative existences, it may mean something more than that. If you say that x1 in the morning time and x1 in the evening time, these two are different. See x in 6am and x in 7am because of the time gap, this x is different from x that we find in 6am as well as 7am. So, therefore a particular object in relation to its time place also plays a relative character. Therefore, they said that we find relative non-existence that is Samsarga abhava.

Further, they said Anyonya abhava that means, mutual non-existence say that a table is not a chair, a computer is not a glass of water, a camera is not an iron rod. So, therefore two components separately we find here and one cannot include other. One cannot include in other, so they mutually exclude from each other.

Now, let us focus what is relative non-existence? According to vaishesika philosophy, Samsarga abhava means the absence of something in something else. As I said that there are relative non-existent, something is absent in something that is an ordinary understanding of the concept relative non-existence.


They said that it is a relative to particular space and time. I said that x at 6am is different from that same x in 7am because of the time x is different here we find. Now, the place suppose x as an individual as a being that we find in a particular place say y, certainly will be different if the x will find in a other place say known as z.

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- ❖ Abhāva is of two kinds.
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- ❖ Samsarga abhāva means the absence of something in something else.
- ❖ It is relative to particular space and time.



Therefore, the relative non-existence depends on time and space as well. Now, it is based on the spacious temporal condition. As I said all kinds of samara abhava can be expressed by a judgment of the general form x is not in p . Here, you must understand though the expression x is not in p . Here, we are talking about the absence of something in something. The relative non-existence, if you expressed in a symbolical form, in a logical form, it appears in this way, s is an object is not in p is another object. So, p and s are related with each other but however, we do not find s in p that is a relative non-existence.

Many people understood relative means opposite of absolute. Here, we must understand the concept not in that form. So, let us in the proper spirit we must understand the way vaisesika philosophy argues the concept relative non-existence. They say that something does not exist in something. That means, they are related with each other and however, we may not find some of the component of s . Therefore, we can express the logical form saying that s is not in p .

Now, they said it is of three kinds. The relative non-existence, we find in a three kinds. The relative non-existence that we are talking about is of three kinds in nature according to vaisesika philosophy. What are those? One is pragbhava, the second one is dhvamsabhava and the third one is atyantabhava. The first one pragbhava, it talks about

antecedent non-existence. Dhvamsabhava talks about posterior non-existence and atyantabhava talks about absolute non-existence.

What is antecedent non-existence? Now, let us have a common understanding. For example, say that a particular chair. Before the creation of that particular chair, we find the absence of that chair but in the same time we may find different other chairs of that same nature or the same kind may be but the particular chair before its creation, before its production we may not find. We may not find its existence in this earth. That is an antecedent non existence.

Then posterior of non-existence talks about that once an object is destroyed, we may find of its pieces but the object as it such in its earlier form we may not find and we do not find because it is broken. Therefore, we say that posterior non-existence, a thing or an object exists before us. Now, it is broken therefore that objects never find. Further, after the destruction of that object, the object not remain as same. Therefore, we find the absence of that same object in the broken pieces.

The third one talking about the absolute-non existence, that non-existence, we find all the time. It is an eternal non-existence. For example, if I say a barren women's child, you may say that I am contradicting myself and here if a women is barren, she cannot biologically gives birth to a child. On the other hand, if a woman gives birth to a child, then she cannot be termed as a barren woman.


Therefore, two things you can find in one side. There is a women who gives birth to a child that women cannot be treated as a barren women and on other side, the women who is barren cannot biologically gives birth to a child. Therefore, see barren women's child this is we could say absolute non-existence. A barren woman cannot give birth to a child. So, the child and barren women, they are absolute non-existence.

Another example, let us I will give hares horn. Hares cannot have horn, therefore the horn in the hare it is an absolute non-existence. It was in the past, it is in the present and it will be in the future. So, here the non-existence we can understand.

Further, they said that there are many kind of concept that also we need to understand in that form. Say for example, dharma karma it is a non-existence. We cannot refer to


particular object. Now, let us discuss one after another. What they mean by pragbhava? Pragbhava according to vaisesika philosophy, it is the non-existence of a thing before its production. A jar was non-existence before it was produced. There might be other jars but that particular jar did not exist before it was produced by the potter, clearly said that let take an example let us take an example of jar.

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- ❖ There might be other jars, but that particular jar did not exist before it was produced by the potter.
- ❖ This kind of non-existence or absence has no beginning, but it has an end.
- ❖ Before the jar was produced its absence existed, but its absence ends when it is produced.
- ❖ **Dhvaṃsābhāva**
- ❖ It states that destruction of existence is creation of non-existence.
- ❖ It is the absence or the non-existence of a thing after its destruction.



Here, vaisesika philosophy categorically said that before the production of that jar, we find the absence of that jar. In the same time, they claim that there may be other kinds of jar of those same sorts will be available in this earth. However, that particular jar which was not produced, here we find the absence of that jar and once it is produced, we find its existence there to be no further absence in it.

Therefore, they said that this kind of non-existence or absence has no beginning but it has an end. Why it is so? Because before the production we may not know that whether that jar can be produced or not by the potter but once it is produced, we find its existence. That means there is an end in it. In this way, we can understand the concept pragbhava. Before the creation, before the production of that jar, the jar was not there. We find the absence of jar once it is produced; we find the existence of jar.

Therefore, they said that it has no beginning, but certainly it has an end. Explaining further, they said that before the jar was produced, its absence existed but its absence


ends when it is produced. It is a very lucid way. Vaishesika philosophy argued the concept absence, the pragbhava. They said that before the jar was produced, its absence existed but its absences end when it is produced. We never find further absence of that jar after its production. So, this is all about pragbhava. Now, we can understand the concept absence of a particular substance before its production.

Now, in the similar fashion they said that once a substance is broken, we find the non-existence of that substance that is called Dhvamsabhava. Dhvamsabhava means posterior non-existence. Here, they said that dhvamsabhava is a non-existence or absence states that destruction of existences is creation of non-existence.

Now, must understand the concept. Destruction of existence is the creation of non-existence. One something is destroyed, then we find the non-existence of it one something is destroyed once something is broken. We may not find the same object in future because that object is destroyed, that object is no more serve its purposes.


Let take the same example, say jar. A jar is made of say glass. Once the jar is broken, we find different pieces of glasses but here after it is broken, the jar we may not find, the jar we cannot find, the same jar would not be available at all because it is broken. That is why after its destruction, the creation of absence we find in it. In the same fashion, dhvamsabhava clearly stated that destruction of existence is creation of non-existence. It is the absence of the non-existence of a thing after its destruction.

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- ❖ A jar becomes non-existent when it is broken or destroyed.
- ❖ The broken pieces may remain exist but not the same jar after its destruction.
- ❖ This kind of absence has a beginning but not an end.
- ❖ The absence of the jar starts when it is destroyed, and it became non-existent after its destruction.
- ❖ After its destruction, we cannot get the same jar, but we may get other jars of same kind.


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Continuing further, the same example I have written here. A jar becomes non-existence when it is broken or destroyed. The broken pieces may remain exist but not the same jar after its destruction. This kind of absence has a beginning but not an end. Say in pragbhava they said that this kind of absence has no beginning but an end because there is an absence we find before the production of the jar in case of pragbhava. Therefore, they said that it has no beginning but has an end.

In case of dhvamsabhava, since the object exist before us. Since, the object occupies a particular place in a particular time, we say that it has a beginning but it has no end because after its destruction we find the absence of it. Therefore, they said that this kind of absence has a beginning but not an end. Has a beginning means we know the object we refer to the object that object serve some purposes. It has a beginning; it does not have any end because after destruction that objects not remain as same that we had seen before its destruction.


Therefore, two kinds of abhavas that you can see, pragbhava in one hand and dhvamsabhava on the other hand and both are relatively relative non-existence. Both are talking about relative non-existence. In a relation to the second one, there are two other points that I need to inform you the absence of that jar starts when it is destroyed and it became non-existence. After its destruction, it is a self explanatory. After its destruction, we cannot get the same jar but we may get other jars of same kind.

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- ❖ **Atyantabhāva**
- ❖ It is the absolute non-existence between two things for all time.
- ❖ This absence is eternal.
- ❖ Example; hare's horn is the non-existent in the past, present, and future.
- ❖ This kind of absence has neither a beginning nor an end.
- ❖ It is absolute and eternal absence.
- ❖ It also implies such absence like a barren woman's child.



Now, moving to the third one Atyantabhava, it is the absolute non-existence between two things for all time. The third one also talks about the relative non-existence. Here, they are saying that the two things or the absence over here, we find between two things for all time. It is an eternal. Therefore, they said it is the absolute non-existence between two things for all the time.


These two components cannot put together. The absence over here we find all the time, both in past, present and future. They said that this is an eternal hare's horn. I have also discussed this concept to you. Hare's horn is the non-existence in the past, present and future. Hare's cannot have horn. If some animals have a horn, then that animal cannot be called hare.

Therefore the hare in the one hand and other side its horn. Here, we find the two objects are having the absolute non-existence that is what they said that any animals of having horn cannot be called as hare and if hare is an animal that animal cannot have horn.

Therefore, the non-existence of horn in hare we find both in past, present and future. Therefore, it is an eternal non-existence, eternal absolute non-existence. Thus, I have said here hare's horn is the non-existence in the past, present and future. This kind of absence has neither a beginning nor an end.

If we say that something has a beginning that means that something must exist like in dhvamsabhava. We said that it has a beginning but it does not have end. In case of pragbhava, we said that it does not have a beginning but it has an end.

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- ❖ **Anyonyābhā** (Mutual Non-existence)
- ❖ It means one thing is not another thing.
- ❖ It is expressed in a judgment form; S is not P.
- ❖ It underlies the difference of one thing from another thing.
- ❖ When one thing is different from another thing they mutually exclude with each other.
- ❖ Negating one from the other is called mutual non-existence.
- ❖ Example; a table is not a chair
- ❖ It has neither a beginning nor an end.
- ❖ It is eternal.

Here, since it is an absolute non-existence we said that it has neither beginning nor an end. It is absolute and eternal absence. It also implies such options like barren women's child. Now, I hope you have understood the relative non-existence stated by vaishesika philosophy.

Now, the second kind of non-existence that we are going to discuss that is Anyonya abhava or mutual non-existence. What is mutual non-existence? Mutual non-existence talks about or a mutual non-existence expresses about two things or having mutually absent from each other, for example if I say that a table is not a chair. We cannot say that a table is a chair because the chair cannot find in table neither the table can find in chair.

Therefore, they said it means one thing is not another thing. A table is not a chair. Mutual non-existence, it is expressed in a judgment form like s is not p. Now, remember what I said in relative non-existence. I said that relative non-existence is of three types' pragbhava, dhvamsabhava and atyantabhava. In these three forms, we find these two objects are related with each other in some non-existence form. Therefore, the

symbolical expression of samsargbhava or relative existence is expressed in this way, s is not in p but here if you find that s is not p, s and p are two different objects may be in the same object but are they are not equal.

You said that s is not p or p is not s. A table is not chair and a chair is not a table. Therefore, they said that it underlines the difference of one thing from another thing. When one thing is different from another thing, they mutually exclude with each other. When one thing is different from another thing, when a table is different from chair they are mutually excluded with each other. Now, I believe that you have understood the concept what is mutual non-existence? You say that a tree is not a snake, a snake is not a rope and a rope is not an umbrella so on and so forth, mutually exclude with each other.

On the other hand, if you talk about samsargbhava here is saying that things are absent in relative in character. It depends on spacio temporal condition but here in case of mutual non-existence, it does not require any spacio temporal condition. You say that table wherever it exist, whatever it form may be certainly, it is different form a chair. Thus, they said only one thing is different from another thing. They mutual exclude with each other negating one from the other is called mutual non-existence.


Further explaining, they said that negating one from the other is called mutual non-existence. An example they said a table is not a chair, it has a neither beginning nor an end. Therefore, it is eternal.

What is commonality we find between atyantabhava and anyonyabhava is that both are eternal in character, the absence that we find in both the cases anyonyabhava and atyantabhava. Atyantabhava is a part or a kind of samsargbhava and anyonyabhava is a different kind of abhava. In both the cases, we find one communality that is the eternal absence in both objects. In case of atyantabhava, we find that the two objects cannot find together in a particular place like barren women's child, a hare's horn but here in case of mutual non-existence, we find the absence that x is different from y, y is different from z in this form.

Therefore, two symbolical forms we find here in while explaining the concept absence or non-existences. One is samsargbhava or relative existence. When the symbolical form is s is not in p but in case of anyonyabhava which talks about mutual non-existence, here

the symbolical expression we find s is not p. Thus, it is also eternal in character which one is a mutual non-existence.

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- ❖ What is the *pramāna* through which one can understand the non-existence of existence in a particular place?
- ❖ Kumarila Bhatta & Advaita Vedāntins said that "absence of the cognition" is known through the method of *anupalabdhi*.
- ❖ Others (Mīmāṃsikas) said that it is due to *arthapati-postulation*, which means contradiction of fact presented to us.
- ❖ Nyāyikas: non-existence is a matter of perception.
- ❖ Abhāva is a matter of qualified perception, which is known through specific sense object contact termed as '*visesa-visesana abhāva*'.

Now continuing further, there are few questions people argued to vaishesika philosophy. They said that what is the Pramana we need to employ to understand the concept abhava. In the other words, what is the Pramana through which one can understand the non-existence of existence in a particular place? This question raised now. Kumarila Bhatt and Advaita vedantins, they said that the absence of cognition is to be understood by help of Anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi is a pramana.

Here, Kumarila Bhatt and Advaita vedantins, they talk about that absence of the cognition is known through the method of Anupalabdhi. What is Anupalabdhi? As you know that Nyaya-Vaishesika talks about four pramanas that is perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony but in Mimasikas philosophy, they have added two more pramana. One is Anupalabdhi and the second one is Arthapati postulation.

We will discuss about these two in detail whenever we discuss Mimasikas philosophy or the epistemology of Mimasikas philosophy but for the present purpose we must elaborate the concept Anupalabdhi. Here, Advaita vedantins is known as Uttara Mimasikas and Purva Mimasikas is known as Mimasikas. These both Mimasikas agreed that the absence of cognition is to be known by the help of Anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi means something

that is absent. That absence, the concept of the absence is to be understood in relation to a particular object which may find in other places.

For example, if I say that there is no pen on the table. That means I know that there is some object known as pen and it exists elsewhere. Therefore, the absence of that same pen we find on the table and this absence cannot be reduced to any other Pramanas, according to Mimasikas philosophy because here it cannot be perceived because once we say that the absence of that pen on the table. We cannot see that there is no pen in this table. What you see is an empty space, we cannot see the cognition of absence of that pen neither it can be inferred.

For having an inference, we need a vyapti relation but here to cognize the absence of a particular object on a particular place in a particular time. All the time we may not find a vyapti relation, therefore according to Mimasikas, the absence of cognition can be identified or recognized by the help of the pramana Anupalabdhi. So, this is stated by Purva Mimasikas and Advaita Vedantins.

Now, some other scholars in Mimasikas they said that the absence of the cognition can also be recognized by the help of Arthapati postulation. What is Arthapati postulation? That means there is a particular fact presented before the cogniser and that particular fact cannot sustain itself because of many other conditions. Therefore, the cogniser has to postulate another fact which substitutes to that fact for its existence.

An example let I will give say Devadatta is a person whose fact by fasting in the day time. Now, I say Devadatta is a person is fat by fasting in the day time. So, if a person is fasting cannot be fat, cannot be a fat man and a fat man cannot be remain as a fat man until unless he is not eating so much food. Here, we find there are two counter fact, a person is a fat but fasting in the day time.

Now, to understand the concept, how can a person who is fat, in the same time fasting in the day time. So, there is another assumption that here we create here, the cogniser assert a different fact in relation to that fact for establishing the concept or the fact that some person is fat by fasting in the day time.

Here, the cogniser what he or she postulates is that Devadatta is a person may not be eating in the day time but certainly eating in the night time heavy foods and because of that he remains fat.

Here, the absence of the fact is postulated or is assumed by the cogniser. So, therefore the negation of the fact on a particular place can be understood in relation to its existence in some other places. That means if I say that there is no pen on my table that concept can be understood in relation to saying that pen may be existed some other places. Say that pen may be existed in my drawer, in my computer drawer.

Therefore, now coming back that after listening to the explanation, after understanding the explanation of vaishesika system that how abhava can be considered as an independent category. There is a question whereas by other schools said that what is the pramana from which, one can understand the non-existence of existence in a particular place. Responding to this question, Kumarila Bhatt, Kumarila Bhatt belongs to Assam. He is a scholar from Assam. He and Advaita vedantins, they said that the absence of the cognition is known through by the help of a pramana known as Anupalabdhi

Now, further some other thinkers from Mimamsikas, they said that it is due to the Arthapati postulation which means contradiction of facts presented to us. What is contradiction of fact that Devadatta is a fat man in the same time fasting in the day time? These are both contradiction in terms and how this contradiction can be resolved by assuming, by postulating a different fact. In relation to that fact, then only that fact that is presented before us in a contradiction form would not remain as a contradiction.

It will assert some fact positively, it will establish itself in this way they say that by the help of Arthapati postulation and by the help of Anupalabdhi, we can able to explain the concept of sense or the concept of non-existence.


Further, nyayakans said non-existence is a matter of perception and what kind of perception? It is not an ordinary perception as we percept table, chair, tree, leaves, color so and so forth. He says that this perception is a special kind of perception. It is a matter of qualified perception which is known through specific sense object contact termed as visesa-visesana abhava. According to Nyaya-Vaishesika, the absence can be cognised through visesa-visesana abhava.

What is visesa? Visesa talks about the particularity and to understand the qualification of that abhava in a particular place helps us to cognise a non-existence of an object on a particular place. I repeat according to nyaya-vaiesika, it is because of the visesa-visesana abhava we could able to cognise the absence of an object on a particular place in a particular time.

What is visesa-visesana abhava for them? They said that visesa stands for particularity. That means to understand the particular absence on a particular place of having a particular time; it is a qualified perception of that object which may present in some other place in some other form. I hope you have understood. It is not that so critical. Visesa-visesana we have to talk about that the absence of a particular substance on a particular time, in a particular place may be qualified by its existence which is available in some other places of having in a particular time.


So, in this way we can understand an absence of a particular object. Therefore, since we can cognise the absence of a particular object of having its own identity, we can claim that abhava is an independent category.

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Creation of the Universe

- ❖ All composite objects are made of the atoms; earth, water, air, & fire.
- ❖ The eternal substances like soul, mind, etc. are neither created nor destroyed.
- ❖ Their views regarding creation of the world is known as atomism.
- ❖ The Vaisesika atomism is spiritual.
- ❖ God is the guiding principle controlling the motion of atoms.
- ❖ Creation and destruction of the universe takes place in agreement with the wishes of God.

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Now, moving further they also talk about the creation of the universe. While talking about the creation of the universe, they said that all composite objects that we find in this earth chair, table, tree so on and so forth, both living and non-living creatures are created

because of the atoms. There are four atoms responsible for creation of the different objects in this earth. These are known as earth, water, air and fire.

Further, they said that there are also many eternal substances exist and they are beyond creation and destruction, they never come. Another purview of creation and destruction they are eternal, their views regarding creation of the world is known as atomism because every object that we see in this earth are created by atom.

Further, they said that atoms cannot move automatically. There will be some person responsible for moving the atom and mixing up the atoms in a different proportional because we find different objects in this earth and different objects because of the different proportionate of atoms in it and who is that person who really moves that atom to mix up in a different proportionate? In that context, they said that it is Ishwara or god who is almighty is responsible for moving the atoms and mixing up atoms in a different proportionate, so that they could able to generate different products in this earth.

Therefore, they said that the vaisesika atomism is spiritual. Why it is spiritual because for them, god is the guiding principal, controlling the motion of atoms creation and destruction of the universe takes place in agreement with the wishes of god. They said that if there is no super natural being, the atom cannot move automatically. So, therefore we find that the super natural being who really moves the atoms and make the atoms mix up in a different proportionate and therefore, we get different objects in this earth. The last they said that it is the Maheswara instead of Brahma, Vishnu or anything. They said that it is Maheswara with a particular name is the ruler of the entire universe.

So, it is the Maheswara who really creates the universe, who really functions the universe and who is responsible even for the destruction of the objects in this universe. I hope you have understood now the complete explanation of Vaisesika padarthas and the issues they raised in their philosophy. Thank you.