

Indian Philosophy
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Module No. # 09
Lecture No. # 40
The Mimamsa Philosophy

Welcome to this session viewers. In this session, we will discuss, in continuation with last class; to recap what we had discussed in the last class - we spoke about a little bit background of Mimamsa philosophy, then we spoke about who are those thinkers or scholars who contributed to development and establishment of the school known as Mimamsa philosophy.

Then, we said that although there are many scholars who contributed to the development of Mimamsa philosophy they have their differences of opinion on many of the issues that we had discussed; apart from that, we said that that, they also consider that valid knowledge can be acquired through pramana - pramana means valid source of knowledge.

Here also, they had a difference of opinion - Kumarila Bhatta said that we need 6 pramana, whereas Prabhakara Mimamsa said that we need 5 pramanas; according to Prabhakara Mimamsa, Anupalabdhi or non perception cannot be considered as an independent pramana.

Further, we find some of the differences of opinion on substances, on categories so on and so forth; moving further, we had discussed what they mean when they talk about the fact that we need two extra pramanas by adding to the list of pramanas stated by Nyaya philosophy.

In this regard, we had discussed what is Anupalabdhi or non perception, also we had discussed Arthapatti or postulation; while discussing the Arthapatti as an independent pramana we said that that there are two contradictory facts that we find from a proposition and to resolve that contradiction the cogniser has to postulate a new fact; as a result the contradictory will resolve.

In this context we had given an example by stating that Devadatta is a fat man by fasting in the day time; also, we said that Arthapatti postulation cannot be reduced to any other pramanas; much after that we had discussed how Anupalabdhi is considered as an independent pramana among other pramanas and how Kumarila Bhatta establishes that non-perception can be considered as an independent pramana and why it cannot come under perception.


After that, we spoke regarding the theory of validity of knowledge - that is Pramanyavada; in Pramanyavada, we had discussed that there are two kinds of Pramanyavada that are discussed in Mimamsa philosophy and even Samkhya philosophy and many other schools as well.

In Mimamsa philosophy, it is stated that we find two kinds of Pramanyavada - one is Svatah Pramanyavada another is Paratah Pramanyavada; Svatah Pramanyavada talks about...Svatah here stands for intelligent, Pramanyavada is theory of valid knowledge; Svatah Pramanyavada states that validity and invalidity of knowledge exists in the matter which is capable of its production - which is capable to produce many of the effects; I repeat, the validity and invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter because the matter is capable of producing many of the effects - that is called Svatah Pramanyavada; Paratah Pramanyavada means...Paratah is stands for **estranging** Pramanyavada is validity.

Many of the schools believe that a knowledge will be valid only where there are some external conditions, which support that; for example, now we can see a chair - now we can perceive a chair, here we find that there is a contact between the object and our sense organs; here the cogniser will be able to recognize the object chair if we are able to find some of the conditions over there; for example, a minimum distance, the cogniser must have a good vision, then there is sufficient light so on and so forth.


Thus, many of the thinkers in different schools believe that knowledge will be valid or invalid depending on the external conditions; in continuation to that, in today's class we will discuss how the different schools have their own opinions on the Pramanyavada - on the theory of valid knowledge.

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Prāmānyavāda

- ❖ Kumarila Bhatt: Svatah prāmānya + Paratah apramānya
- ❖ The Sāmkhya: Svatah prāmānya + Svatah apramānya
- ❖ The Buddhists: Paratah prāmānya + Svatah apramānya
- ❖ The Nyāya: Paratah prāmānya + Paratah apramānya
- ❖ Kumarila refutes the views of Sāmkhyas by asking them how the same knowledge can be valid and invalid?- doesn't it lead to self-contradiction?
- ❖ Parthasarathi Misra refutes Buddhists view by stating that if the validity of knowledge is determined by the subsequent knowledge, then it leads to the infinite regress.
- ❖ Further, if knowledge is not intrinsically valid, it can't be validated by any other knowledge.

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In the last class - in very brief - we had stated about the four schools; but, in today's class we will discuss in a very elaborate way about why they said so, what are the reasons for stating so and whether their argument - their argument means other school's argument - differs from Mimamsa's school; if they do not differ, on which grounds do they have a commonality; all those things we will discuss in detail.

Coming to the point that Kumarila Bhatta - Kumarila Bhatta is a scholar who belongs to Mimamsa philosophy - Kumarila Bhatta said there are two kinds of validity: one is Svatah Pramanyavada another is Paratah Pramanyavada; Samkhya philosophy said Svatah pramanya and Svatah apramanya; Buddhist philosophy said Paratah pramanya and Svatah apramanya; Nyaya philosophy said Paratah pramanya and Paratah apramanya.

As you know, we have two Pramanyavada - Svatah pramanyavada and Paratah pramanyavada; on the other hand, we find Svatah apramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada; here, Svatah stands for intrinsic and Pramanyavada stands for validity; it is an intrinsic validity - Svatah pramanyavada; Svatah apramanyavada means intrinsic invalidity; Paratah pramanyavada means extrinsic validity; Paratah apramanyavada means extrinsic invalidity; since we have two kinds of pramanyavada, in permutation and combination - if we do the permutation and combination of these two Pramanyavada

- we find that there are four and those are known as Svatah pramanyavada, Paratah pramanyavada, Svatah apramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada.


There are four thinkers - Kumarila Bhatta you find in Mimamsa philosophy, then we have a Samkhya philosophy view, then we have Nyaya philosophy view and we have a Buddhist philosophy view - there are four schools; they have a different opinion in relation to the validity and invalidity of knowledge.

Now, why did Kumarila Bhatta say Svatah pramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada? The reasons are as follows: Svatah pramanyavada means the validity of knowledge lies in the matter which is capable of producing effect; Kumarila Bhatta says that a matter which is capable of producing different objects it must have validity on its own otherwise it will not be able produce any effects, which have validity in the outside world; therefore, they said that prior to the production we find the validity in that matter - prior to production of any of the object - we find the validity lies in the matter which is capable of producing the effect.

Further, they said that Paratah apramanyavada - that means, once the object is produced we have a knowledge about that object because we perceive that object - our sense organs are in contact with that object; what happens here... since our sense organs are in contact to that object, it depends on many of this external conditions which are really causes for the object not being recognized properly.


As I said, if there is no proper light I cannot perceive a chair; if the chair is kept at a distance from me I cannot perceive the chair as it can be perceived if it were near to me; thus they said that it is the external condition that matters to find the invalidity of knowledge; what is validity and invalidity? You already know that - validity means there is a new knowledge that we acquire about that object and it certainly should not contradict with any other knowledge and must be free from other defects; these are the three components stated by Mimamsa philosophy.

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Therefore, they said that the validity of knowledge - knowledge about an object - lies in the matter, which is capable of producing the effects and once it produces the effects then we have knowledge about that object; here the validity and invalidity come because of the external conditions; in other words one of the things that is produced - the validity and invalidity of knowledge about that object - depends on many of the external conditions; if the external conditions are not supported for a cogniser to cognise that object then it will turn into invalid knowledge; this is the Kumarila bhatta stand point.

Moving further, the Samkhya philosophy - the Samkhya scholars - believe that Svatah pramanya and Svatah apramanya - the validity and invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter itself; they argue that if the matter is not valid then any effort put into it will not be able to produce any of this valid knowledge or any of this good effect; if the validity does not lie in the matter, how can we expect that whatever it produces has validity? Therefore, they said that validity and invalidity lie in the matter which is capable of producing the effect

Svatah pramanyavada - intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity; both validity and invalidity lie in the matter which is capable of producing the effect; they argue that if the matter is invalid then whatever it produces will be invalid; if the knowledge about the matter is invalid then whatever effect it produces will certainly result in invalid knowledge.


Now, Buddhist thinkers said Paratah pramanyavada and Svatah apramanyavada; when they said Paratah pramanyavada they said that validity of an object - or we can have a validity, we can have a knowledge and that knowledge will be valid when there is in an external condition that matters - when there is a sufficient amount of light, it should be in a particular distance and so on and so forth; therefore, according to Buddhist our knowledge will be valid because it depends on the external conditions.

Whenever we recognize, whenever we identify an object certainly there are external conditions which matter, because in darkness we cannot identify an object - in darkness we cannot recognize an object; therefore, validity of knowledge lies or validity of knowledge depends on the external conditions.

They further said that Svatah apramanyavada - intrinsic invalidity - why did they say that? They said that when we cannot claim that a knowledge will be valid when it lies in its matter because once it is produced we do not know its validity or invalidity because we do not know whether it solves its purpose; in the first production of an object it cannot be cognised as valid or invalid - the reason behind that is that once it is produced we do not know what the purpose is, we do not know whether it fulfills its purpose or not - whether it can be used for the purposes for which has been produced; all the things we are able to know only when we recognize that object; we know how it can solve the purpose and so on and so forth; therefore, validity never lies in the matter, validities can be accessed by the cogniser when there is a contact between sense organs and that object.


In that way, they said that invalidity lies in the matter - the invalidity of knowledge that is a Svatah apramanyavada; the invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter; however, the validity of knowledge can be assessed when there is an external condition present over there when a cogniser is cognising the particular object.

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Now, if we see the Naiyayika's stand point, Naiyayikas clearly stated that both validity and invalidity of knowledge depends on the external conditions; they said that we are not discussing about the matter because we do not know anything as such in the matter; once it is produced then we have the sense organs that are in contact with that object and of course, once we recognize that object it is supported by some of the external conditions; therefore, does the external condition really matter for cognising an object - what it is?

Therefore, they submit the view that both validity and invalidity of knowledge depends on the external condition; hence, they subscribe the view saying that Paratah pramanya and Paratah apramanya - both validity and invalidity lie in the external condition; both validity and invalidity depend on the external condition.

Now, let us see how Mimamsas react to those other opinions given by or stated by Nyaya schools, Buddhist schools and Samkhya school; Kumarila refutes the view of Samkhya by asking them how the same knowledge can be valid and invalid, because in Samkhya they said that Svatah pramanya and Svatah apramanya - both validity and invalidity - lie in the matter which is capable of producing the effect.

Samkhya standpoint is very clear - they said that, if something is not capable of producing validity then how can it produce validity? If the matter is not valid how can we expect that it will produce something that is valid knowledge; if the matter is invalid


can we expect valid knowledge out of it? Here, Mimamsa Kumarila Bhatta - specifically - argues about how Samkhya can say that - that a table is not a table; because, Samkhya argues that validity and invalidity lies in the matter in the same time; further, Kumarila Bhatta asks Samkhya - is it not that you are contradicting when you say that both validity and invalidity lie in the matter itself; this is Kumarila Bhatta's reaction towards Samkhya view on pramanyavada.

Now, Parthasarathi Misra is another scholar in Mimamsa philosophy; Parthasarathi Misra said that Buddhist claims cannot be accepted because they are stating that Paratah pramanya and Svatah apramanya - validity of knowledge depends on external conditions and invalidity lies in the matter; they said that, if one thing can be consider as valid knowledge and that valid knowledge is to be established by the help of other valid knowledge and further that valid knowledge is to be establish by another valid knowledge, then it will go in a infinity regress; at no point of time can we claim that these are the external conditions that really matter for assessing whether a knowledge is valid.

Thus, Parthasarathi Misra claims that if the validity of knowledge is determined by the subsequent knowledge then it leads to the infinity regress; further, they said if knowledge is not intrinsically valid it cannot be validated by any other knowledge; because, Buddhists claim that invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter; how did Parthasarathi misra refute this argument? On the first ground, they said that if something is invalid at any cost whatever we try - try to get the valid knowledge out of it - we cannot succeed because it is intrinsically invalid.


Therefore, they said that if knowledge is not intrinsically valid then it cannot be validated by any other knowledge; if you claim that knowledge is not intrinsically valid and further you say that it depends on the external conditions for cognising its validity - it is a contradiction; if the knowledge is not valid how does it matter whether external conditions are present or not? Because, it is not capable of producing the valid knowledge; in this way, Parthasarathi Misra refutes the claim made by the Buddhist scholars.

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- ❖ Kumarila criticizes Nyāya by arguing that if validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity and invalidity, the knowledge would be either neutral or devoid of any logical value.
- ❖ But the fact is that we can never experience the neutral knowledge about an object.
- ❖ How many extraneous conditions are required to validate knowledge of an object is not mentioned by Naiyāyikas. Thus, it is erroneous to accept that the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on the external conditions.
- ❖ Although knowledge and illusion are contradicted yet they are inseparably related with each other.

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Now, Kumarila also criticizes Nyaya views of Pramanyavada; because, Naiyayikas said Paratah pramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada - both validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on the external conditions; Kumarila Bhatta rejects the Naiyayikas arguments; Kumarila Bhatta said that if the validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to the external conditions then prior to the knowledge of its validity and invalidity the knowledge would be either neutral or devoid of any logical value; it is a logical argument if you can see that - Naiyayikas said, that validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on the external condition or external's condition and Kumarila Bhatta is asking that if the knowledge is not valid intrinsically how can you claim or on what basis we can derive some valid knowledge out of that - is it possible?

Further, Kumarila Bhatta said that, if you are claiming that validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external conditions, it simply means that prior to its production or prior to the external conditions the matter is itself in a neutral stand point - it is neither valid nor invalid - can you claim so?

Because, Kumarila Bhatta further argued that we cannot find any kind of knowledge at any stage which has a neutral value; at any point of time we cannot claim that any knowledge has a neutral value; if it is so, then Nyayika's stand point cannot be accepted - we cannot accept something that says that validity and invalidity of knowledge depends on external condition; if it is so, then we have to accept - we have to logically accept -


that prior to the external conditions of validity and invalidity of knowledge the knowledge was a neutral - it is neither positive nor negative; at any point of time we cannot claim that a knowledge has a neutral value.

Hence, Naiyayika's argument cannot be accepted by Kumarila Bhatta; thus, they said that the fact is that, we can never experience the neutral knowledge about an object; further, he said the number of extraneous conditions are required to validate knowledge of an object is not mentioned by Naiyayikas; thus, it is erroneous to accept that the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external conditions.

Further, they said - let us assume, let us accept that according to Naiyayikas the validity and invalidity of knowledge depends on external conditions; but, he has not mentioned how many external conditions really matter to cognise the validity and invalidity of knowledge; if there is no fixed number of external conditions then it varies from person to person, time to time and place to place.


Hence, whatever is valid for a person may not be acceptable for another person; because, it is not the case that two people agree to cognise an object having the same external conditions - it is not so; because, two people may take different accounts of cognising that object. The two people may differ in accepting the different external conditions for cognising the object; therefore, Kumarila Bhatta strongly refutes the Naiyayika's argument that knowledge - or the validity and invalidity of knowledge - depends on external conditions.

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- ❖ Kumarila criticizes Nyāya by arguing that if validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity and invalidity, the knowledge would be either neutral or devoid of any logical value.
- ❖ But the fact is that we can never experience the neutral knowledge about an object.
- ❖ How many extraneous conditions are required to validate knowledge of an object is not mentioned by Naiyāyikas. Thus, it is erroneous to accept that the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on the external conditions.
- ❖ Although knowledge and illusion are contradicted yet they are inseparably related with each other.

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
Here, you find knowledge; knowledge means - knowledge about an object. knowledge about a fact, knowledge about an event - that is knowledge; also we find that whenever we talk about knowledge there is every possibility that we may encounter illusion; we may think that we have acquired the knowledge, but that is not the real knowledge - that is an illusion; how do you know that? Because, when prior knowledge is rectified by other knowledge or contracted by other knowledge we accept that our prior knowledge was an illusion.

Thus, in Mimamsa philosophy it is stated that, although knowledge and illusions are contradicted they are inseparably related with each other; that is what we find a very famous statement - to err is human; it is human beings who cognise the object; it is stated that when...it is not the case that whenever we cognise the object we know the object as it is at all times - no; because, there are many times when we cognise snake as a rope, we cognise shell as silver and many more things; why does it happen? They said that we encounter an object, we identify that object and whatever knowledge we acquire at that time or whatever knowledge we acquire in that time it is not valid knowledge, because it is counter-acted or negated by other kinds of knowledge in later periods.

Once it is counter-acted, once it is contradicted we can know that our previous knowledge was an illusion - was not valid knowledge; thus knowledge and illusion although they are contradictory in their nature yet they are inseparably related with each


other; many of the scholars accept that illusion is in itself a knowledge - of course, this is not valid knowledge, however it is a knowledge; in that way one has to understand what is illusion and what is knowledge and how illusion differs from knowledge; on the other hand, how knowledge differs from illusion; as you can see there is a logical relation between knowledge and illusion. We have knowledge it is - counter-acted in the later period, therefore we accept that our prior knowledge is an illusion; in this way, knowledge and illusion both are inseparably related with each other

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Nature of Illusion

- ❖ Knowledge is self-illuminated and eternally real, said by Mimāṃsikas.
- ❖ Illusion is the understanding of one thing as another.
- ❖ Example; identifying a rope as snake is an illusion.
- ❖ In this case, the contact between the sense organs with the object can't not be ruled out.
- ❖ The knowledge of snake is neither due to perception nor due to inference, but certainly due to the memory.
- ❖ The snake arises in cognizer's mind because of the defects in his/her visual organs which may occur due to the extraneous conditions.
- ❖ On the other hand the characteristics of snake are remembered by the cognizer.

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Now, we will discuss what is the nature of illusion - how can we understand the concept of illusion; it is philosophy which tells you how to understand the concept of illusion and no other discipline as such is able to explain what is illusion and why we have an illusion - this is the beauty of philosophy.

Once you understand the philosophy, once you have an interest in philosophy, then you may be able to explain many of the new concepts which you may not have focused on or which you may not even have known in your past philosophy; arguments to understand a particular concept or a thinking in its true nature - in that sense

Now, Mimamsa philosophy tries to explain what is illusion; they said that knowledge is itself illuminated and eternally real; according to Mimamsa philosophy knowledge is itself illuminated and eternally real; once we say that this is the knowledge - when can

we say - when we can claim - that we have acquired knowledge in our general understanding?

When can we claim that we have acquired knowledge? We can claim that we acquired knowledge only when we know that object, we know what it is, we identify that object of having its essential and accidental qualities, we know what are the purposes for which it has been produced and how it can be used for those purposes so on and so forth. If you add further, you can say how that object is different from other objects; if you know all these features then you can claim - yes, I know that object, therefore I have knowledge about that object; hence, we can claim that I have acquired knowledge about that object.


In the same way, when you say that you have knowledge about a particular concept - that means, you have understood the concept and it is sure that your understanding should not be a contradicted further by any other knowledge; on both grounds, we can claim that we acquire the knowledge about the object, about the concept, about the fact or an event; therefore, once you have a knowledge it is self-illuminated, it is eternal; because knowledge of the chair - say, knowledge of the illusion - it remains as it is, it would not change further; however, the cogniser who is cognising that knowledge may not exist eternally in this earth; because, he may be in the chain of birth and death, but the concept as such - the knowledge as such - it is eternal, it is self-illuminated; as I said, the knowledge of a chair, the knowledge of a gain, the knowledge of water - it remains eternal; it would not change, it does not fall into the cycle of birth progress and destruction.

But it is the cogniser who really falls in the trap; he or she cognises the object and by the passing of time he may fall in the trap of birth, growth and death; but, it is true and is eternally true that the concept remains as it is, eternally; it was in the past, it is in the present, it will be in the future.

The concept of water - how people perceived water in the past is the same way that they are perceiving it in the present and it will be in the future - it will not change; but, those who are perceiving the water they may change, they may be subject to birth and death; therefore, they said that, it is a very clear statement they made that knowledge itself is self-illuminated, it is eternally true and it exists for all the time.


Moving further, they said that illusion is the understanding of one thing as another; just few minutes ago I said what is illusion, but according to Mimamsa philosophy they said that illusion is the understanding of one thing as another thing; that means, we have a knowledge about an object and we consider that we have acquired the knowledge about that object; but, later it is counter-acted or it is contradicted by other knowledge; therefore, our prior knowledge may not be valid knowledge, hence the prior knowledge will be treated as an illusion - why is it an illusion? Because, we identify an object as what it is not - we identify a rope as a snake, we identify a rope not as a rope but as a snake; therefore, the knowledge about that object - it is a rope - is an illusion.

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- ❖ The snake arises in cognizer's mind because of the defects in his/her visual organs which may occur due to the extraneous conditions.
- ❖ On the other hand the characteristics of snake are remembered by the cognizer.

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Now, I believe it is clear to you what knowledge is and what illusion is and how these two concepts are related with each other and how these two concepts cannot be separated from each other. An example I gave is identifying a rope as snake is an illusion; in this case, the contact between the sense organs with the object cannot be ruled out; how really does it happen? How really does illusion appear for a cogniser? Why a cogniser cognises something as what it is not.

Here, they have explained by giving an example - they said, a cogniser is cognising a rope as a snake; whenever he or she is cognising that object there is a sense object contact - there is a sense organs contact between that object and the sense organs; here, we find there is a contact between sense organs of the cogniser and the object and that

cannot be ruled out; of course, there are some external conditions which matter to perceive that object; further, they said that the knowledge of snake is neither due to perception nor due to inference but certainly due to memory - they very clearly said it, and interestingly they presented; they said whenever there is a illusion it is not because of perception not because of inferences, but because of memory as well.

They clearly said, that the knowledge of snake is neither due to perception nor due to inference, but certainly due to the memory - why is it so? Because, whenever the cogniser perceives the object - let us say rope - in that time, he may find some of the features that are common to both rope and snake; therefore, he is able to recapitulate the same sort of object having some of the features - like snake. Therefore, the concept of snake was remembered by the cogniser and in that time - in the moment when you perceives the object 'rope' it reflects in his mind; therefore, it is the memory which compels the cogniser to cognise the object which is presented before him as a snake, but not as a rope.

Because, he perceives the object and he finds some of the features which **our loves** even in a another object - let us say snake; the concept of snake was in his mind at that time and because that object lies in his mind he or she immediately claims that this is not a rope, but as a snake; because, if you remember we said that we cognise an object because of its features, because of its qualities; but, here what happens is that the mind which immediately reflects the concept of snake - unfortunately, the snake has some of the features which he finds in the object presented before him; therefore, mind compels him to have an impression of the object - snake - in his mind; compels the cogniser to claim the object as a snake instead of a rope.


Thus, they said that the knowledge of snake is neither due to perception, nor due to inference but certainly due to memory; the snake arises in the cogniser's mind because of the defects in his or her visual organs, which may occur due to the extraneous condition. There is a another condition that they have described - whenever the cogniser tries to perceive the object, because of the external conditions the cogniser may not be able to cognise the object clearly, however he can cognise some of the features of it, but he cannot cognise the full object.

On the other hand, the characteristics of snake are remembered by the cogniser; there are three things which are very clearly and logically stated - these arguments are very logical in nature; they said that it is an illusion when a cogniser cognises a rope as a snake - this is an illusion because it is counter-acted in the later period; how does it happen? Why does this illusion happen? They said, whenever the cogniser tries to cognise an object some of the external conditions may not be well presented over there or some of the external conditions may not support the cogniser to cognise the object - the first argument; the second argument is that whenever he tries to cognise an object he find some of the features of the object; the third argument is that because of some of the features he finds and he recapitulates whatever earlier experiences he had.

He found that there is another object known as snake of having so and so features; in that time, it reflects the object 'snake' in his mind of having so and so features which is presented in the object before him; as a result the impression of that snake in his mind causes him to identify that object as a snake.


I repeat: there are three claims is made - the first claim is that the cogniser tries to cognise the object where there are no sufficient support from the external conditions, the second is that he tries to identify that object which is presented before him of having so and so features and the third one is that those features he recapitulates whatever he had in his previous experiences and found that snake has so and so features and now the concept snake is in his memory and here memory compels the cogniser to cognise the object a snake and not as a rope.

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- ❖ Rope is the object of vision while snake is in the mind.
- ❖ Illusion is resulted because of the confusion between two types of knowledge.
- ❖ It is due to failure in discriminating one knowledge from another.
- ❖ Thus, all illusions are subjective.
- ❖ Like illusions, errors are also subjective.
- ❖ Having a cognition which is not answering the object is called 'error' (khyātivāda).
- ❖ Khyātivāda is of two types
 - i) Asatkhyātivāda
 - ii) Satkhyātivāda

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These are the three conditions, which result in the cogniser to claiming an object as different from what it is; this is the result where a cogniser cognises a rope as a snake - in this way illusion appears Rope is the object of vision, while snake is in mind; illusion results because of the confusion between two types of knowledge - the first knowledge is that he tries to identify an object which is presented before him - that is due to the sense organ's contact directly; further there is another knowledge which he is able to recapitulate in his memory; thus, they said that illusion results because of the confusion between two types of knowledge - one is perceptual knowledge which is presented before him another was memory knowledge which he recapitulated consciously. It is due to the failure in discriminating one type of knowledge from the other; all illusions are subjective in nature - any illusion you talk about it is subjective in nature.

For example, you are going in a straight road - you are driving a car - you find that at a distance it seems that road is going down or the road is going up - it is an illusion; as you go close to that road you find that the road is very clean - it is straight. it is neither up nor down; but, from a distance - since the road is very straight - due to some reason or other you identify that after five minutes the road will be up or down; during summer time from a long distance if you see, there is a mirage - you find that there is a water; but, that is not a really water it may be the dust particles which are called mirage.

It is an illusion to identify mirage as water, to identify a straight road as an up or down road, to identify a snake as silver; in many cases, due to some of the external conditions we identify a shell as a silver because some of the features of silver lie in the shell and also we find the inverse relation; in all the cases, you find these three conditions: the first condition is that the cogniser perceives the object and because of some of the external conditions the cogniser is not able to perceive the object as it is; however, he or she tries to cognise the object with the help of some of the features which you find in that object.

At the same time there are some kinds of objects he will be able to recapitulate with some of these features; because of the compulsion of the mind he is able to claim the object - what is reflected in his memory but not what he has perceived.

As a result the illusion appears; like illusion we find error - it is a similar concept; when you cognise X - not as an X, then it is an error; when we cognise a cow is not a cow then you say error; when you cognise snake as a rope is also an error; because, what is expected is that we as a cogniser have to cognise snake as a snake and not snake as a rope; because, of some common features between snake and rope we are in a confusion as to whether to claim that object which is presented before us as a snake or a rope; therefore, error is also subjective - why is it subjective? It is not the case that all cognisers will identify the snake as a rope all the time while having the same conditions external conditions; so, it differs from person to person and even place to place.

Therefore, they said that like illusions, errors are also subjective in nature; having a cognition which is not answering the object is called error; having a cognition...here we are trying to have a cognition on that object which is presented before us; therefore, they said having a cognition which is not answering the object or not answering the object is called error or Khyativada; when they try to explain the concept error they claim that error and illusion...may be these two concepts are overlapping each other, but one must understand that illusion means there is an idea or a concept that one believes in and later finds that it is not true - it is not the valid knowledge.

In case of error it is a mistake; it is a mistake by the individual, the mistake does not lie in the object - it is a mistake because of the individual; even illusion also illusion because of the individual - individual or the cogniser believes an object in a different way - what


it is not; here, a cogniser understands or believes an object with a different features - what it is not.

A cogniser tries to cognise an object with different features - what it is not; therefore, it is the responsibility of a cogniser - he has to or she has to cognise the object correctly; therefore, both illusions and errors lie in the subject or it depends on the cogniser and hence it is subjective in nature.

Thus, they claim that whenever a cogniser tries to identify an object and is not able to identify the object as it is, **then they are all lies**; thus they said having a cognition, which is not answering the object is called error or Khyativada. The concept of Khyativada is very clearly known to many of the schools and many of the schools contributed to the concept of Khyativada - theory of error; because, they believe that to cognise something not necessarily resulting in valid knowledge...because of many of the conditions; now some of the conditions you know and some of the conditions we will discuss.


Whenever the situation demands we will discuss, but broadly if you see Khyativada are of two types: one is Asatkhyativada and another is Satkhyativada.

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Asatkhyātivāda

- ❖ Asatkhyātivāda is proposed by Mādhyamika school of Buddhism.
- ❖ This school is known as sunyavādins.
- ❖ For them, neither the mind nor the phenomenal world is real.
- ❖ Everything is unreal.
- ❖ According to them, error lies in the cognition of non-existence.
- ❖ Here, non-existence is cognised as existence.
- ❖ Again, cognition of unreal is apprehended as real.
- ❖ Example; we cognise shell as silver.

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Asatkhyativada talks about the Madhyamika schools; Madhyamika school is a school from Buddhism; a Madhyamika school is also known as Sunyavadins - those who believe that neither mind nor the composite world is real; according to them nothing is

real because everything is in a momentary process everything is in the process of constant flux.

Thus, they said that neither the mind nor the external world is real - this is their standpoint; Madhyamika school accept the Asatkhyativada - they said that everything is unreal and according to them error lies in the cognition of non-existence; it is non-existence where the error lies, because whenever we try to cognise the object that object may not remain as it is - it has changed - because every moment things are changing. Therefore, they said that neither mind nor the object is real in this world; error lies in the cognition of non-existence - here non-existence is cognised as existence and again cognition of unreal is apprehended as real - we cognise shell as a silver

There are two things that Madhyamika school highlighted - the first thing they said that everything is in the process of constant flux nothing remains fixed because they believe in the **momentariness**; therefore, they said that neither mind nor the empirical world is real everything is unreal and we as cognisers try to identify non-existence as an existence; let say, now I am trying to identify an object, say, table; whenever we try to identify an object table immediately it changes; therefore, I as a cogniser or me as a cogniser I identify the non-existence of table as a table; whenever we try to identify that object the object may not remain as it is - it changes; an illusion according to him lies when the non-existence is cognised as an existence and further they said that the cognition of unreal is apprehended as real.

In this way they describe the concept Asatkhyativada - the example is that we cognise shell as a silver and in this case also illusion appears; this is the theory of error - Asatkhyativada; in the next class we will discuss Satkhyativada and how other schools contributed to it.

Thank you.