

Introduction to Cultural Studies
Dr. Avishek Parui
Department of Humanities & Social Sciences
Indian Institute of Technology-Madras

Lecture - 33
Foucault – What Is An Author - V

So hello and welcome to this NPTEL course entitled Introduction to Cultural Studies where we are reading Michel Foucault's essay, What Is An Author. We have already had several lectures in this essay and now we are sort of just winding up now with this lecture and perhaps one more lecture after this.

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author of a theory, tradition, or discipline in which other books and authors will in their turn find a place. These authors are in a position that I will call "transdiscursive." This is a recurring phenomenon – certainly as old as our civilization. Homer, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers, as well as the first mathematicians and the originators of the Hippocratic tradition, all played this role. Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century, there appeared in Europe another, more uncommon, kind of author, whom one should confuse with neither the "great" literary authors, nor the authors of religious texts, nor the founders of science. In a somewhat arbitrary way we shall call those who belong in this last group "founders of discursivity."

They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. In this sense they are very different, for example, from a novelist, who is, in fact, nothing more than the author of his own text. Freud is not just the author of *The Interpretation of Dreams or Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*; Marx is not just the author of the *Communist Manifesto* or *Das Kapital*: they both have established an endless possibility of discourse. Obviously, it is easy to object. One might say that it is not true that the author of a novel is only the author of his own text; in a sense, he also, provided that he acquires some "importance," governs and commands more than that. To take a very simple example, one could say that Ann Radcliffe not only wrote *The Castles of Athlin and Dunbayne* and several other novels but also made possi

Now I just begin where we stopped in the last lecture and that is the point where Foucault talks about transdiscursivity and he talks about certain authors being founders of discursivity. So this should be on your screen at the moment. So he talks about different kinds of authorship. He talks about authorship in scientific writing. He talks about authorship in philosophical writing, in literary writings and he really makes it complicated and that is one of the complexities of this particular essay and the reason why we find this essay so illuminating in our current times.

That is he breaks away from his one idea of authorship or authority. He talks about different kinds of, different kinds of politics of authorship which are prevalent in different discourses. So scientific discourses, literary discourses, philosophical discourses etc. And you know he talks

about you know this is where we stopped in the last lecture. He talks about transdiscursivity and some you know some authors or some writers they become transdiscursive or become founders of discursivity. So in that sense their authorship becomes more important.

Their authorship becomes more permanent and more timeless and more monumental in certain sense than say authors of literary works, author of scientific works etc. And he gives examples of Freud and Marx you know and to basically corroborate as point and this is what we are going to do at this particular lecture. So this is what he had said in the last lecture. We had discussed it, I will just wind up little bit, summarize little bit and then we will move with this particular lecture with the text that will cover in this particular you know session.

So Foucault had said in a somewhat arbitrary way we shall call those who belong to the last group as founders of discursivity. So the last group being the kind of authors, the figures or the writers who sort of inaugurate a discourse in a way or who start a discourse who produce a discourse which then becomes monumental, which then becomes transcultural or it moves beyond culture. It moves across culture, it moves across time etc.

So these people are maybe defined as founders of discursivity. So how are they unique and this is the beginning of the section that we will start off with today and this should be on your screen. They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else; the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. In this sense they are very different, for example from a novelist who is in fact nothing more than the author of his own text.

So he talks about again, this is what I just mentioned a couple of minutes ago where he is talking about different kinds of authorship. So he is saying over here that these authors and by these authors he means transdiscursive authors, they are not just writing a text. They are not just writing a work. But they are actually inaugurating a tradition, inaugurating a particular style, a particular discourse which will then have many takers, which will have many revisionist, which will have many reformers. But you know it will become a discourse in its own right.

So in that sense this kind of authorship is different ontologically as well as functionally from say writing of a novel or writing of a literary text okay which is more limited in its quality and then he goes on to corroborate what he is saying. Freud is not just the author of the interpretation of dreams or jokes and their relation to the unconscious. Marx is not just the author of the communist manifesto or Das Kapital.

They both have established an endless possibility of discourse. So again this is one of the key conditions and this is a very important section which I will spend some time with. This possibility of discursive formation is something that Foucault is interested in and this is the reason why he is offering a niche, offering a particular subcategory of authors who are not just writers of certain text but also they are inaugurators of certain traditions.

They are inventors of certain traditions and again this has to be made different from inventors of science, inventors of scientific theories and you will make the different quite clearly in a bit. But you know for authors who are inventors of discourses, for authors who are inventors of certain styles of thought they are not just writing a text or a book or a series of books. They are actually inaugurating a tradition of thought.

And therein lies the difference from say literary writers or scientific writers because you know you might argue that even scientific writers are inventing theories, inventing theorems, inventing different kinds of formula etc. But then Foucault argues that those formula or those theories or those theorems are already part of a scientific tradition, right. They are part of a system. But these writers, writers like Marx and Freud he singles out these two people quite interestingly.

They are actually inaugurating a system you know a systematic thought or an epistemic system you might argue, okay. So this epistemic system is something which is being inaugurated by these writers and what that does is that it produces an endless possibility of discourse. So discourse is formed and reformed and manufactured and formulated by these kinds of transdiscursive writers, okay.

So it established an endless possibility of discourse. Obviously, it is easy to object and Foucault is the first to say that you know it is easy to refute this theory. It is easy to say that you know how can you say that a literary writer does not produce a discourse. How can you say a literary writer does not produce a style? I mean there are numerous examples of literary writers who have produced styles which have become important and monumental and which are being followed by several other writers subsequently. So how is that different from Marx or Freud. And this is what he goes on to say and this should be on your screen at the moment.

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They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. In this sense they are very different, for example, from a novelist, who is, in fact, nothing more than the author of his own text. Freud is not just the author of *The Interpretation of Dreams or Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*; Marx is not just the author of the *Communist Manifesto* or *Das Kapital*: they both have established an endless possibility of discourse. Obviously, it is easy to object. One might say that it is not true that the author of a novel is only the author of his own text; in a sense, he also, provided that he acquires some "importance," governs and commands more than that. To take a very simple example, one could say that Ann Radcliffe not only wrote *The Castles of Athlin and Dunbayne* and several other novels but also made possible the appearance of the Gothic horror novel at the beginning of the nineteenth century; in that respect, her author function exceeds her own work. But I think there is an answer to this objection. These founders of discursivity (I use Marx and Freud as examples, because I believe them to be both the first and the most important cases) make possible something altogether different from what a novelist makes possible. Ann Radcliffe's texts opened the way for a certain number of resemblances and analogies which have their model or principle in

One might say that it is not true that the author of a novel is only the author of his own text. In a sense he also provided that he acquires some importance governs and commands more than that. To take a very simple example one could say that Ann Radcliffe not only wrote *The Castle of Athlin* or *Dunbayne* and several other novels but also made possible the appearance of the Gothic horror novel at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

So you know he is saying that you know one might argue there is someone like Ann Radcliffe inaugurated the Gothic horror tradition of literary writing so how can that not be an example of transdiscursivity. How can that not be an example of the author function that you know Marx or Freud enjoyed. How is it different? Someone like Ann Radcliff who you know begins to have a tradition, offers a tradition which has been taken up by several other writers subsequently.

So how is that not part of the same you know authorship production, authorship ontology right? So how is that different? But then this is what Foucault would argue. So in that sense her author function exceeds her own work. So in that argument strictly speaking when we argue that you know Ann Radcliffe is not just the writer of the castle of Athlin or Dunbayne but she is the inaugurator of the Gothic horror tradition of literary writing. So that too is a valid argument.

But this is what Foucault says. But I think there is an answer to this objection. These founders of discursivity I use Marx and Freud as examples because I believe them to be both the first and the most important cases, make possible something altogether different from what a novelist makes possible. So the different lies in the possibility. The different lies in the production that comes out of the possibility. So you know he makes the mapping out quite clear over here.

Ann Radcliffe's texts opened the way for a certain number of resemblances and analogies which have their model or principle in their work. So Ann Radcliffe offered a model which was then taken up, imitated mimetically or you know through different writings subsequently. So it was a model that was followed later on through analogy. So people who wrote in that tradition who could say that they were making analogist relationship to Ann Radcliffe's idea of the horror,

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Radcliffe founded the Gothic horror novel means that in the nineteenth-century Gothic novel one will find, as in Ann Radcliffe's works, the theme of the heroine caught in the trap of her own innocence, the hidden castle, the character of the black, cursed hero devoted to making the world expiate the evil done to him, and all the rest of it. On the other hand, when I speak of Marx or Freud as founders of discursivity, I mean that they made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and equally important) a certain number of differences. They have created a possibility for something other than their discourse, not compe

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So you know he mentions the few strategies and few themes over here the innocent heroine, the cursed hero, the doomed castle. So these are the props, these are the figures, these are the different structures which keep coming up in that kind of writing. But on the other hand when I speak of Mark or Freud as founders of discursivity, I mean that they made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also and equally important a certain number of differences.

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This would seem to present a new difficulty, however, or at least a new problem.

So therein lies the difference. So he is saying when he comes to looking at Marx and Freud they not just offered structures or styles of or props, or figures but also offered a tradition from which people could differ right and difference creates more possibilities, difference makes production more possible right and we have seen how difference plays out in different political context and you know in previous discursive context.

So think of Homi Bhabha, think of Orwell's essay and you know the other texts we covered so far and what Foucault is saying over here is the difference over here is equally important. So it is not just analogy, it is not just repetitions, it is not just structural repetitions, stylistic repetitions, figurative repetitions but also differences. So there is a whole host of writers and thinkers who drew of Marx, drew of Freud and then differ from Freud and differ from Marx and therein lies the possibility. The difference produces this possibility.

And that makes Freud and Marx transdiscursive in a way that it does not make Ann Radcliffe transdiscursive. So Ann Radcliffe's works despite being inaugurated of certain literary traditions, they are limited to stylistic traditions. They are limited to literary tropes. They are limited to certain themes which are then replicated and you know followed and agreed on by subsequent writers.

But Freud and Marx they are more important because people have also drawn on them to differ from them, to deviate from them and the difference lies, the difference lies in a difference just to play with words a little bit, okay. So they have created a possibility for something other than the discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded. So you know something which has to be drawn from the discourse but at the same time they have made possible new kinds of discourses which have emerged from the original discourses.

So Freudian tradition of thinking, Freudian tradition of psychoanalysis, the Marxist idea of economy, people have disagreed vehemently with those traditions but at the same time the disagreements are reliant on the original model. So they have offered discursivity possibilities. They have also offered discursivity differences and therein lies the significance of these 2 figures. To say that Freud founded psychoanalysis does not simply mean that we find the concept of the libido or the technique of dream analysis in the works of Karl Abraham or Melanie Klein.

It means that Freud made possible a certain number of divergences with respect to his own texts concepts and hypothesis that all arise from the psychoanalytic discourse itself. So that particular psychoanalytic discourse it created a possibility of other discourses similar to it but also equal importantly it also made possible discourses which differed from it, discourses which were divergence from it, okay.

And therein lies the monumentality, the significance of these discursive thinkers, of these writers who have become more than writers because they have become founders of certain discourses, right and so that is the key difference that Foucault is mapping out over here. So he is saying it is possible, it is perfectly possible for a writer, a literary writer to invent a particular style that other writers who follow subsequently.

So you can think of the modernist stream of consciousness technique. You can think of the postmodernist unreliable narrator technique. So all these are styles which are followed subsequently by other writers. But what makes Freud or Marx more important and more transdiscursive is that they are not just offering styles, they are not just offering structures they are offering systems of thought. They are offering an epistemic system that people can differ

from. But even the difference, even the divergence from that epistemic system would require a certain degree of tribute to it, a certain degree of drawing on it okay. So therein lies the key difference between transdiscursive writers and literary writers who found certain traditions.

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black, cursed hero devoted to making the world expiate the evil done to him, and all the rest of it. On the other hand, when I speak of Marx or Freud as founders of discursivity, I mean that they made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and equally important) a certain number of differences. They have created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded. To say that Freud founded psychoanalysis does not (simply) mean that we find the concept of the libido or the technique of dream analysis in the works of Karl Abraham, or Melanie Klein; it means that Freud made possible a certain number of divergences – with respect to his own texts, concepts and hypotheses – that all arise from the psychoanalytic discourse itself.

This would seem to present a new difficulty, however, or at least a new problem: is the above not true, after all, of any founder of a science, or of any author who has introduced some transformation into a science that might be called fecund? After all, Galileo made possible not only those discourses which repeated the laws he had formulated, but also statements very different from what he himself had said. If Georges Cuvier is the founder of biology, or Ferdinand de Saussure the founder of linguistics, it is not because they were imitated, nor because people have since taken up again the concept of organism or sign; it is because Cuvier made possible, to a certain extent, a theory of evolution diametrically opposed to his own fixism; it is because Saussure made possible a general grammar radically different from his structural analyses. Superficially, then

Okay, now he comes to the other problem, the other possible question that how about, what about writers who write in a scientific tradition, writers who invent theories, writers who invent formula and you can also make the argument that they are inventing a certain tradition of scientific thinking, a certain tradition of scientific analysis etc. So how is that they are not considered to be transdiscursive writers in a way that Marx and Freud are.

So this is the next section that Foucault is examining and see this is again a really characteristic, a key mark you might say of a really great intellectual. That he is offering you the different possibilities that you can use to refute him. So he is offering some theories, at the same time he is giving you the different perspectives that you can use to refute those theories and then he is backing these theories.

So it really requires a huge amount of confidence, a huge amount of epistemological certainty, epistemological confidence, epistemological openness to do this and this is what Freud, what Foucault offers over here and this is what the characteristics you might argue of almost all great

public intellectuals that they offer the different perspectives, they offer the different ways in which you can attack them, in which you can refute them.

And they are the ones who tell you okay so I am offering this theory and these are the ways you can refute this theory but then if you refuted that way I would defend my theory in this particular way. So they established a very dialogic structure in their essay. So he is also offering the different possibilities of refutation of his own theory within the same essay okay and that makes the essay very dialogic in quality, okay.

This would seem to present a new difficulty, however, or at least a new problem. It is above, is the above not true after all for any founder of a science, or any author who has introduced some transformation into a science that might be called fecund, right. So what about the rich, the fecund scientific thoughts, scientific theorem, scientific theories, scientific formula. How is that not transdiscursive. How is that not monumental in the same way as Marx and Freud are?

I mean for instance you can argue that someone who invents a theorem, someone who invents a particular formula that particular person, that particular figure inaugurates a certain tradition of authorship, inaugurates a certain tradition of analysis. So how is that different from the unique significance of someone like Marx or Freud and you know this is what Foucault is arguing and this is what Foucault is defending over here, okay.

After all, Galileo made possible not only those discourses which repeated the laws he had formulated, but also statements very different from what he himself had said. If Georges Cuvier is the founder of biology, or Ferdinand de Saussure the founder of linguistics it is not because they were imitated nor because people have since taken up again the concept of organism or sign. It is because Cuvier made possible to a certain extent a theory of evolution diametrically opposed to his own fixism.

It is because Saussure made possible a generative grammar radically different from his structural analyses. Superficially, then the initiation of discursive practices appear similar to the founding of any scientific endeavor. So he is saying at least if you read it at a superficial level the initiator

of a discursive practice sounds exactly similar to the founder of any scientific endeavor. So how is that different? How is the initiation of a discursive practice different or unique compared to say the founder or the initiation or the inventor of a scientific endeavor. So what is the difference here?

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Is the above not true, after all, of any founder of a science, or of any author who has introduced some transformation into a science that might be called fecund? After all, Galileo made possible not only those discourses which repeated the laws he had formulated, but also statements very different from what he himself had said. If Georges Cuvier is the founder of biology, or Ferdinand de Saussure the founder of linguistics, it is not because they were imitated, nor because people have since taken up again the concept of organism or sign; it is because Cuvier made possible, to a certain extent, a theory of evolution diametrically opposed to his own fixism; it is because Saussure made possible a generative grammar radically different from his structural analyses. Superficially, then, the initiation of discursive practices appears similar to the founding of any scientific endeavor.

Still, there is a difference, and a notable one. In the case of a science, the act that founds it is on an equal footing with its future transformations; this act becomes in some respects part of the set of modifications that it makes possible. Of course, this belonging can take several forms. In the future development of a science, the founding act may appear as little more than a particular instance of a more general phenomenon that unveils itself in the process. It can also turn out to be marred by intuition and empirical bias; one must then reformulate it, making it the object of a certain number of supplementary theoretical operations that establish it more rigorously, and so on. Finally, it can seem to be a hasty generalization that must be retraced. In other words, the founding act of a

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It can also turn out to be marred by intuition and empirical bias. One must then reformulate it, making it the object of a certain number of supplementary theoretical operations that establish it more rigorously and so on. Finally, it can seem to be a hasty generalization that must be retraced. In other words, the founding act of a science can always be reintroduced within the machinery of those transformations which derive from it.

So what he is saying essentially is if we invent a theory, if we invent a theorem, if we invent a formula in the scientific tradition, that particular theorem, that particular theory is already

belonging to a certain tradition, right. So it is not really a departure from a tradition. It extends the tradition, it extends the particular epistemic system, right. But at the same time it belongs to the particular tradition.

So in a way, the discursive initiation that Freud offers, that Marx offers is a dramatic departure from anything that came before it, right. However, even you know basically a life changing scientific theorem like Galilean theorem or the Copernican theorem so they too belong to certain tradition which they drew from right and therein lies the difference. They always drew from a certain epistemic structure, certain epistemic economy, right and in that sense it is not really an initiator of a new discourse, okay.

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that founds it is on an equal footing with its future transformations; this act becomes in some respects part of the set of modifications that it makes possible. Of course, this belonging can take several forms. In the future development of a science, the founding act may appear as little more than a particular instance of a more general phenomenon that unveils itself in the process. It can also turn out to be marred by intuition and empirical bias; one must then reformulate it, making it the object of a certain number of supplementary theoretical operations that establish it more rigorously, and so on. Finally, it can seem to be a hasty generalization that must be retraced. In other words, the founding act of a science can always be reintroduced within the machinery of those transformations which derive from it.

In contrast, the initiation of a discursive practice is heterogeneous to its subsequent transformations. To expand a type of discursivity such as psychoanalysis as founded by Freud, is not to give it a form generality it would not have permitted at the outset but, rather, open it up to a certain number of possible applications. To limit psychoanalysis as a type of discursivity is, in


So in contrast to that when he comes to a discursive initiation or a discursive inauguration what we see. In contrast, and this is on your screen, in contrast the initiation of a discursive practice is heterogeneous to its subsequent transformations. To expand a type of discursivity such as psychoanalysis as founded by Freud is not to give it a form generality it would have permitted at the outset but rather to open it up to a certain number of possible applications.

So the key difference is in the form as well as in the function, okay. The form of this discursive inauguration is not general, right. It is open, it is plastic. It can be taken up in different configurations and different times. In contrast to that if you look at scientific formula it is a

general formula right. it is a general formula that belongs to a particular tradition and in that sense it is not really plastic, it is not really open, it is not really permutable in different other contexts. It belongs to a strict tradition of epistemic analysis.

But in a discursive inauguration and discursive practice it is not really a general formula. It is something that is very specific at the same time it is very open and its entanglement of specificity and openness is what makes discursive practice unique in quality and now this entanglement of this combination between specificity and openness.

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reality, to try to isolate in the founding act an eventually restricted number of propositions or statements to which, alone, one grants a founding value, and in relation to which certain concepts or theories accepted by Freud might be considered as derived, secondary, and accessory. In addition, one does not declare certain propositions in the work of these founders to be false: instead, when trying to seize the act of founding, one sets aside those statements that are not pertinent, either because they are deemed inessential, or because they are considered "prehistoric" and derived from another type of discursivity. In other words, unlike the founding of a science, the initiation of a discursive practice does not participate in its later transformations. As a result, one defines a proposition's theoretical validity in relation to the work of the founders - while the case of Galileo and Newton, it is in relation to what physics or cosmology

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While in the case of Galileo and Newton, it is in relation to what physics or cosmology is in its intrinsic structure and normativity that one affirms the validity of any proposition those men may have put forth. To phrase it very schematically, the works of initiators of discursivity is not situated in a space that science defines. Rather it is the science or the discursivity which refers back to the work as primary coordinates, okay. So this is a key difference. It does not matter.

So the work of Freud or the work of Marx does not really matter, I mean to the extent of which it can be applicable later and can be gone back to originally. So in the case of science for instance if you take the Galilean example, it can only be true if it stays within a particular tradition, if it stays within a particular narrative of epistemic analysis. So only within that narrative does it have its applicability. Only within that narrative does it have its particular function, its particular form.

Whereas if you look at the discursive practices it does not really require, it does not require any particular narrative at all. It can be applied to from different perspectives, from different positions and different points of historical times. So in a way it becomes metahistorical. It becomes you know it does not really depend, it does not really matter from what historical position we are analyzing it, right. So it transcends any particular parameter of knowledge.

It can be used almost universally, it can be used any context and therein lies the difference, therein lies the you know the discursive function of these thinkers, of these writers Marx and Freud that they belong to tradition which is metadiscursive in quality. It is a creator of a discourse at the same time it is not consumed by any particular discourse right. So therein lies the uniqueness of these writers, okay.

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considered "prehistoric" and derived from another type of discursivity. In other words, unlike the founding of a science, the initiation of a discursive practice does not participate in its later transformations. As a result, one defines a proposition's theoretical validity in relation to the work of the founders - while, in the case of Galileo and Newton, it is in relation to what physics or cosmology is in its intrinsic structure and normativity that one affirms the validity of any proposition those men may have put forth. To phrase it very schematically: the work of initiators of discursivity is not situated in the space that science defines; rather, it is the science or the discursivity which refers back to their work as primary coordinates.

In this way we can understand the inevitable necessity, within these fields of discursivity, for a "return to the origin." This return which is part of the discursive field itself, never stops modifying it. The return is not a historical supplement that would be added to the discursivity, or merely an ornament; on the contrary, it constitutes an effective and necessary task of transforming the discursive practice itself. Reexamination of Galileo's text may well change our understanding of the history of mechanics, but it will never be able to change mechanics itself. On the other hand, reexamining Freud's texts modifies psychoanalysis itself, just as a reexamination of Marx's would modify Marxism.

What I have just outlined regarding these "discursive inaugurations" is, of course, very schematic: this is true, in particular, of the opposition I have tried to draw

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It will not change the law of mechanics, it will not change the narrative of mechanics, right. So Galileo's text or Galileo's work is well within the laws of mechanics. So it will not change. It is not outside of that particular law of mechanism. So in that sense Galileo's work is not really an inaugurate of a tradition. It becomes an extension of a tradition right. So changing Galileo's work will not change mechanics, will not change the theories of mechanics or the formula of mechanics.

But on the other hand if you change, if you go back and reexamine Freud's text, if you go back and reexamine you know Marx's writings, then entire narrative of psychoanalysis changes. The entire narrative of Marxism changes. So in that sense Marx and Freud really belong to the inaugurate, the inception point, the zero point, the origin point of that particular discursive narrative, right. So the discourse starts with them. The discourse begins with them.

So any change in understanding any change in an examination of Freud or Marx will change the entire ontology of Marxism, the entire ontology of psychoanalysis and therein lies the key difference between scientific discovery and discursive discovery. So a discursive discovery, a discursive invention such as Marxism or psychoanalysis is completely reliant on the original proponent, the original author, in this case it is Marx or Freud, right.

So if you reexamine Freud's work, if you reexamine Marx's works that will change the entire ontology, the entire epistemic structure of Marxism and psychoanalysis. However, if you change, if you reexamine Galileo's work then Galileo's works will become different. Galileo's works will get a different kind of appreciation. However, that will not change, that will not alter fundamentally the laws of mechanics. The laws of mechanics will stay unchanged in that sense.

The narrative of mechanics will stay unchanged in that sense, okay. So in that sense what he is saying essentially is scientific discoveries or scientific writers they might offer paradigm shifts in a way we look at science, in a way we look at different kinds of scientific laws. However, those paradigm shifts too are embedded in an existent discourse, in an existent narrative of knowledge. However, when it comes to someone like Freud and Marx they are the initiators or the inaugurators of that particular discourse. They are the beginning of that particular narrative.

So they are the origin point, the point zero from which that particular narrative begins. So any change in their work, any change in our assessment of the work will change the entire structure, the entire function, the entire ontology, the entire epistemology of that particular narrative whether it is Marxism or psychoanalysis, okay.

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field itself, never stops modifying it. The return is not a historical supplement that would be added to the discursivity, or merely an ornament; on the contrary, it constitutes an effective and necessary task of transforming the discursive practice itself. Reexamination of Galileo's text may well change our understanding of the history of mechanics, but it will never be able to change mechanics itself. On the other hand, reexamining Freud's texts modifies psychoanalysis itself, just as a reexamination of Marx's would modify Marxism.

What I have just outlined regarding these "discursive insaturations" is, of course, very schematic; this is true, in particular, of the opposition I have tried to draw between discursive initiation and scientific founding. It is not always easy to distinguish between the two; moreover, nothing proves that they are two mutually exclusive procedures. I have attempted the distinction for only one reason: to show that the author function, which is complex enough when one tries to situate it at the level of a book or a series of texts that carry a given signature, involves still more determining factors when one tries to analyze it in larger units; such as groups of works or entire disciplines.

So what I have just outlined regarding these discursive insaturations is of course very schematic. This is true in particular of the opposition I have tried to draw between discursive initiation and scientific founding. It is not always easy to distinguish between the two. Moreover nothing proves that they are two mutually exclusive procedures. So now again, this is the, look at the confidence in Foucault's works, in his thoughts.

He is very quick to tell you what I am saying is by no means conclusive you know you can always challenge me. I am making these convenient classifications but you know these classifications might not work at all. So scientific discourses and discursive practices might come together and they very often do. So it is not really wise all the time to map it out, map these out as a neat ontological category.

So it is perfectly possible for these two types of knowledge, these two types of narratives to be interdependent on each other, okay. Moreover, nothing proves that they are two mutually exclusive procedures. So they may not be necessarily exclusive procedures. I have attempted the distinction for only one reason.

To show that the author function which is complex enough when one tries to situate at the level of a book or a series of texts that carry a given signature, involves still more determining factors when one tries to analyze it in larger units such as groups of workers, groups of works or entire

discipline. So the entire, this particular passage was done to define the author function in a particular way. So he says you know I have made these differences.

It is very artificial differences between scientific writing, discursive writing, literary writing just to corroborate certain kind of author function that I was trying to prove or trying to sort of explain over here. So just to sum up what Foucault had discussed in this particular section that we have studied in this lecture. He talks about the unique author function which is transdiscursive in quality.

An author function which becomes inaugurated of certain tradition part, right and makes the difference between the literary authorship or scientific authorship and this kind of authorship which is discursive authorship you might argue and this discursive authorship which becomes transdiscursive they literally become founders of certain narratives of knowledge in a way that a scientific invention or a literary writing cannot be because any literary writing belongs to certain tradition right or any scientific invention belongs to a certain tradition right.

And if you change that particular scientific writing, if you change that particular literary writing it will not change the entirety of the tradition. However, if you change, hypothetically speaking, if you change the writing of Marx or the writings of Freud, if you reexamine and find out they are completely different that will completely and entirely and fundamentally change the entire narrative of knowledge which they produce and therein lies the uniqueness as transdiscursive author functions, okay.

So this is what Foucault discusses in this particular section and with that we conclude this lecture and we will conclude this particular essay in the next lecture. Thank you for your attention.