

**Political Ideologies: Contexts, Ideas, and Practices**  
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**Wk 11 Topic 11 Nationalism lec 3/5 45:24**  
**Identity politics. Forms of nationalism. Nationalism and colonialism.**

Well hello again, everyone. We're continuing with our Ideologies course 19-20 on the NPTEL program, 2019 and 20. And we're in the middle of our eleventh topic, which is nationalism. This is the start of our third lecture on it, and we're going to move on from self-determination, which we concluded with last time. We're going to move on from there to a theme that runs through nationalism, we'll continue with that.

And the theme is that of what actually makes a nation, what constitutes a nation, our theme today leads on from self-determination, and it is that of identity politics. Well, nationalism, as we have seen, like conservatism and fascism, relies on - we saw this last time - and develops conceptions of identity. It draws on concepts like territory, religion and language, and on less tangible things or less obviously tangible things, like memory and will and political loyalty. This does remind, or tell, people who they are and what brings them together as a people. But as we saw last time, in its stronger and more strident forms, we saw this also with fascism, it can inculcate, nationalism can inculcate a sense of identity or purpose, but these aren't necessarily always benign, and we'll see there are potential complications here.

These less tangible elements may also explain how it is that nationalism is often very prominent in politics, and why nationalist politicians or writers are often very popular, in some cases for long periods of time, and this happens, even if, as we shall see, much of the theory of nationalism is contradictory and even incoherent. We're all, of course, very well aware that nationalism has its own ugly and very ugly side, we see these sides manifested very frequently.

Well, how then is this tied up with identity politics? Well, nationalism is sometimes based on identity politics, and we're familiar with the phenomenon. We need to look at some of the thinking behind it. When nationalism is based on identity politics, it involves the idea of a national consciousness. Proponents of such forms of nationalism often draw on what they claim are national myths, national traditions, national folk-tales and national legends. And they do this to define or specify the national consciousness which they advocate. For example, in Germany, there were two philosophers - Johann Herder, 1744 to 1803, and

Johann Fichte, 1762 to 1814, and Herder and Fichte were among the most noted proponents of this particular form of nationalism.

Herder seems to have held that each nation possesses its own national spirit. He seems though, to have considered this to be a matter of language and culture, and he seems also to have rejected the idea of a hierarchy of nations. I've drawn that from a paper by Forster dated 2007. Well, that kind of thinking, that kind of Herder thinking, is often called cultural nationalism. And at least in theory, this form of, this kind of cultural nationalism is a little bit different from nationalist theories based on ethnic membership or ethnic nationalism. That is both racially and culturally exclusivist; in extreme forms, it amounts to fascism and it does have permanently fascistic undertones.

So, that kind of nationalism based on ethnic membership or ethnic nationalism is somewhat different from the kind of thing that Herder's putting forward; his conception of cultural nationalism seems to see - that seems to see that national identity is more a matter of language and culture. Well, there are various contexts in which nationalism has historically emerged and it seems to have arisen when peoples have been subjected to prolonged colonial or imperial rule.

What we now call Germany, what we now know as Germany, was an area of 39 states, including city states, before the Prussian army's victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71. Those victories enabled the Prussian ruler Wilhelm I to proclaim himself the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm, and to claim that Germany had been unified. In effect, it was the spread of Napoleonic rule across much of Europe that had given rise to nationalistic uprisings. Napoleon at one time looked as though he would come to dominate the whole of Europe - and he got very close to taking Moscow, as you no doubt are aware.

But similar developments, partly in response to Napoleonic rule or the threat of it, or the memory of it, similar developments occurred in Italy and in Latin America, in response to colonial rule. In Italy certainly, Napoleonic rule was the issue; in Latin America, Iberian, that is Portuguese and Spanish rule, were, were the colonial forms of rule in Latin America. The major nationalist leader Simón Bolívar, 1783 to 1830, led successful uprisings against imperial Spain. Several independent countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela were founded as a result. I draw that point from Heywood 2007. Similar things could be said about India.

Similar things could be said about India. Before the achievement of Independence in 1947, the idea of India as a single nation may not even have figured in the thinking of the hundreds

of rulers in the geographical area now called South Asia. And that's not to deny various kinds of broad linguistic and cultural commonalities, that's the best word I can use, these were not rigid commonalities, and they were not frozen and certainly weren't necessarily imposed. And that's been noted, I add this now, that's been noted as forming an idea of India. People like, scholars like Shashi Tharoor have mentioned them in their own work on earlier senses of an Indian identity that was known as India. Those are more to do with language and culture and patterns of cultivation and food and perhaps even patterns of clothing and so on.

But the idea of India as a single nation may not even have figured in the thinking of hundreds of people who ruled the geographical area we now call South Asia. Even in the first War of Independence in 1857, some of those involved in the uprising, such as the Rani of Jhansi, seem to have been relatively indifferent to the fate of the kingdoms or other areas around them, let alone the wider region of what we know today as India. Even some of the most courageous among those who fought in the war of independence in 1857 seemed to have little or no awareness of what has been called, I quote, "a great cause" for which they were prepared to sacrifice their narrow selfish interests.

I take that quotation about the great cause from Professor Abel's book, *Glimpses of Indian National Movement*, published in 2005. Now this state of affairs, this sense of not self-absorption, but relative, I repeat relative, indifference to a wider sense of what we would now call a sense of India, this state of affairs continued until and even after Independence, for some time. It's well enough known that the 561 princely states at the time of Independence were extremely suspicious of and even hostile to the Indian National Congress for a range of reasons. It's also fairly widely known that very few of them had any wish to accede to the incipient Indian union. I draw that from Walter Reid's book, published in 2016.

In the end it - you know, what led the princely states to accept the fact of India and their presence within it, of modern India as a state and their presence within it, what led them to accept that may have been, I'm speculating a little here, may have been nothing other than the facts of geography and the fact that almost none of the princely states had the slightest chance of defending themselves against attack by other countries. Those were likely to have been the main reasons for their accession to the Union, the Union of India. Now that of course has changed very greatly in the last few decades. The princely states are now simply part of the states of India, where they happen to be, and many of the former rulers are now significant political participants in the Indian Republic; many of them have joined political parties and led them, and stand for election in the usual way.

You will be aware that they made the maintenance of certain privileges, like the privy purses, one of the conditions of their membership of the Indian Union, and privy purses were eventually abolished, if I remember rightly in the early 70s, not without disagreement and acrimony. But that happened and today, the rulers of the former princely states are citizens of the Republic of India. Many of them even, have even changed their names so that they don't claim, so to speak, princely or royal status, and just use their own given names.

Well, what are the consequences for the idea of nationalism? It is an ideology but it's so elastic and even amorphous, almost shapeless, that its political expressions inevitably draw from other ideologies. And therefore, there are forms of nationalism, which fall into relatively clear strands. These show of course, strong inheritances from particular ideologies, and we need to be able to identify the main forms. What are these? What are these main forms? They are liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism and reactionary nationalism, and expansionist nationalism, I'll repeat the list - liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism and reactionary nationalism, and finally expansionist nationalism.

Well, let's look at liberal nationalism first. This may well be one of the oldest forms of nationalism; it dates from the French Revolution and the ideas which inform that, some of that revolution, in particular those which were put forward by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712 to 1778. For example, in addition, Polish struggles for independence from Russia led Rousseau to conclude that there is such a thing as the general will; he looked at the example of Poland, and concluded that there is such a thing as a general will.

And he concluded that this is vested in any culturally unified people. That's Rousseau's sense, Rousseau's articulation of the concept. Therefore, monarchical or autocratic government is illegitimate, and according to Rousseau, governments must express the public will. Sovereignty would therefore reside with the people and not the monarch. And the people ceased, therefore, in that conception, to be, under that conception, the people ceased to be subjects of a monarch.

Instead, they became citizens of a nation, that is, citizens who possessed inalienable rights and duties. This is a highly political vision, as under it, citizenship is both a national and a political status. And as a political status, it involves and requires a certain form of political organization. Now this in turn gives rise to the idea of the nation-state. And that's a concept we shall examine in a later section, as we proceed, a little bit later on.

Now, what Rousseau articulated was something very recognizable as a modern conception of citizenship. And in part we owe that concept, that modern form of the concept to

Rousseau and his inheritors. The concept of citizenship therefore, involves nationalism as well as citizenship in liberal forms. We, you'll recall some of these from our liberalism topic, the idea of the modern citizen, the individual with inalienable rights is a typically liberal concept.

It had the result that, or has had the result that, liberal principles, such as mutual non-interference, such as tolerance, such as the right to national liberty or self-determination, are therefore central not only within states, but also central to relations between states, and could also constitute the basis for the international order, we can recognize those concepts when we look at the contemporary international order and the principles on which that is organized.

Now, there are consequences, citizens who enjoy rights within their national boundaries, under this modern concept of citizenship, are also obliged to ensure that their own governments don't restrict the rights of other citizens in other countries to live their lives as they wish. So this goes beyond nationalism. Right - here we get a concept of citizenship as political, and its implications and consequences go beyond nationalism *per se*, to a form of internationalism. Many of the founding ideas of global or multilateral bodies such as the UN or the EU, the European Union, many of the founding ideas of those organizations show the widespread acceptance of such principles and well also, a further result is that member states of bodies, such bodies are expected to work towards negotiated agreements. For example, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC was founded in 1985. And it explicitly excludes discussion of bilateral issues, that is issues between any two member states of SAARC.

Now in relation to other regions of the world, the UN often has a very substantial role in agreements between states. For example, the British Good Friday Agreement, which was signed in 1980, 1998, I beg your pardon, 1998, the British Good Friday Agreement effectively ended violence so severe in Northern Ireland that it amounted to civil war. It's a UN treaty. It comprises two parts - one signed by most of the Northern Ireland political parties, and the other signed only by the British government and the government of the Republic of Ireland, the government of a separate state.

These are all examples of the way the kind of conception of citizenship and self-determination and national identity, which Rousseau articulated in the 18th century and which we have inherited, today, in sometimes modified forms. These conceptions of citizenship involve the idea of inalienable rights and have consequences for the organization of states and for the ways states conduct themselves towards one another.

Now those are typically liberal and recognizably modern forms of the idea of citizenship and of national identity, the two go hand in hand in these conceptions. But there's another form of nationalism. Rousseau's form can be called liberal nationalism or the form we inherited from, broadly, from Rousseau can be called, can be called liberal nationalism. There are other forms, and we need to look at conservative and reactionary nationalism.

Well, conservative thinkers and leaders have often regarded nationalism as a dangerous and destabilizing force, especially when their own subjects have a variety of ethnic, religious, linguistic or other origins. But towards the end of the 19th century, leaders like the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, a Conservative, the first German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, and the Russian Tsar Alexander III, all came to see nationalism as a unifying force - and that it would - came to see, that it could help them to maintain order and to preserve the traditional institutions of their countries and societies.

Now, strong forms of conservative nationalism are often expressed in vehemently exclusivist and even racist terms. They're often very obvious today; for example, in the United Kingdom, they were expressed for a long time and no doubt will continue to be expressed in the form of hostility to membership of the European Union, which as you I'm sure know, the United Kingdom left on the 31st of January 2020. That is just a few days ago, less than a week ago.

In the European Union, member states accept [appointing] the founding treaty, the old European Economic Community, The Treaty of Rome, 1957 member states except when they join or accede to the EU, member states except that under EU rules, under EU law, the law of the EU takes precedence over domestic law in the event of an actual or possible clash of laws.

And opposition to this kind of supranational authority, even if member states agree to it, opposition often takes the, within Member States, often takes the form of aggressive and sometimes violent hostility to citizens of other EU states, who are nevertheless, under EU law, entitled to live and work in any member state. In the United Kingdom, this has occasionally been a very ugly manifestation of hostility towards the EU or towards other EU member states. And it's a form, it's one of the more extreme forms of conservative nationalism that is being expressed here. Now the Conservative Party, one of the major British political parties and the party that has been in office since 2010, the Conservative Party has always been deeply divided over membership of the former EEC and now the EU.

And yet, I mean at the time I wrote this, 2016 or so, when I wrote the first edition of the book, the most visible nationalist party was the UK Independence Party or UKIP. It won 15 per

cent of the votes in the 2015 general election. But under the simple majority, or first past the post, electoral system, it gained only one seat in the House of Commons, the lower chamber of Parliament. Now, its fortunes changed in the 2017 general election - the UKIP vote share amount collapsed to 1.8 percent and the party won no seats. There were other political factors and the electorate were free to make their own decisions on it. UKIP is much less prominent than it used to be and some of its own members formed their own party, a separate party called the Brexit party led by the former MEP, now former MEP, Nigel Farage, (but) if I am not mistaken over that.

But there are other Western countries where forms of ethno-nationalism express conservative nationalism, and are very prominent. These include Germany. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland party, AfD or AFD, has gone from opposing the Eurozone bailout for Greece in 2013 to a much more wide ranging and extreme nationalist position. This involves, this extreme nationalist position involves expressing particular hostility towards Germany's substantial Turkish-descended minority and towards the West Asian refugees, whom the government, the German government has admitted to the country in the last three years or so. I draw that point from the BBC. Some of the AfD's own member's positions have been so extreme that even their first leader Bernd Lucke left the party over its increasing xenophobia. But in 2016, the party took second place in the provincial elections in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. It got 21 per cent as against the Social Democratic Party's 36 per cent. The AfD has repeatedly won seats in other provincial assemblies as well and openly asserts that multicultural, multinational societies cannot work.

Now these are particularly strident forms of conservative nationalism. But they're not the longest-standing in contemporary or recent decades in Western Europe. One of the most successful and long-standing conservative-nationalist parties in continental Europe is the French Front National, or National Front. This was founded in 1972 as an assemblage of far right parties, and it's now a strong national party. The party won several municipalities in the 2014 municipal elections, and it topped the regional elections in 2015, with 28 per cent of the national vote. It also won the French elections to the European Parliament in 2014 with a quarter of the French votes to the European, to that parliament. The party's leader, Marine Le Pen, came second in the first round of the next presidential election - that was held on the 23rd of April 2017, and Marine Le Pen got 21.3 percent of the vote. There was a runoff vote between the first and second - that is the French system - and in the second and decisive round, which was on the 7<sup>th</sup> of May 2017, and well, Emmanuel Macron, who had won the first round with 24.01 percent, won by 66.1 percent to Le Pen's 33.9 percent.

The Front National's main positions are socially conservative and economically protectionist. Economic protection, economic protectionism, as I am sure you know, runs directly counter to the EU's Single European Act; that dates from the old EEC days, and was passed in 1986, or '87. Much of the Front National's support, however, results from its hostility to mass immigration. The party's expressions of this often come close to open Islamophobia, and other forms of racism, and they seem to be based on the idea that large cultural and religious minorities are a threat to French national unity. That's the conservative nationalist element in the Front National's outlook.

Now as this National Front, the French National Front has gained more widespread support, well at the same time the leader has moderated some of the party's more obviously xenophobic positions. She even presided over the expulsion of the previous leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who happens to be her father; his attitudes were very extreme, and he publicly all but denied the Holocaust. Indeed, his reference to Nazi gas chambers, as I quote, "a detail" of the Second World War was what led to his expulsion from the party; that was just too much, too much for the party to take and they threw him out, but certain other countries in Europe continue with extreme forms of xenophobic nationalism.

And one of the most obvious is Hungary. In Hungary the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán started his second term in 2010 on an explicit and extreme nationalist platform, which he calls illiberal democracy. Orbán's Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union - in Hungarian, the Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség - currently rules in coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party. And the two together well, particularly Orbán's party, the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union has espoused positions so extreme that the European Union has warned that Hungary is at risk of suspension from the EU.

So - what does that tell us about the thinking of the current ethno-nationalist, or racist nationalist, or xenophobic nationalist parties in contemporary Europe? There's something very interesting going on here. None of them makes any mention of the fact that for the task of reconstruction after the terrible destruction in the Second World War, almost all the larger European countries - that includes the United Kingdom - imported what amounted in all to several million cheap labourers from extremely poor regions of the world. Those territories included former imperial territories as well as Yugoslavia and Portugal.

Many of the conditions laid down by the European states concerned were extremely restrictive. Germany, for example, made it very difficult, if not impossible, for imported workers or *gastarbeiter* to obtain German citizenship. The obliteration of this fact from European public discourse, or near-obliteration of it, is not, is in effect, not nationalist but



racist and it constitutes racism on a continental scale. But it barely figures in the contemporary European political discourse, and certainly **does** not figure in conservative nationalist discourses in the EU countries and its former - and the former EU country, the United Kingdom.

Well, conservatism, nationalism does have less extreme and less xenophobic forms, and one of its greatest moderate European exponents was probably Charles de Gaulle. He led exiled French forces during the Second World War. And then he was president of France; from 1959, he played a substantial part in creating the French Fifth Republic to end a serious constitutional crisis. So from 1959 he was president of France, president of the Fifth Republic. But de Gaulle's form of conservative nationalism, which he had introduced as head of the Provisional Government towards the end of the war, involved substantial state support for and **the direction** of the economy.

This kind of nationalism seems to appear in established, well-established states, and it shares many of its main contentions, main arguments, with conservatism, such as a view of society as organic. And it - this form nationalism also places great value on the traditions and historical inheritances, which according to conservatism make countries what they are.

The resulting policies can cause tensions even with international allies. De Gaulle, for example, made France an associate member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, from 1965 onwards, and he did this rather than allow France to continue being a full member. One reason was his insistence on France's having an independent defence and foreign policy.

This caused his, de Gaulle's NATO allies, France's NATO allies, a great deal of anger and dismay. They saw it as weakening NATO, which for them was a necessary strategic alliance against the threat of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, also known as the Warsaw Pact. We must remember here that the Warsaw Pact was signed, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was set up in response to the formation of NATO, which I remember it took place in 1949. And the Warsaw Pact was founded a few years later, and actually had an abolition date, which was not that long ago - might have been about 2000 or so or 2004 or 5 if I remember rightly. But certainly, France's decision to become an associate member of NATO did cause the other members a great deal of anxiety and anger.

Well, that's conservative nationalism, and we see plenty of it around us in many different parts of the world. We see many expressions of it, some which are very extreme indeed, and

amount to the expression of severe religious hatred as well as ethno-nationalism and quasi-fascistic racist nationalism or ethnic nationalism.

Well, what about expansionist nationalism? Now this too, is connected with imperialism and fascism. We've already seen that fascism rejects all state boundaries. We've seen the ultra-nationalist element in fascism. Why? All state boundaries are - you know why does expansionist nationalism reject all state boundaries as fascism does? Well, because these are regarded under these concepts as false and artificial creations. They divide and weaken the unity of races. And for fascism as we've seen, racial membership is the defining feature of human membership. Races are the defining units of human membership.

Therefore, according to fascist theory, the superior races must unite across all frontiers. And they must ultimately be assembled into some sort of fascist territory which only they occupy. That process will inevitably involve violent conquest. It also involves mass expulsions, and finally, mass extermination.

Well, aggressive or expansionist nationalism often shows similar tendencies. It had its historical peak in the 18th and 19th centuries, when the major European powers extended their empires across most of the world. This form of expansion was accompanied by often crude but highly popular expressions of racial and cultural superiority, including the conviction that the so-called White races, especially the European ones, had a duty to colonize all others with a view to elevating them morally and culturally.

The British imperialist politician T.B. Macaulay even told Parliament - he was speaking about India - he even told Parliament in 1833 that - I quote - "to have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have ruled them so as to make them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens would indeed be a title to glory all our own." End of quotation.

Other forms of expansionist nationalism have sometimes been expressed in Russia. And they involve the idea that Russians are the, I quote, "natural leaders" of all Slavic peoples. I take the quotation from Heywood. What would that mean? It would mean that all who speak Slavic languages are, in effect, subordinate to the leadership of Russia and Russians. And it will also mean that Slavs are in some way culturally superior to people who inherit other cultures.

Similar claims are made elsewhere - they're made to time from time to time all around the world. They're made in varying cultural and political contexts. And the attitudes concerned

have given rise to particular forms of terminology. One of the words used for expansionist nationalism is “jingoism”; that was coined in the 1870s and means aggressive or militarist nationalism. Another word often used is chauvinism, which is derived from the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a French soldier. He was a French soldier, Nicolas Chauvin, and he was also a fanatical follower of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Well, does that then mean that these are the only forms of nationalism? We need to start looking at some of the responses. We will come to them next time, before we do our worked example, but I’ll cover them briefly here. Nationalism and colonialism, well, do go together. Certain forms of nationalism are direct responses to the experience of colonialism and imperialism. In 1920, Britain ruled a quarter of the land surface of the globe, and 420 million people; that was just under a quarter of the world’s population at the time. France, including its European territories, ruled about a third of the area of the world, and it encompassed about 110 million people.

These were the largest empires yet known in human history. Together with the Dutch and Portuguese empires, they also subjugated and controlled well over half a billion people. And they did so often in conditions of great cruelty and brutality. For example, the Aborigines of Tasmania were exterminated by white invaders; and in a climate of racism and cultural contempt, well, imperial rule has generated lasting bitterness which continues very obviously in our own time.

So too unfortunately do the, do the racism and cultural contempt with which peoples in former imperial powers regard peoples of former subject nations. Despite all the legislation, despite the increasing interconnectedness, obviously, obvious interconnectedness to the world, these attitudes continue on the sides of the imperial powers, among the imperial powers, and also among the former subject powers.

Well, we need not be at all surprised that colonial and imperial rule resulted in the emergence of nationalist movements. We needn’t be at all surprised that colonial imperial rule themselves played a part in creating the idea of nations where before colonial conquest other senses of association and authority had obtained.

A further important element in many of the anti-colonial national liberation movements was a commitment to economic self-determination. This was partly because the modern imperial powers had industrial economies, which needed enormous supplies of raw materials, and which produced far more than their own populations could possibly consume. We’ve seen this in the light of Marx. Well, the imperial powers plundered raw materials from their

colonies, and sold the resulting finished goods back to what were in effect captive markets where the populations were prevented from developing their own productive systems. In India, this is only too familiar - the move by the Indian independence leaders to defy this forced consumption by starting the *swadeshi* movement caused the colonials very great alarm.

Lenin regarded Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, and he also noted that the colonization of markets applies to rivalries between industrialized countries, countries which compete for markets in one another's economies as well. Now the economic element in anti-colonial or postcolonial nationalism often drew on ideas which the colonials themselves largely unintentionally imparted to those colonial leaders who had been to school or who'd done high studies in imperial countries. Academics who founded and taught in universities in the British and French empires also played a part in teaching the philosophic and political ideas of the imperial powers or the intellectual traditions. They too may well have had the effect, these professors may well have had the effect of aiding the developing independence movements among colonized peoples.

Many leaders of the independence movements also saw the inequalities of their own societies as a moral and political evil, and many of them included a strong socialist element in their nationalist campaigns for independence. The resulting political economy ranged from, for example, the broadly social-democratic outlook of Jawaharlal Nehru to the more explicitly Marxist commitments of Hồ Chí Minh in Vietnam, and of Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader.

Perhaps the most extreme form of anti-colonial Marxism was that adopted by Mao Zedong, who led China from 1949 to 1978. We need to remember, however, that leaders like Castro and Che Guevara, as we've seen before, they rejected the Soviet model, even if they were much more explicitly Marxist than, say, the Indian social-democratic leaders.

Now, the specific relation of Mao's politics and the system he created to Marxist analyses of capitalism is a more complex issue and we don't need to cover it here. But we do need to note that India's commitment to social democracy with a broadly state-managed - not state-controlled - economy caused the country's emerging business elites such concern that in 1944, they effectively forced a plan known as the Bombay plan on the Indian National Congress. Under this plan, the state would install the basic infrastructure of a modern economy by the late 1970s and then hand much of this over to the private industrial sector. I've drawn this from the Vijay Prasad's work and from other analyses.

As I've said earlier, Fidel Castro and his fellow revolutionary and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara decided not to follow the Soviet model of political economy and to devise their own, which they considered much more appropriate to Cuban conditions.

Well, these are only a few of many examples which show that anti-colonial nationalism is as complex as any other form of nationalism. Well, that in turn means that proponents of it face political issues just as much as proponents of any other ideology do and that they can be manipulated. Now, in India the colonials often used differences among nationalists to deadly and terrible effect. And we'll come back to these examples next time. We'll pause there. We've looked at forms of nationalism - liberal, conservative, reactionary, expansionist, and anti-colonialist. We have got to the point where we can start looking at specific examples of the ways imperial powers often exploited conditions among their colonial subjects to maintain colonial rule, we'll look at that next time and then we'll go on next time into a worked example. So we'll stop here and we'll catch up next time.