

Introduction to Political Ideologies: Contexts, Ideas, and Practices
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Citizenship as substantive membership of the polity 49:05

Well, good afternoon everyone. We're resuming our NPTEL Ideologies course 2019-20, and we'll continue with our concluding topic, that is the twelfth topic, and it is republicanism and citizenship. We've started it, I'll recap briefly at the point where we ended last time, and we'll go on through the topic today. It'll probably take us at least this lecture and possibly another one and then a worked example after that, very likely.

Well, let's recap where we were. We were in the process of showing how or seeing how contemporary republicanism has emerged in and through severely critical responses to liberalism and the radically insoluble conflicts that liberalism cannot resolve.

So let's recap where we were last time. In practice, liberalism looks very different from the theory allows us wide range of individual rights, of choices protected by rights and liberalism also, on its own self-description, refrains from imposing any substantive theory of human nature.

In practice, of course, things are very different. Liberalism does have a substantive theory of human nature, which is that we are, according to which we are, radical choosers, that is the essence of being human. Well, in practice, of course, liberalism runs into significant problems, even (in), I have argued, as have many others, these are incoherences.

First of all, we're only too familiar with radically insoluble conflicts between positions which seem to have no common ground whatever. In liberalism the rights of a foetus, for example, are often counterposed to the rights of the mother - and abortion then means the foetus loses its rights when the mother's might be upheld; or the other way round, the foetus's rights are upheld, say against those of the mother. And that is a result of putting the issue in terms of rights.

Similarly, a right to a traditional life is often set against the right to choose another way of life, or against, for example, the right of a contractor to pursue their occupation even if it means

building over traditional habitats. So which is to the right of, which right is to be protected - that is the contractor to pursue their lawful occupation, the builder that is or the developer or the right of people living in traditional habitats to maintain their, to live in their traditional habitat, rights to maintain traditional ways of life?

Another example is those, you know of such a clash is between those - and these things happen frequently as do the others. What about those who hold that war is destructive and violent and must be banned and prevented wherever possible - and those who hold that oppressed and colonized peoples have a right to wage war, so as to achieve independence or national self-determination? The UN, as we saw earlier, recognizes our right to self-determination.

A third example of an irresolvable clash, yet another one, is that justice requires that we all have an equal opportunity to develop our talents. And therefore, taxation for public healthcare and public education is necessary to give all of us that opportunity, so that we can exercise the right to develop our talents. But hold on, wait a moment, shouldn't we all be free to incur only the obligations we want to incur? That would imply that taxation should be abolished and we should be free to choose schools and doctors and occupations and whether or not and how much to pay for other people to benefit from same kinds of things that we do.

In India for example, a very familiar complaint is that affirmative action quotas - called reservations in India, as I'm sure you know - affirmative action quotas in India are often claimed to disadvantage those who achieve the target grades for admission to publicly funded universities and colleges or public-sector employment. Now in this kind of case the right to have structural disadvantage recognized is set against the right to be rewarded for achievement.

Well we shouldn't be surprised that the supposed arguments degenerate so quickly into bitterly entrenched positions and mutual hatred if not worse. They were never a argument in the first place, they were really assertions of purported rights. Liberalism, as we saw last time, has no conceptual resources with which to resolve these kinds of difficulties. They are simply impasses or contradictions or - in a fashionable term in the humanities - aporias.

Well what about the actual empirical results of liberalism? Beiner for example, Ronald Beiner has been severely critical of these. Instead of the principle of choice, which according to liberalism we have a right to, instead of that all we see is a, he says, "A shopping mall, culture where vast numbers of shops all sell the same junk."

Much of that may or much of the junk may also be built to manufacture to fail after given time. So we have to go back and buy the newest version, irrespective of the often unrecyclable rubbish that such a practice generates and creates. Well, the upshot then is that reasoned criticism, reasoned analysis, reasoned evaluation of our ways of life becomes impossible. It cannot be done within liberalism.

Now that's very serious, when entire way of life gives cause for concern or much of it does. Beiner himself says, he poses the question like this, he says, "Why should we respect a way of life that is, I quote, "servile, conformist, and unreflective"?" We might add - or even worse than that.

What would it even mean to respect such a way of life? The point I'm recapitulating here is that the dead ends and incoherences have a deeper source in liberalism, and that is the conception of, liberalism's conception of the human being as a radical chooser and nothing else. To be human is to be a chooser. Now this is a substantive theory of human nature, it is a philosophical anthropology and it is a philosophical anthropology of precisely the kind that liberalism requires us to refrain from adopting.

And, in addition, it means that we can't investigate the substance of ways of life. We can't investigate how we've come to need liberation from say feudality or inherited privilege or arbitrary power. Yes, liberalism historically has delivered us from such captivity and that's a great, a mighty achievement.

But it has only delivered us into another sort of captivity and that is the captivity of these sterile and irresolvable oppositions between competing rights. That also means that under liberalism we cannot address, precisely because individual rights are the core of, or at the core of liberalism or at the centre of it, means we cannot address the combination we see all around us - that is, that of private perfection and public squalor or emptiness, because liberalism cannot accommodate

the idea of shared predicaments, unless those are simply chance developments. At that point liberalism can only fall silent.

Now part of the problem, as I've already indicated, is that by accepting choices the essence of personhood, liberalism rules out any substantive enquiry into the content and context of the choice we make. Have we been brain washed, coerced, bullied? Have we been lied to, are we making genuine reasoned informed choices and decisions? That can't be investigated within liberalism because it requires (invest) the investigation of substantive ways of life. And it requires that we look at the of an unintended impact so certain kinds of actions,⁷; it requires that we ask in what ways the rights we insist upon themselves creates these kinds of problems.

Well Beiner and many of the other contemporary republicans excoriate the uniformity under which we live, but liberalism would make it impossible to investigate the commercial pressures which creates that kind of uniformity - which, you know that kind of uniformity results from market pressures. Advertising, for example, is very often the sale of lifestyle rather than substance – it has a lot to do with this. The larger corporations know this, they have colossal advertising budgets, and they mount fierce and often coordinated campaigns against, for example, attempts by states to restrict alcohol and tobacco advertising. This, well, tobacco advertising has been banned in a number of countries, actually banned. And a number of countries - I think certain Scandinavian countries and now Scotland - have minimum alcohol pricing. In other words, the choice is still available to people to consume tobacco and alcohol but it is severely discouraged by state policy.

Now even within particular markets, commercial pressures have a no less insidious effect. We might need a free and diverse media for liberal societies. But commercial pressures mean that, this is well documented, that media outlets consistently, are under commercial pressure to cut staff. And they become more more dependent on official and corporate press releases as we have seen. Now the result is that we end up less and less well informed about the major issues facing us and often simply unaware of major issues which the mass media choose not to mention at all for whatever reason they may be commercial, they may not, we don't know.

And as a result contemporary republicans have attempted to identify constructive responses which enable us to, simply to circumvent the sterility of liberalism. Well, many of them have

referred back to Aristotle, the great Greek philosopher, 384 to 322 BCE. And for Aristotle we are speakers of language, we are therefore reasoning beings and that's what makes us *zōa politika*.

What does that mean? It means that, yes, we live and start with the fact of disarrangement and well, that means asking what these disagreements are about. Abortion is almost a canonical example, the sterile positions for and against it in a rights discourse exclude, those sterile positions exclude the circumstances in which conception occurred. You know, was the conception and at a result of forced sex such as coerced or coercion or rape? Was it the result of less obvious forms of coercion such as an absence of sex education to people of all ages including children and young people – that's done in a great many countries in the global North. What about this, do people have access to good contraceptive advice and services, do they conceive as a result of patriarchal cultures in which women are expected to conceive until they have a male child? - and so on.

Now investigating all those issues requires learning about the world we live in, and it means being prepared to reason our way towards a faculty of practical wisdom as doctors call this 'phronesis', a faculty of practical wisdom or practical judgment. That means engaging with the public issues we face - learning about them and learning from and participating in public discourse or public discourses on the kinds of issues we face.

Citizenship is therefore an activity and not just a status. In the Aristotelian sense of the term it also relieves us of the burden of being saints, of being perfect people who always do good things and behave well all the time. It means recognizing weakness and its impact; it means being wherever we can, honest about weakness and temptation and our susceptibility.

And it means that there's no fixed boundary for the public space, we've seen how greatly our sense of the political has expanded even in relatively recent times. Feminism is certainly done that for us, it's a priceless contribution feminism has made to our sense not only to ourselves but therefore to our sense of the political. Similarly, the way we treat the natural environment has become part of our political space. It is, it had better be, it is a matter now of our survival in the relatively short term.

And in addition, we will be familiar with the ways in which Marx, for example, is just one figure, in showing us the extent of structural disadvantage and discrimination in all democratic societies, however, democratic they might look. But what, what is the nature of the space, what is the space in which we engage in this kind of reasoning activity, it is the space of politics.

For Aristotle politics is the supreme human activity, the architectonic activity. It is what integrates and makes sense of our roles or our other roles in society, and enables us to identify what it is to be fully human. Well, we might and we should wonder what this has to do with the politics we see around us all the time. We see corruption, unscrupulous conduct, violence, mass slaughter, lying, brutality everywhere; if that 's the world of politics, is that what Aristotle means, no.

Aristotle and his inheritors mean something vastly different. What they recognize and advise us - show us we need to recognize is that we need to pay far more attention to what is happening in the political space including our systems of state, our legal and judicial processes and so on at every level. We would need, of course, to transform our public institutions and our laws and systems of state very greatly.

Can this be done? Well, there are powerful forces against it - we're going to look at the idea of illiberal democracy to start with. This term seems to be coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997, in an article Zakaria wrote for the journal *Foreign Affairs*. He identifies a problem which we have noted above, and that is that it is not enough for liberal political systems to stop by institutionalizing or stop with institutionalization of certain values and certain types of political organization. Okay, among these are free and fair elections, the separations of powers between elected assemblies, you know, that is the executive branch of government, the judiciary and the legislature. It's not enough just to have the separation of powers. The point is that, Zakaria and many others have pointed out, that many of the essential features of such systems such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of property even need to be protected.

Liberalism requires the protection of all those. Now Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria calls this second side protection constitution liberalism. He cites Philippe C. Schmitter as saying that such

constitutional liberalism has never been unambiguously linked with the practice of democracy. We have not often had those kinds of protection.

Now Zakaria was writing in the mid to late 90s, at a time when any number of dictatorships around the world were being replaced by democracies. And he concludes that most if not all of the emerging democracies are procedurally democratic but they, in fact have, I quote, “strong executives, weak legislatures and weak judiciaries and few civil and economic liberties.”

For Zakaria, it is not acceptable to claim that such forms of executive power are sometimes described as necessary for the elimination of rigid social stratification, or of powerful established interests such as institutionalized religions or landed or corporate wealth. In many developing countries and increasingly in the developed world, as we know, that kind of wealth is tightly concentrated in corporate or family hands.

Now there are sets of conditions under which we live. We now live in a world permeated by permanent and apparently limitless electronic surveillance by virtually every state in the world. Moreover this a world in which open expressions of racial and religious hatred are once again part and parcel, also it seems, of life in western and many other democracies.

In that kind of world, Zakaria’s distinction between constitutional liberalism and democracy many well looked look much less convincing then it might have looked in the late 1990s. We also need to remember that much of the repressive legislation involved has been passed almost unquestioned by impeccably elected legislatures. There are examples - plenty of them; the U.S. Homeland Security Act and The Patriot Act were both later criticized for unconstitutional provisions. And if I'm not mistaken the Obama Administration allowed some of the time limited or sunset clauses in that, in those pieces of legislation to lapse quietly, they do not repeal them openly, they just let them lapse. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 2000, gave a large number of public bodies at different levels almost unlimited powers of electronic surveillance.

The British Parliament passed a further a law, The Investigatory Powers Act, in 2016. More recently the British government has started to require that publicly funded schools decide and record the ethnic background of their pupils. That was a procedure which used to be carried out

by state officials in the now abolished apartheid South Africa. In the UK the data of collection has been outsourced to a private firm. If parents do not disclose a child's ethnic background, the schools have been told, I quote, "to guess the background." That comes from a paper by Pells, P-E-L-L-S, 2016. I'm not sure if that practice has since been abandoned, but the practice of officials deciding people's ethnic background or racial background was a feature of apartheid South Africa as well.

So today Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria would have even more evidence of the spread of illiberal democracy than he did at the time. Now that has of course been noted. Yascha Mounk points out the ways in which several apparently stable democracies, including wealthy western ones, have seen the rise of populist and often demagogic politicians. Mounk cites Donald Trump, of course, who won the election and is a candidate for the next one later this year. The French leader of the *Front National*, The National Front Marine Le Pen, the far right Dutch politician Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders are all cited as examples by Mounk. Mounk also mentions the British referendum vote on the 23rd of June 2016 to leave the European Union. He is blunt about the political opportunism of those who use, for example, terrorist attacks or attempted coups to advance their own brands of xenophobic or ethno-nationalist politics. Mounk specifically names Marine Le Pen's reaction to mass killing in Nice by a man driving a stolen truck during the Bastille Day celebrations on the city's, into the city's promenade on the 14th of July 2016. He goes into detail over the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's swift centralization of power after the failed coup that month, July 2016. Erdoğan dismissed thousands of people, apparently not for anything they had done but for what they might have thought. And including university professors, civil servants, all kinds of people and that effectively put an end to a long standing Turkish dispensation under which a secular or a secularist elite had legislated to protect religious and ethnic minorities, and a reasonable of varying variable amount of journalistic and academic criticism.

Similar processes have been very obviously working in Hungary and Poland as well. And those countries' elected governments have 'swiftly undermined the constitutional courts'. They 'stacked government institutions like the electoral commission with party loyalists and have turned the most important media outlets into uncritical propaganda machines.' That's a quotation from Monk, from Mounk rather.

This is of course much more than just a matter of political climate. Yascha Mounk rightly identifies the enormous democratic deficit in the European Union, where three of the four major institutions - that is, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice - barely figure in the consciousness of over five hundred and twenty million EU citizens, even though those bodies' decisions have an enormous impact throughout the EU - throughout the EU, that is the law in the EU. Mounk is also equally right when he points out that the only elected EU institution, the European Parliament, is elected on tiny turnouts, sometimes of 30 percent turnout or under, or less, and has, well, hardly any publicity in the rest of the European Union; that does vary across the across the EU anyway.

Well the European parliament also has few if any formal powers, but it does have powers that it can use, so that's a slightly unfair comment on Mounk's part. The European Parliament, under the treaty of Maastricht, the European Parliament can, well - sees all draft EU law - which is drafted by the European Commission; that's the only drafting body in the EU. The European parliament sees all this, that's the law under the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the EU, turned the EC into the EU. And the European parliament can reject or amend any such draft before the draft goes to the actual lawmaking body, that is the Council of Ministers. This is called the co-decision procedure.

Secondly, the European parliament can dismiss all the European Commissioners. On the one occasion it would almost certainly have done so over a substantial corruption scandal, the commissioners resigned *en bloc*; some were reappointed, who were – had not been, clearly not been involved in the corruption of which the others had not been accused, about 23 or 25 commissioners.

Furthermore, the debate on the EU's democratic deficit has actually been under way for a considerable time. Reforms have been proposed and there has been fierce public criticism of the EU's subordination to highly secretive and very powerful corporate bodies. For example, the European Parliament very rarely uses the co-decision procedure and instead allows almost all draft legislation through under the much less stringent consultation procedure.

But - Mounk nevertheless concludes that the problems faced by liberal democracy as it turns into illiberal democracy constitute only one half of the problem. The other half is what he calls

the tendency of the elites in liberal democracies to see themselves as in effect having to protect liberal democracy against the worst populist movements and the worst populist motivations. Mounk calls this undemocratic liberalism, and he says it is part of the cause of ordinary people's bitter sense of remoteness and alienation from their own apparently thoroughly democratic systems. As we saw in the chapter on liberalism, the elitist tendency and a profound fear and distrust of the public are inherent in liberal theory and in supposedly liberal democracies.

Now Mounk says that historically liberalism and democracy only came together coincidentally, that is during the first three decades after Second World War, when enormous inequalities were significantly reduced and hundreds of millions of people, especially in industrial countries, experienced previously unimaginable improvements in their lives - not just their standard of living, in their whole lives.

But - Mounk does not mention the role of the state or mass trade union membership in bringing this about. Neither does he mention the impact of vastly expanded public provision in education and health care at every level in such countries. In respect of health care of course, the exception is the United States, despite the more recent passage of the Affordable Care Act by the Obama administration.

But - Mounk's explanation, however, relies on what he considers only a historical coincidence. And that is the improvement in material conditions in relations of production, in industrial countries after the Second World War. That may be a Marxist or quasi-Marxist explanation. Zakaria for his part makes little or no mention of such material conditions as forming a decisive context for the coincidence of liberalism and democracy. But like Mounk he sees the collapse or imminent collapse, Zakaria sees the eminent collapse of liberal democracy as alarming and very dangerous for the whole world. Given the alternatives on offer, some of which a lot of leaders, may be about to impose on some of them - on us too - given the alternatives on offer, their alarm and their anxiety are entirely understandable.

Mounk, of course, was writing twenty years after Zakaria writing in 2015 or '16, very much in our own time, and he sees an urgent need for us to restate and protect the ends of liberalism. But - substantive ends are precisely the kinds of things that liberalism cannot allow itself to propound.

We've seen that problem above in the chapter on Liberalism and earlier, we've seen it earlier in the liberalism chapter and also in this topic, republicanism and citizenship.

Now there's a further set of problems for our predicament as outlined by Zakaria and Mounk and they are certainly not the only two, I have just drawn from them because they are fairly clear and fairly direct. There's a further set of problems and Zakaria and Mounk both neglect the way hundreds of millions around the world have come to think they're faced by threats like permanent debt, unemployment or underemployment, and even the obliteration or overrunning of their own cultures.

How is it that they have come to think that only some kind of powerful leader who promises to assert cultural, religious or ethnic or racial homogeneity can save them? Well, the single greatest source of our knowledge, if knowledge is the right word, of the world is the largely corporate and mass media; that's been thoroughly documented around the world. But, Zakaria and Mounk, well neither Zakaria nor Mounk seems to pay much attention to the part played by the mass media in creating our current sense of our situation.

Of course, there have been other - people written powerful and sharp analyses of the media's part and our sense of our problems, and many of those have been written by very experienced journalists, Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Edwards and Cromwell, 2006 and 2012, Dan Rather, a famous journalist 2011, McChesney and Nichols 2005, Nichols and McChesney, 2013. There is plenty of work around this is in work all over the world in almost all even reasonably serious democracies.

And yet neither Zakaria nor Mounk seem to pay much attention to the media's part in creating our sense of our current situation. But all is not lost and in spite of challenges, and threats and other problems including commercial issues, the mass media broadly under the complementary term, under the umbrella term, I beg your pardon, under the umbrella term complementary media have emerge mainly on the internet.

I've written about this myself, other people have covered it as well, in much greater detail than I have. Well, the point is that there have been reactions, and similarly examples of public involvement often show that when ordinary people, almost irrespective of their background,

have the chance to address public issue seriously, they can and frequently do engage openly and seriously with the issues before them to reach very sound decisions.

In 2000, the Canadian province of British Columbia used a form of nearly random selection to create a 160-members citizens' assembly. That assembly considered several different electoral systems and then decided on a particular one to replace the existing simple majority or first past the post system.

The existing system had twice in succession in provisional elections in British Columbia, the existing simple majority system had twice in successive elections produced anomalous results for the, in the elections for the province's assembly. In 1996, the liberal party won the popular vote; they got 41.8 percent of the vote against the New Democrats 30.5. But the liberal party lost the election, because they won fewer seats.

In 2000, four years later, the Liberals won 77 out of 79 assembly seats, but they only won 57.6 percent of the vote. In that election, the New Democrats won 21.6 percent of the vote, one-fifth, but the won only 2 out of 79 seats. The Green Party got 12.4 percent of the vote and won no seats at all. The result was a one-party assembly in a climate of declining public confidence in the formal political process.

The public were deeply disturbed about this - and in response, the incoming provisional government created this citizens' assembly. The assembly received funding and administrative support from the provisional government, from the civil servants, who were delegated to assistant advice. The members had initial training at weekends, and then they held over 50 public hearings all round the province. And they concluded with six more meetings.

The assembly discussed several different electoral systems. And then they recommended by vote of 123 to 31 that the province change to a proportional system based on the single transferable vote. The members chose criteria for any electoral system from a list of 9 different systems, and they decided, I beg your pardon, the members of the assembly chose criteria from a, for an electoral system from a list of nine.

And they decided that the main criteria were - effective local representation, a fair proportional way of translating votes into seats, and maximum voter choice. Those were their main criteria for an electoral system. Crucially, all the evidence was that they made a reasoned and intelligible choice based on deepening knowledge of the subject. And they did this without collapsing into aggregates of opinion or vote-banks.

There's a lot of documentation on that. Now, there are other ways of getting citizens involved. In India, the state of Maharashtra is one where the central government's National Rural Health Mission – NRHM - has drawn upon local Non-Governmental organizations, NGOs, to help include citizens as monitors of the health mission. The mission itself was started in April 2005 as a response to a health care system, if the word system is at all applicable here, which was widely acknowledged to be a national disgrace and that is widely said in public. The NRHM specifically mandates community monitoring. And it states that community monitoring cannot be implemented by state health department officials alone. It is largely the officials concerned who must be monitored, and that's in the NRHM. This involves a change in the balance of power between ordinary people and the officials.

The plan explicitly intends, the community monitoring plan explicitly intends that ordinary people have and authoritative voice in evaluating the mission and in influencing decisions, in the national health mission document 2013. Now there's a Pune-based NGO called SATHI, which notes that community based monitoring or CBM generates popular pressure on officials to maintain the quality of services.

And it independently generates information about the functioning of health services that the standard management systems almost always miss. These include things like whether or not doctors actually turn up, whether or not nursing staff make the outreach visits they are supposed to make. It also includes the way staff behave towards patients, it includes prescription practices, it covers corruption and denial of care, or orders to patients to go to private providers.

And it covers illegal charges demanded by staff from patients. I've got that from the CBM report 2012, and a report by a researcher called Kakde 2010. These are all public documents, they're on the net. Now it is you know, we should not be surprised that when the CBM - Community

Based Monitoring - was started, ideas of what it would involve varied very greatly. Even NGOs saw the task as data generation and form-filling.

The villagers insisted on having more open-ended questions, so that they could state their perceptions of the way the NRHM was being implemented. Well, the creation of a newsletter across the districts together with media coverage of the public hearings or Jan Sunwais, literally 'people's hearings' - that may have helped here, and may have helped the villagers to get more information and insist that they have a say in the kinds of questions that were asked about the workings of the system.

Now, the very fact of public hearings at a range of levels from Primary Health Care – PHC - to district level was crucial. It revealed some embarrassing failures in the way the NRHM worked. And it exposed other gaps in the system, but significant improvements resulted. And they seem to have resulted without the creation of the grossly excessive, burdensome, and destructive monitoring systems which are inevitable in managerialist régimes.

It may be equally significant that the NRHM requires the lowest tier of government in India's constitution, the village panchayats, to be involved in the monitoring process. Now as time went by the citizens started to participate in planning the services, and officials' dismay, even shock, at the very idea of such involvements started to fade. It is also crucial that the quality of citizen involvement improved as citizens came to know more about the official systems and powers -

And about the funding systems involved, that's in the Kakde report as well. Even many of the doctors in the NRHM had no idea about such matters as the citizens identified. And similar benefits from citizen involvement have been noted in, for example, a citizen journalism initiative called *Iindaba Ziyafika*, which was conducted jointly by the South African newspaper *Grocott's Mail* and the Rhodes University School of Journalism and Media at Grahamstown in Natal.

That project was time-limited as funding was provided only for a set period. But similar benefits of, from citizen involvement were noted in that particular project. And one implication is that citizenship as informed engagement is inherently egalitarian, as we're all reasoning beings and therefore, equal and respect of that capacity or faculty. A further implication is that inequalities and the processes which generate and maintain them would need to be publicly justified. The

public to whom those inequalities would have to be justified would inevitably include victims of the relevant processes and structures and inequalities.

This egalitarian character of the idea of citizenship as informed engagement, this egalitarian feature of it amounts to a, or say egalitarian character of it amounts to a development and republican thought since Aristotle. Aristotle is often criticized for accepting the exclusion of women and slaves from citizenship, and for holding that were only those who can afford the time that is those who have the wealth and leisure to reflect on public matters are entitled to be citizens. I draw that point, I've summarized it from a paper by Mulgan, written in 2000. Now, Aristotle does seem to recognize that this would exclude, he did does recognize that this would exclude large numbers of men who have to make their living through labor or trade and commerce, but who would otherwise be fit for citizenship, Mulgan makes that point too. Aristotle does also say that, domestic equality is the closest private approximation to public justice. Today we would probably not accept either of those exclusions - of women or of large numbers of men who haven't the wealth and leisure so to be to reflect on public affairs. We would probably rightly reject both of those features and today's republican theories rightly regard gender equality as an inherent element in citizenship.

Indeed citizenship would, well, would be unintelligible without it. And it would be unintelligible without the element of universal entitlement to citizen membership that characterizes all democracies today, despite efforts by some of them to restrict entitlement to citizenship to those who are already, no doubt, almost certainly lawfully resident. This has happened in more countries one by the way.

Now this also means that we don't need to concern ourselves excessively with whether or not Aristotle is a recognizable social democrat or a liberal by today's standards, or a conservative supporter of the established order. That issue has been debated by Aristotle scholars such as Richard Mulgan and Martha Nussbaum. But it is not a directly pertinent to our concerns here.

What we need to do instead is to see where Aristotle's recognition that we are reasoning beings and therefore *zoa politika* takes us. It certainly takes us far beyond Aristotle's historically contingent limitation of the entitlement to citizenship. The point here is that severe inequalities, including structural and systemic inequalities, would almost certainly undermined any wide

sense of citizenship in which I have outlined it here. Severe structural and systemic inequalities would render, would make it unintelligible and perhaps seem impossible to think of any sense of shared predicaments. In very unequal society that's often very obvious. Elites often buy themselves out of the effects of grossly dysfunctional public processes and public institutions. Well, this we have seen with the Ecologism topic, the elites probably cannot buy themselves indefinitely out of the diseases and dangers caused by water or air pollution and they cannot indefinitely buy themselves locations, away from sites of things like radioactive contamination, they can't do it indefinitely. And as for distributional or material inequality, this cannot be separated from, cannot be separated from wide a questions of the mode of production.

But - there is no justification for removing that kind of issue from serious and open examination by citizens. Any serious discourse on such a topic would furthermore need to abandon the current promises or assumptions of ever-increasing wealth and ever-increasing consumption, we saw that with the Ecologism topic anyway. Well, what such a field of discourse could well do on the other hand is to initiate serious examination of what we produce and how we produce it, and of what we consume and how we consume it.

Under liberalism these would be matters of private preference. And the state would be seen as a permanently alien and potentially hostile institution. But, under the idea of republicanism such matters air pollution, water pollution, severe structural and material, other material inequalities become matters of public concern and decision. That in turn means the boundary between the public and the private is itself to be decided by reasoned public consideration.

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